

## LECTURE III.

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### THE WORKS OF GOD.

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#### SECTION I.—HISTORY OF CREATION.

WITH the infinite variety of objects and purposes exhibited in the Universe, there is a prevailing uniformity and sufficient resemblance in the physical and moral world to indicate the identity of the Creator. In the moral, as in the physical world, blessings are reserved in one field for another. Nations are depositories of blessings for other nations, and individuals are made the messengers of good to others. Egypt supplied a large territory with food, and the Greeks held the elements of civilization for the world. So the Israelites, by their constitution, location, and surroundings, were the chosen people for preserving the doctrine of divine unity in the midst of polytheism, and the purpose and promises of the system of atonement in the center of false religions and vain philosophy. By their offerings and sacrifices they kept the hope of redemption before the eyes of the world. As the farmer must preserve his seeds, and the general his supplies, so the Jewish nation required special care, not for their merit, but for the good of the world whose only hope was in the coming Messiah.

For this reason they were God's chosen people. Moses was an inspired Jewish writer, and probably had special reference to the position of his people and ancestors in the history of creation. And their known relations to the pa-

triarchs who received the promises of God respecting the future and the Christ justified this conclusion. And yet, in doing this he not only vindicates the divine parentage of his people and their obligations but the universal fatherhood of God. The presentation of the Creator as the father of the Israelites and as the creator of all things, and the implied claims of such a God upon all men, seem to be the triple objects of this wonderful history. In accomplishing these purposes but few facts are given, but these facts reach back into the invisible eternity of the past, and into all the endless consequences of the "dominion" and "subduing" of the earth in the future. In this brief history we have the simple fact of universal creation. That this includes the material of all things is evident. (a) Whatever is without beginning must be independent. Every particle of matter is dependent, and therefore had a beginning. (b) It has been generally believed, especially by Christians of all ages. This belief must rest upon nature or revelation, and in either case has a good foundation. Whatever is involved in nature is true. And so is supernatural revelation. Only upon one or both of these grounds can a belief so universal be accounted for. (c) The language of the Bible vindicates this position. "The word of the Lord" and "The breath of his mouth" were the elementary principle of creation. It was not matter. (See Psa. 33: 6.) "For by faith the worlds were framed, so that things are *not made of things which do appear*" (Heb. 11: 3). They could not have been made from eternal matter, for matter is the most apparent thing imaginable. (See John 1: 3.) Matter is something or nothing. If it is something, then he who made "all things" must have made matter; if nothing, then the whole theory of religion and philosophy is a farce. We do not know how he made matter, nor how he made matter into its various forms, nor how life and spirit are produced. Indeed, no man knows the nature and essence of matter. We only know something of its forces, forms, and laws; *i.e.*, its phe-

nomena. We do not escape difficulties and mysteries by affirming the eternity of matter and assuming that creation only means the shaping of what existed from all eternity independent of God. But whether this creation is direct or by evolution, is not theologically essential. And yet it may be well for even scientists to be philosophical in this matter. Everything is necessary or contingent, caused or uncaused. All motion is caused and implies causal force. The assumption that motion is a law of matter is without the least foundation. Every particle of matter, organic or inorganic, is dependent; therefore, for every change, mechanical, chemical, or vital, there must be a cause, and a first cause, which is supernatural. Whether this work is accomplished by a thousand changes through various different states and evolutions, or by direct miracle at once, is not material. If God fixed the laws involved, set in motion the star dust producing the revolutions, and the molten mass from the disintegration of which the soils are formed and life produced, the creation is as real as if by direct word of power. But there are some difficulties in the way of this theory of evolution. No experience or testimony has ever furnished any proof of the change of species or transitions of that kind. There is no proof of vital cells in inorganic matter, nor of organic life, vegetable or animal, without such cells. Agassiz, probably the best authority upon earth with reference to embryology and the source of life, says there is no life known without germinal cells. And there is no proof that vegetable cells have ever produced animal life. (*d*) That animal cells have produced intellectual life is still more improbable. There are three impassable, unbridged chasms in the field of nature which natural forces have never spanned: between inorganic matter and vegetable life, between vegetable organism and animal life, and between animal life and intellectual beings. None but the Creator works across these gulfs, and if there are subterranean passages not yet known, they are those which natural forces and finite powers cannot pass. They

are formed by the Almighty, who must, in the nature of the case, still be honored as the Creator. The reasoning from what is assumed to be the remnant of caudal appendages or other organs of former species is about as consistent as the assumption that, because the special marks of the wagon maker are seen in the coach as in the buggy, therefore the coach was made from the buggy. Such resemblances may prove the oneness of the maker, but cannot prove the descent of the works. Manufacturers frequently have some peculiar mark on their works that prove they were all made by one man, but to assume that these different works necessarily proceeded one from the other is absurd. So if there are different points of resemblance in different types of animal life, it is absurd to assume that one is thus proved to have been the product of the other. We thus arrive at the conclusion that the entire universe is the work of God. The single leaf no less than the shining sun, the work of their reproduction and successive generation, are all the work of God who planned the whole from the beginning. This law embraces all the suns, stars, and planets of the heavens. But this sublime portion of creation we leave to the astronomer; it does not necessarily belong to theological discussion. The physical formations and forces of the earth may be left to the geologist, chemist, and naturalist, while we pass on to notice particularly those works of God which are mental and take on moral character.

In theology we refer to relations from which spring the obligations and the character of intelligent beings. Confining ourselves to those portions of the works of God, let it be observed that angels are a portion of his works. Some deny the doctrine of angels, upon the ground that they are not discerned by the senses. But neither the reason, the memory, nor the affections of the mind are so discerned. Indeed, there are many invisible forces that are recognized by the senses only, in results, and not immediately. So the fact that angels are not seen or heard or otherwise known by the

senses, ordinarily, is no proof of their non-existence. But the most common objection to the doctrine of angels is the affirmation that the ignorant and superstitious believe in them and are blindly given to that assumption. To this it may be replied that they are no more confident of this than of the events which we know are true. To suppose things are false because ignorant men believe them, would be to deny the most common facts in life, which are generally believed by ignorant men. It is not true that this belief in angelic life and agency is confined to ignorant and superstitious men. In proof of this doctrine, we affirm (1) that the general order and gradations of life in nature indicate their probable existence. If we look upon life as upon an inclined plane, we see the portions below man crowded with beings. Next to man is the highest order of animals, and throughout the whole realm of existence below him there is one vast and continuous range of life. Indeed, it seems as though the Creator had economized space and duration, using every portion of both for animal existence just as far as possible. As we walk up that grade amidst the innumerable multitudes of beings, to man, we then look upon a wider field of higher elevation between man and God, and ask if all that space is unoccupied. Is man the last being in the catalogue? Is it not probable that there are innumerable beings above man and between man and God? We argue that if space and time are occupied thus closely by the lower grade of beings, they are probably occupied above by the higher grade. (2) Such has been the belief of all nations with scarcely an exception. Under different names, titles, and distinctions, men have always and everywhere believed in beings superior to themselves, and generally in the ultimate and higher Spirit above all. Thus virtually by their demons, monsters, and saints, have they peopled the whole realm between the human and divine. This shows that the doctrine cannot be absurd or unnatural. (3) The general influence of the doctrine is favorable to human welfare. It gives a higher con-

ception of the Creator and his works. As everybody knows that the constitution and faculties of man present a higher expression of divine wisdom and dignity than the clam, so to believe in angels is to believe in that which suggests a higher and more sublime power of the Creator. The doctrine also gives a better conception of man's destiny. As there are beings higher than man, and man is a progressive being, it suggests vast possibilities in the field of knowledge, improvement, and growth. The doctrine also encourages the pious (Psa. 91: 11, 12; Matt. 18: 10; Col. 1: 14; Heb. 12: 22). We do not know the precise work and mission of the angels, but they are the "Messengers of God"—"ministering" spirits to the saints. (4) The Biblical references to angels in connection with prophecies, miracles, and moral efforts, as well as the resurrection and judgment, prove their existence and importance in God's kingdom (Gen. 32: 24; Job 15: 15; Acts 5: 19; 8: 26; 10: 3; 12: 7; 23: 8). Angels are spoken of in seventy-two instances in the Old Testament and one hundred and thirty-six places in the New Testament. This must suffice as evidence of the simple fact of angelic existence, which is as far as it is proposed to go in this chapter. Their nature, work, responsibility, and liability to fall will be referred to hereafter.

#### SECTION II.—THE CREATION OF MAN.

1. HIS ORIGIN. When God had created the heavens and the earth, the world and all that is therein, he said, "Let us make man." The sun, moon, and stars were shining in their new glory, and seeds planted in the earth were bringing forth after their kind." The sea was teeming with its multitudes of brilliant life; the birds were singing their songs of praise; animals were walking forth in their new fields of life and luxury; and now was to be brought out the ruler of all these things; one who was to "have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the fowls of the air, over the cattle and over all the earth, over every creeping thing that creep-

eth upon the earth." "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them."

That this creation was directly the work of God is evident from the language of history itself. It is also evident from man's own consciousness. We know that we exist and that we are still dependent, and yet distinct from other beings. Our existence being beyond question, our dependence certainly renders it certain that there must be some creator, the author of being. Man could not have created himself; he could not have been the product of a being less than himself. This consciousness of dependence leaves the voice of consciousness almost beyond question in support of the doctrine of Divine agency in his creation; and the fact that there is no product of mind from matter, nor change from lower things to higher forms and species, leaves it certain that man was the work of God. But there are numerous Scripture references putting it clearly in that light. "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2: 4, 7). If any language can convey the idea of direct force and agency, this conveys that idea. The close connection of the different changes effected from the dust of the ground, the physical formation, and the breathing of life for the living soul, indicates that this work was immediate, and not through any other forms of being. It will be noticed that here is a special Divine operation not manifest in any other part of creation. By his "word" he made the trees, the fish, the birds, the animals, and called them "very good." But here after completing the physical work, he breathed the breath of life, thus communicating a new life distinct from other lives. (See Ex. 4: 11; Job 35: 10.) "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? he that formed the eye, shall he not see?" (Psa. 94: 9.) This language refers the distinct senses directly to the creating power of God. "Have we not all one Father? hath not

one God created us?" (Mal. 2: 10.) "He giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth" (Acts 17: 26). We here have not only the declaration of the Divine creation of man, but the declaration of man's original unity. It has been sometimes affirmed that Adam was the father of the Jews or a section of the human family, and that other races and nations have their own parental origin. This language, as well as the original account of creation, would seem to contradict that assumption and leave the conclusion as generally held, especially in Christian countries by almost all Christian philosophers, that all spring from one original parentage. It is true there are great distinctions and differences among different races of men; it is also true that great changes are seen within the range of history, produced by climate, modes of life, etc. But yet the leading characteristics of men are the same throughout all the world and in all ages. "Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning, made them male and female?" (Matt. 19: 4.) Thus Christ declared that man was made at the beginning, and in that phrase "beginning" must indicate a definite time when both were created. (See 1 Cor. 11: 8-12; 1 Tim. 2: 18.) In these passages different inferences may be drawn with reference to the relative position of man and woman, but the fact of the creation of both, and that the woman was created from the man, is positively declared. In reference to the creation of the woman from the man it should be noticed that the word translated "rib" may simply mean "side." But although the same figurative import is possible in that language, yet there is nothing absurd nor especially astonishing in the simple statement of the fact as it is. All human flesh, in the processes of nature, is the result of distinctive, constitutional changes, and if God miraculously took a piece of the flesh of man from which to create the woman, there is nothing so startling or absurd as infidels would have us believe. The transference of skin



and flesh from one part of the human system to another is a common surgical operation for the increase of beauty and utility. If the Creator, who has arranged the laws of nature for the development of human flesh by natural means, should appropriate a portion of that flesh miraculously for the consummation of the greatest work in the universe, there can be nothing unreasonable in it. Many other passages convey the same idea of direct Divine agency, to deny which is to deny the voice of consciousness in reference to our dependence, the voice of science as indicating the period of man's abode upon the earth, the voice of universal belief which places the origin of man somewhere in the hands of Divinity. It leads us to conclude that man is the work of God's miraculous power.

II. HIS NATURE. The simple aspect of man is a duality, body and mind. This distinction has been recognized by all men in all times, places, and circumstances, and is involved in all languages, literature, business, and laws. To deny it is to deny common consciousness and common sense. Man has a body and a soul; but other distinctions belong also to these two grand divisions of the powers of human nature. The body is a wonderfully constructed machine with parts and powers innumerable, with means of support and continuance, mysterious beyond all conception. Its relations to the various growths and substances on which it depends for renewal of fiber and strength, show its relative superiority to all other material works. Nothing in the physical works of God excels in adaptation and design the human system. But these things belong to the anatomist and physiologist.

With the material body, man possesses *animal instincts*. These instincts are immaterial, possessing no parts that can be dissected, weighed, or measured; they are very susceptible, and capable of exerting great influence upon the mind and body. They are not a subject of perception; we simply know of their existence by internal experience. The mind

takes cognizance of the existence of these powers. All matter is the subject of perception; we perceive substance, form, and color, but there is no perception of instinct. It is an internal force, producing internal phenomena. It differs from mind in that the intellect moves always in a logical trinity; having one fact, another is stated or assumed, and the "therefore of reason" is the process of all mental action. Instinct has an impulse, and strikes direct for its gratification. The instinct seems sometimes to reason, but upon a closer examination it is found to be only following a track of necessity, having no power of choice, but an affinity, as water seeks the lowest level, and electricity the farthest end of the coiled wire. The instinct sometimes is moved by the associations, as in fear or appetite, but this is only by recurrence, and not by memory. An animal having once been frightened or injured in a certain place will show fear when in that place; and so, many times men will find a recurring sensation which differs from actual memory. There is no evidence that the animal ever reflects upon the past or anticipates the future. The future is never feared or longed for by the instinct. The animal is sometimes said to be ashamed or to show guilt, but never unless there has been harm experienced, and then by the recurrence of instinctive nature the impression is repeated. The water is turned down hill, and the wind is guided in its currents, and so the instinct is moved in its course, but not by volition. It is by the necessity of its nature and conditions. So we see that the instinct differs from the mind in these particulars: it is destitute of reason, reflection, hope, conscience, and the power of choice. Yet man possesses these instincts in common with all the animals under his control. They are parts of human nature, to be recognized and governed, utilized and enjoyed. This is the seat of appetite for food, drink, and sleep, and of many of the elementary principles of maternal, filial, and social affections. Man eats, drinks, and sleeps like other animals; he feels sudden emotions and impulses, regardless

of reason or conscience, like the animal. Instinct receives impressions but not ideas, and its language expresses emotion but not thought. It is frequently in strong habits positively against the will and judgment. When allowed control over the man, it leads to all kinds of misery and crime. When controlled by the conscience and judgment, it is a source of joy and comfort, and may be at last for the highest purposes of life. That this is a part of human nature is evident from the following considerations:

1. It seems necessary to animal life. There are no animals entirely destitute of it. Man possesses the animal functions in the body. It would seem absolutely impossible to have such life without the accompanying instinct.

2. We should argue, *a priori*, that this is necessarily required in man's compound nature, for the connection of soul and body. There is no life without it; in matter there are no links or laws like those of mind, and how mind can take hold of muscle we cannot tell. Neither can we tell exactly by assuming the existence of instinct; but the assumption of these powers certainly supplies a rational connecting link between matter and mind wherever the two are found existing together.

3. We have the most striking proof, perhaps, of this department of human nature in the infant, which for a while shows much of life, spirit, appetite, and passion, and yet is without reason or conscience. Indeed, the beginning of human life seems to be almost entirely in the field of instinct.

4. The conduct of man is frequently irrational and unreasonable; and so much like the animal that we must suppose that at times this instinctive nature predominates,—the *man* seems to be lost sight of.

5. All men are conscious of an internal conflict such as is described so graphically by Paul in Rom. 7. Things they would do, they do not; things they would not, they do. This conflict of the flesh with the spirit, as spoken of also in Rom. 8, in Galatians, and indeed everywhere in the New Tes-

tament, proves it clearly. Paul himself, after a long experience, under inspiration, declares, "I keep my body under," showing still the necessity of struggle. There was a thorn in the flesh that he wanted removed very much. Some suppose that it was disease, sore eyes, bodily deformity, or other physical defect. We know not ; but whatever it was, it had its seat in the instinct and body, so that the struggle was still with these, and for the victory "grace" was necessary but not the removal of the thorn. This view of human nature becomes exceedingly important in considering the doctrine of depravity and the doctrine of sanctification.

Hereditary influence acts mainly upon the body and its instincts, and upon the mind only through those animal powers. No man is naturally perfect, but naturally depraved, not simply in body, but in instinct. Through the depravity of these powers and passions the first impressions on the mind are experienced, and that is why "all have gone out of the way," "all come short of the glory of God." In a word, all are naturally depraved in that way and to such a degree that depravity is universal; and inasmuch as the first impulse of the mind comes through this deranged medium, as the rays of light passing through colored glass carry the colors upon the object beyond, so the impulse passing through this medium affects the mind and heart. Sanctification belongs to the soul; and one "born again," "born of God," must be pure if a child of God, and washed by the "blood of the Lamb." But religion is for the soul, and the instinct remains with the body while the body lives. Instinct is not sinful, but it is sinful to allow it to predominate over the man. Like Paul, to "keep it under," is our duty, and for this, God has promised the "sufficient grace," and the "Spirit," and the "Comforter." The presence of Christ is promised to the individual to give strength and power for holding these animal powers in subjection. Their entire removal is undesirable and impossible, for the moment animal instinct is re-

moved, the man must die. That this is the true aspect of human nature is still farther vindicated by the following Scripture references: Rom. 7; 8: 1, 12; 13: 14; 1 Cor. 1: 29; 2 Cor. 10: 2; Gal. 5: 17, 24; Col. 2: 18; and other places without number.

### SECTION III.—MAN AS A SPIRITUAL BEING.

"The worlds were framed by the word of God." "God said, Let there be light: and there was light," and in the same manner every step in creation was taken until the last great work was presented. "Let us make man" was then the introduction to the work proposed. Just how much was implied in the plural it is not necessary to assert, but it is very certain that the Divine purpose with reference to this work differed from that shown in all preceding works. Here not a simple word but a consultation of the Godhead is revealed. The man was formed out of a material already existing—the dust. This work was completed by the breath of God, producing a living soul. The word soul, like all other words, has different meanings in different relations. Sometimes it means the entire being: "There were eight souls in the ark;" sometimes the life: "Deliver my soul from death." But generally it refers to the mental powers of man in distinction from the bodily. "Fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Evidently in this place and many others it embraces all that is not embraced in man's physical and animal nature. It is generally used interchangeably with spirit, and the effort to make a regular distinction between spirit and soul is an effort without Biblical authority or philosophical foundation. In two places it is referred to as "soul and spirit," as though it might be dual; but in many places we have a similar combination, as when the Lord and Christ, who are both one, are spoken of as though there were two. So in these two instances where these two are mentioned, it is evidently only intended to give force, as when the Lord commands us to

love him with all the heart, mind, and strength. Multiplicity of words does not disprove identity of meaning. The beast has a spirit which "goeth downward," while the spirit of man "goeth upward." At all events, the language of the Bible justifies the assumption in this discussion of general unity in the mind. Mind is the most marvelous work of God. In its capacity it is wider than all the world. It easily passes the sun, stretches beyond the distant star, and creates new worlds, mentally, in space; weighs the planets, compasses continents and oceans, mountains and plains, winds and waves, armies and nations, and civilization's widest development. Realities and facts as well as imaginary creations can readily be deposited in the power of memory. Not only in the wideness of these powers of mind is its grandeur seen but in their specific and varied adaptation. Every thing, and being, and event in all the world and in all time can be used by this one mind. It takes in not only oceans and dew-drops, nations and individuals, but phases of thoughts and feelings, and depths of philosophy, beyond all computation. In these capacities it is equal to all externality; it is a world of itself, with capabilities adapted to the world without. Between these two worlds there are five open doors through which communication is maintained between the empire of mind and the external universe. Through these doors all knowledge of reality and truth is gained, and when they are closed, acquisition of knowledge ceases. And yet, with all this capacity of the mind for grasping external objects, it never goes out of itself to touch the external world, nor allows a single particle of material substances to come within its sacred temple. The mind seems shut up within itself, looking out through these doors upon the empire over which it was designed to hold dominion. No ultimate substances or forms of matter get into the conception of the mind. And here is the greatest mystery of all. It may be accurate and reliable, and yet testify of that which is absent in time or space.

External objects are not reached by the mind or conveyed to the mind. But in some mysterious way there is conscious sensation through the brain upon the soul. Whatever sense is the medium, a simple sensation is all that is actually experienced. So far as we know, these sensations are just alike, for we are unable to find distinction except in the intuitive assignment of them to their respective fields. The sensation from without, through the eye, ear, touch, taste, and smell reaches in some way the mind; a simple sensation, nothing more. And yet the mind immediately, intuitively, and involuntarily explains that sensation, and refers it to its appropriate medium and cause, so that no one attempts to eat a song or hear a picture or see pain. Each of these sensations, which seem to be similar, is somehow, by intuitive force, explained, and referred through the proper medium to the real cause.

Strictly speaking, this sensation is all that is actually phenomenal to the mind from without. But immediately upon such external sensations there are sensations from within of which the mind is conscious. Elementary ideas, termed by Upham and others "Original Suggestions," arise at once, and the mind is conscious of these elementary principles within. The simple ideas of power, space, duration, unity, essence or substance, personality or being, by their union or otherwise become compound, and in reality constitute the elements of all thinking and reasoning. These internal causes of sensation, like external causes of sensation, are meta-phenomenal, being external and internal to the sensations. Thus we have *sense, perception, and consciousness of intuitions* and necessary truths. This, undoubtedly, is the beginning of man's conscious, intellectual activity. But these sensations are transient, whether produced by intuitions or perception. And now come in the functions of the memory, which retain the sensation and its explanation for farther use. Then there is a conception of what has been perceived and passed, nearly as clear and quite as distinct as the perception. Things are

seen and known as distinct to the consciousness in conception as they were in perception. These conceptions constitute the grounds of our judgment, plans, and general works of life. They are sometimes completed by the imagination, or creative faculty; and sometimes fragments and conceptions of the past are put together so as to make new creations. In these purposes of intellectual life and attainment no class of mental phenomena disappears. Perceptions retained by the memory and reviewed by conception become the occasion of feelings and purposes involved in practical life. These feelings, although differing entirely from the simple sensation which is the philosophy of all knowledge, are more or less intuitive. There are certain parental feelings, filial emotions, human sympathies, patriotic attachments, which are never learned, explained, or denied by the normal mind. They are simple, inherent states of the sensibilities arising under certain conditions and relations. The mother never learns to love her child; but she learns to carry out that love. The child never learns to love its mother; but it learns how best to execute that love which is intuitive. So with other natural affections. But these feelings may be extended, disciplined, and increased by voluntary action and change of relations and location.

Besides these natural affections, there will be the feeling or sense of the beautiful, sublime, and grand; and a feeling, as well as intellectual action, in hope and fear. These feelings and sensibilities of the mind are necessary to human happiness, society, progress, and hope. The sensibilities of the soul are more important in human experiences and life than is generally imagined. Upon these perceptions of truth, intuitions of the mind, feelings of the soul, and recognition of relations, an entirely distinct feeling is presented for consideration. Through the faculty of perception we see the realities of life; through the judgment and sensibilities we apprehend the import of these relations, and immediately feel an *obligation* to those to whom we sustain relations. A feeling



of oughtness is immediately experienced, and with that feeling of obligation we recognize at once the claim of another party upon us. The word obligation means a cord, or that which holds, and we feel that something is binding upon us with reference to those to whom we are related. And by relation is expressed the idea that beings are so situated that they affect each other. Upon the perception of such relations, obligation naturally and necessarily arises. The *grounds* of obligation are in moral nature, the *occasion* in relations.

With man's moral nature and moral relations, there is necessarily an obligation,—something binding one to another. This feeling and sense of duty arises from the conscience. The conscience is that power of mind which, recognizing the relations, discovers moral quality in actions, and enforces the obligation, producing pleasure upon compliance, and pain upon violation. Conscience never fails to give a right decision. An immense amount of confusion in philosophy and in practical life has arisen from the failure to make a distinction between intellectual action and the action of conscience. The heathen mother, from her standpoint, with her degree of knowledge, thought it duty to throw her infant into the Ganges. The error was in her intellect. Conscience never moved any being to do what he knew was wrong. But right and wrong must depend upon the condition or relations of the individual, and the misconception of these relations will, of course, lead the true conscience to decide for the wrong act. Conscience is, therefore, never to be disobeyed, but should always lead to an investigation of the grounds of its action. The physician might feel a conviction of duty to give a certain remedy to a patient, but upon farther examination see that another remedy will be the true one. The conscience, therefore, is always right in its own action, but always depends in that action upon the light enjoyed. So Paul thought he verily ought to do many things contrary to the will of Jesus of Nazareth. His sin did not

lie in obeying his conscience at that time, but in the wickedness of his life, which placed him where he did not see things in their true light. If he had obeyed the demands of his conscience in thought and submission to God, it would have changed his standpoint, as, indeed, it did at last, giving entirely another view. So that while he was "walking in all good conscience" he said he was the "chief of sinners" because he had persecuted the Church of God. Not because he obeyed the conscience, but because he placed himself in false relations and under a false light. The conscience could only act according to the light furnished.

So we have in man, as thus developed, his intellectual powers and sensibilities, his conscience, moral susceptibilities, and convictions. But one thing more is necessary to constitute the moral agent. A man may have knowledge, but if unable to see the moral quality of actions, he can neither do right nor wrong any more than the animal. But if man has intellectual power, knowledge, and conscience, and still has no power of choice, he can do neither right nor wrong. He knows some things, and sees the claims, but if unable to choose, he cannot be virtuous nor vicious. He is a mere machine, not acting in himself at all, but moving as acted upon. All actions must be caused; and if not caused by man, he is not responsible. If caused by another, whether God, man, or devil, the responsibility rests upon the real author of the action. This power of choice, therefore, is necessary to man's responsibility and moral character. It involves principles of causality, the nature of which is unknown and unknowable. Man cannot explain the causal principle in the kernel of wheat. He finds the germinal cells developing, but cannot explain the causal force. Everywhere, in all things, when we arrive at cause, we have to stop; we can know only that there is a cause. In the human mind we find original susceptibilities to sensation, and intuitively assign cause for its explanation; and we find native powers of action, original in the mind, so that the will is a

part of the human mind able to originate action. Should we say that man cannot will without something moving him to choice, and that all choice must have some cause outside of the will, we should find ourselves in the same difficulty when we step back to the first cause. We could not account for the divine choice, which upon that hypothesis must be moved by something outside of the being himself. We therefore conclude that the infinite God is capable of creating a being who shall be a cause in himself, and so have the power of self-action as to render his conduct and his character the work of his own choice.

There are certain objections urged to this view of the freedom of the human will :

1. It is said to be incomprehensible. So is everything in nature, especially all causality which is unknown and unknowable. Necessitarianism is quite as incomprehensible. How, with our known powers, we can be necessitated, is a mystery. Indeed, that would contradict universal consciousness and practice. Neither is light increased nor are difficulties diminished by denying the freedom of the will.

2. It is said to imply Divine weakness in suffering man's will to prevail against his own. But if it be God's will to have such a being as man in existence, that prevailing purpose of God is realized ; and in creating such a being so much above all other beings on earth, the power and freedom of God are manifest. And certainly to have left man with other beings below him with no power of choice, a mere machine, would not have increased the honor of God.

3. It is said to be inconsistent for God to create such a being with such capabilities and possibilities for sinning. Man is incapable of looking into the philosophy of things and the plans of God, and to attempt to decide *a priori* what freedom God has, is almost blasphemy. In every-day life we see numerous relations and forces which we cannot explain, or deny, or deny their utility. And for man to attempt to set up his own judgment upon what the Divine

freedom should allow, and then pass judgment accordingly, is too absurd to deserve notice.

4. It is said that all volitions are foreknown, and therefore cannot be free. (a) But knowledge is never causality, and the knowing of a thing as it is, is not the cause of it. The memory of an event that occurred yesterday, did not cause it; the knowledge of an event occurring to-morrow, cannot any more be the cause. If the event had been otherwise, it would have been known otherwise. Knowledge must be as the event. (b) God knows every act and knows who causes it. (c) This objection can hardly be honest, for in everything else, statesmanship, battles, business, and all the common affairs of life, this plea is never urged or followed. Everybody assumes that freedom and responsibility for action exist.

Let us proceed to notice a few positive proofs in favor of the doctrine of the freedom of the will:

1. The nature of the mind's action. There are original elementary ideas in the intellect, and original elementary feelings in the sensibility, and we should expect to find the same general law in the will, and that there will be the same original grounds of action in that department of the mind.

2. The nature of motives. Motive is a condition of volition, but not a cause. Mind is the agent, and acts upon the motives, and in yielding to any motive, it is conscious of the power of contrary choice.

3. The nature and feeling of personal responsibility, whether for the past, the present, or the future. One may regret or be pleased with the past, and thus assume that he had the power of choice. And so with the present and future, there is naturally and necessarily in these conditions implied this freedom.

4. The nature of virtue and vice implies the freedom of the will. Neither could be possible without choice. Nothing controlled by force, as the wood floating down the stream, or

the animal acting without intelligence, can have the state of mind involved in vice or virtue. No man praises one for doing that which he could not avoid, nor condemns what is not a matter of choice.

5. Universal history, language, literature, and social and civil institutions, everywhere and in all time, recognize this fundamental truth of human nature, and the voluntary character of man's actions. No matter what may be the profession or philosophy of the historian, even if the blindest necessitarian in profession, he will come to condemn men for some things and justify them for others upon the ground of their capacity for contrary choice. So with poetry and literature universally. Civil constitutions and institutions, and all judicial decisions imply this same doctrine; and rewards and punishments irrespective of this are always recognized as unjust and tyrannical. Men are considered as justly punished for doing only what they might have avoided.

6. Personal and universal consciousness. (a) We know of our mental choice, but of nothing back of it. To affirm there is something back of choice is to affirm what is unknown. Our knowledge of causality goes back only to the volitions, so far as the mind is considered in its immediate action. Motives are considered and weighed, but always with the assumption that the ultimate conditions of action are subjective. (b) We are conscious of power to choose, and in that consciousness of power we are conscious of ability for contrary choice, or the choice of an alternative. When we choose one thing we are conscious of another thing with reference to which decision is free. (c) The mind necessarily feels responsible for its actions, and nature cannot lie. But this conviction is false if man has not the power to choose.

7. This doctrine of freedom is clearly implied in the doctrines of the Bible. The whole system of the Divine and moral government, the nature of sin and doctrine of atonement and justification by faith, all involve this doctrine.

Indeed, it is assumed in such a way that these doctrines are a fiction without it. The freedom of the will, therefore, is a doctrine that is necessarily involved in the doctrines of the Gospel.

8. This is especially true of the laws of the Bible. Its injunctions, threatenings, and promises everywhere, and in all places and cases, bring in this universal law of moral beings. The law must be obeyed voluntarily, if at all, and duty must be performed by choice. Penalties are inflicted and threatened upon the ground of voluntary disobedience, and all the promises of earth and heaven are based upon this condition.

9. Salvation is proposed and promised upon conditions which imply the freedom of the will. The state and action of the will is given as the only hindrance. (See John 1:11; 3:9; 5:40.) All the provisions and invitations of the Gospel are upon the condition that man repents, believes, and calls upon the name of the Lord (Acts 11:18; John 3:16; Acts 2:21). And all are invited as though the will was free (Matt. 11:29; John 7:37; Rev. 22:17).

10. Positive statements of the Bible. Deut. 30:19; Josh. 24:15; 66:3; Heb. 11:25; John 5:40; and other passages too numerous to mention.

Thus we see that the moral agent must have *intelligence*, *conscience*, and *will*. We cannot conceive of a being with any moral character without these characteristics. Man is thus a trinity in himself, and that is what constitutes him a man in distinction from the animal creation. But this shows us in the simplest form, and yet conclusively, in what sense man was created in the image of God. The body does not make the man, nor the instinct which is the image of the animal. Holiness does not make the man, for one must be a man in order to be holy. To be a governor and controller of things, in which traits of man's character some have imagined that they saw the image of God, is not peculiarly human. Animals govern each other. It is, in the things affirmed, that *man* was

created in the image of God. That is, that all those traits which constitute the man and are necessary to his manhood are seen in the Creator. These traits in God are infinite; in man they are finite. The image of God was not in the holiness of the man, in the kingship, nor in the body of man, but in the real and essential manhood. *Intelligence, sense of right, and power of choice* are essential to manhood, and in these, man is distinguished from all other beings upon earth, and in these respects he is in the image of God.

#### SECTION IV.—HUMAN DESTINY.

DESTINY is the assignment of a thing or being to some specific place and use. It may be unconditional, as the position of the sun, the changes of the seasons, and the compositions of air and water. Even in human nature there are fixed laws which are unconditional. This fatal assignment belongs to the physical government of God; but there is a destiny assigned to beings by infinite wisdom and goodness with reference to which man can still exercise his choice. So the moral laws of God indicate a Divine plan with reference to the life, position, and use of man's powers and faculties.

The real destiny of a being or thing is known by the nature of such thing or being, and the nature of the circumstances and conditions in which it is placed. As, for instance, when we examine the structure and contents of the eye, see its mechanism and laws, and learn that it is not adapted to hearing but is adapted to light and the objects brought to view by light, we know just as well the design of that eye as we know the design of the telescope or eye-glass. So in the animal; we know the destiny of the fish by his powers of motion and respiration. We know the destiny of the bird by the structure of the organism and the instincts developed. So we know the destiny of man by looking into his nature and the circumstances which surround him, and the conditions of his life and happiness.

1. He is a material being depending upon material objects for nourishment and life, placed where these objects may be secured by his labor and industry. And, therefore, we know that he was placed here for the cultivation of the soil and production of its fruits, and improvement of the earth's surface generally. And this involves his relationship to organic matter and to the vegetable kingdom; that is, he is placed here to cultivate the soil, produce the products, and enjoy happiness by this means; and thus by subduing the earth and reaping its fruits he meets his destiny.

2. Possessed of an animal nature, he is in close affinity with the animal creation, and having intelligence he is thus evidently destined to possess and rule the animal kingdom. The voice of nature, and of animal nature, is but the echo of the voice of the Creator, who said, "Have dominion over the fish of the sea, the fowl of the air, and every creeping thing upon the earth." He is destined in this to be the ruler over the lower animals, to be a guide in their development and improvement, and to enjoy the luxury and pleasure arising from the relationship and use of animals. This is his destiny,—the king of animals.

3. But no individual is individually developed without society. Each man is in one sense a part of other men. He cannot live alone if he would; he would not, if he could. Being thus dependent upon his fellow-men, and where their help is indispensable, he is evidently designed for society. His destiny is to fill some place and part in human society as really as the wheels of the factory have their destiny. In the family is seen the first development of society, the highest development of the individual. Destined to be a member of the family, he is destined to do the work and duties belonging to such associations. If in his relationship to matter and to animals he is to secure them for his use, he is, then, as a member of society, to secure them for the use of others beside himself. These family relations and obligations have their limitations, and are too limited for the



full development of the individual. Wider society needs to be organized. The man is evidently born for civil society, and civil society is an institution of God. It was formerly supposed that most men were destined for subjects and a few for rulers; but a more careful investigation of man's character shows these dual functions in every individual. Because every individual has ability and is inclined to share some portion of the responsibility of rulers, and because every individual is placed where he is, and must be subject to the law of others, therefore civil society, in its widest sphere, indicates the destiny of man in civil government. Under these two great institutions we have various other associations and combinations for which man is intended, and in which he works out his destiny. Associations for scientific and literary purposes, institutions of learning, publication of books, works of art, all involve society and indicate the destiny of man. Co-operative industries and commercial compacts bring before us the great general idea of human destiny. A man, therefore, to meet his destiny in this life must grasp the inanimate objects around him, the things that grow, and animals that move, and associate with human society and individuals who stand upon the level with himself. While meeting his destiny in all these respects, there is constantly developed more or less interest in philosophy—the cause of all things—and in the over-ruling Providence which shapes the affairs of men. No classes of men have ever been found to work out their destiny in these respects without the recognition of a God. When man has tilled the soil, shaped the rocks, controlled the beasts, and organized society, there are still wide fields of experience within each soul in which the sublime question would occur, "Is there not a cause?" Man can no more work out his destiny without this God in his mind and affections, than the infant can work out its destiny without the mother. A natural thirst of the soul for the worship of a God is seen in the revelations of history and experience, indicating a possible development in still

higher and more important fields. As indicated in the direct purpose of the Creator with reference to human destiny, we find the human sensibilities indicating precisely the same process. There are four classes of feelings, and but four, arising in the human soul. Every man, naturally and necessarily, has feelings with reference to *material objects*, *animal nature*, *human society*, and *God*. In looking upon the heavens there is a feeling of awe; upon the landscape and upon material objects as wrought out by the hand of art, the sense of the beautiful.

Architecture, sculpture, and painting are material objects touched with human skill and exciting human emotions. But every one will observe when thus moved by these physical objects, that if a living animal passes suddenly before him there is a change in his feelings. He is made to have a feeling for animals as well as for things, and this response to animal life proves an existing susceptibility in that direction. And when we turn from these exhibitions to meet the face of the friend, perhaps the very face represented by the picture, another class of feelings spring up in the human soul. One only needs to pass into the art gallery and look at the painting and see the lady with her pet dog, and observe the emotions that play upon the face change, and then look upon that same one as she meets a friend, to see that there are three distinct classes of feelings brought out according to the circumstances. And if we take these same classes of feelings, and in the stillness of the evening hour, the sublimity of the midnight moon, or the solemnity of sickness or death, indulge in reflection and thought, we shall find the mind opening higher and wider for a God, and the feelings moved accordingly. If we take this view of the whole world, we shall find people of every nation exhibiting a peculiar class of emotions not awakened or developed outside of religious causes. In itself even fanaticism reveals a class of feelings appertaining to worship. These various sensibilities and emotions are in every human being, cover the entire field of man's

feelings, and indicate distinctly his destiny. The bird, on the wing, the water-fowl upon the tide, the fish in the depths, the animal on the plains, and animals everywhere exhibiting their powers, tastes, and modes of life, do no more positively indicate the destiny of these creatures than these feelings in human nature indicate man's destiny. We may, if we will, know what we were made for. But in many respects there are frequent trials and failures, and everywhere we see indications of the fact that man is placed here as a probationer to learn the lessons of his destiny. A deeper and more sublime idea arises respecting the design of the whole. What is man's destiny as a whole as determined by the principles of this life?

*That the earth is a place, and life a time, of probation is evident from the following considerations:*

1. The subjective constitution of the man himself indicates this fact. He possesses *instinctive appetites* and passions, a *natural love of knowledge* and a *natural love for success*, which are stimulants and impelling forces. But the utility and happiness reasonably looked for from this source are only secured by their restraint. Gratification with limitation is the law of human happiness and well-being. For this restraint man has *reason, judgment, and conscience*; and as every human being from the first has possessed these impelling forces, right in themselves, but sure to err without restraint, so these animal instincts would rush on for gratification to our destruction if there were not some restraining forces. And so, like the governor in the engine, these restraining principles are given. Obedience to them is the proof of virtue. They involve the idea, therefore, of probation in themselves. Angels must have seen in our first parents a constitution fitted for probation and a state of life involving it.

2. A study of general forces and development of nations and the world shows that the whole race is on one continued trial. Every nation that has ever arisen, and every form of civilization that has died, proves that mankind was destined for trial

here, and that the world as a whole was made for a probationary state.

3. What is true with reference to nations is also true, most emphatically, with each individual. Every day and every event in human life is probationary with reference to some other day or event. One experience relates to a coming experience; each event to a coming event. There is not a single period in a single life that is not designed for preparation for a coming event and period. The whole of life is made up, therefore, of probationary work, and we know just as well what is the destiny of man in this regard as we know that man is intended to eat, drink, and sleep. His eating is for the coming day, his sleeping preparatory for coming exercise; and so everything in human life is probationary. And if every single event is probationary, the whole must be; for the whole must be as its parts.

4. The Bible is very decisive upon this question. It is not impossible nor is it sacrilegious to trace the development of Divine plans under the guidance of Divine authority. The plan of the Abrahamic life is a model and pattern that stood out, and still stands out, with its influence upon coming individuals and nations; all the patriarchs were preparing the way for the Mosaic dispensation, and Moses, the great law-giver, led the people to the long-promised land for their future residence. The judges were preparing for a new form of government, and the prophets for one greater than the prophets, and the law itself was a "schoolmaster" to bring men to Christ. This progressive development of religious society shows the general character and preparatory stages and object of God's government in this respect. The laws, like the history of the Bible, are constantly regarding things at one period with reference to another. Nothing can be plainer than the fact that the great legislators are constantly at work in one period for another period, and leading the people to meet their destiny in this respect. There are specific passages of Scripture which will note this

particularly. Notice especially Eccl. 3: 1; 12: 13, 14. It is said sometimes that the Old Testament gives no revelations of the future, but no man can believe the statement at the close of the book of Ecclesiastes and not see that there was a thought deeply imbedded in the mind at that time in spite of worldliness and "vanity" reaching into the future. "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter." A "conclusion," as though there was a conclusion for all these things. Glancing at all the facts brought together in that book: "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil." In Matt. 12: 36; 13: 37-43, a figure is presented which is frequently brought out in other portions of Scripture—seed-time and harvest. The whole world is a field for seed-sowing, and the whole of life with reference to the coming harvest. Nothing can more plainly present the idea of probation. Luke 16: 19-31 gives a specific and graphic account of the experience of two individuals upon earth, and of consequences after death. And the whole of it is a farce and a falsehood, or the whole of life is probationary. And even if we could for a moment confine its import to this life, it would prove the general character of life as a probationary condition. But it means more. It is probationary with reference to a future life, according to Rom. 14: 12, where it is declared that we must "give an account for the deeds done here in the body." This is only one of the many places conveying the idea that here men are doing things for which they must render an account in the future, a caution and condition of the common doctrine, "Be not deceived; God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Gal. 6: 7). (See also Heb. 13: 17; 1 Peter 1: 17; 6: 2.) We thus arrive at the conclusion that in the light of nature, under the convictions of reason and conscience, and by the Word of God, man has a destiny assigned him here,

and that he is destined to be tried and proved as a probationer ; and if under that trial he comes forth with a suitable preparation, a higher destiny awaits him. But there are some limitations to this probation here on earth ; that is, circumstances that suspend probationary conditions.

1. By the suspension of consciousness in sleep, accidents, disease, or insanity, man is rendered incapable of attending to the duties and conditions of probationary life. Through these stages of insensibility and of unconsciousness or derangement the character continues as it was when entering that state. If that suspension of consciousness continues through life, its beginning is the end of probation. Man cannot, in any sense, be called a probationer that has no self-control or consciousness of existence.

2. This same result may be produced by overpowering influences and motives. Man is finite. His strength, reason, judgment, and purpose are limited. He may yield so far to influences that he has no self-control. "It is not true that every man has his price," in the common sense of that language, but every man's ability is limited, and beyond that limit he is not responsible. Judicial decisions always have taken cognizance of the forces and motives under which repeated crimes have been committed. Too strong threats of evil may drive the child to theft, or a child of larger growth to other crimes. But especially is this true, sometimes, under the strongest sympathetic and magnetic force, which seems to overcome the mind as the specific gravity of one body overcomes a lighter body.

3. The force of habit may suspend man's ability for acting, or his refusing to act, as really as insanity. It is unquestionably true that many men have acquired a habit for indulging in strong drink, which, under ordinary circumstances, they cannot resist. This is no doubt criminal, but the criminality belongs to the formation of that habit, and the obligation of the moment is to change residence, circumstances, or moral relations to God or man so as to secure help for reason and

conscience in their struggle with habit and appetite. Every man having the power of reason may overcome such evil habits by changing the associations and purposes of his life, and by securing the sympathy of the good and the help of God.

4. This probationary condition is suspended by death.

(1) The means of grace and efforts for reformation are adapted to this life only. "It has pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe" (1 Cor. 1: 20). Preaching belongs to this life, and so do all the prayers, exhortations, written and oral discourses, church organizations, and family sympathies. These are all employed as instruments for changing the purposes and lives of men, and nothing is said of any means or instrumentalities for convicting and converting men in the future life.

(2) Promises are adapted to this life and imply a cessation at death. The Spirit is promised, but it "will not always strive with man" (Gen. 6: 3). It is promised as the "seal of redemption" but it may be "grieved" (see Eph. 4: 30). Promises of success to churches and ministers seem to be limited to this life.

(3) There is no promise of a probation in the future life, nor any indication of such a probation. Matt. 12: 32 simply declares pardon of the sin against the Holy Ghost impossible in the future world, but that does not imply that other sins may be forgiven there, as sometimes has been affirmed. It simply declares the impossibility of the pardon of that sin, and is so stated in the parallel text in Mark 3: 29. 1 Peter 4: 6 merely declares that the Gospel *was* preached to them that are now dead. Nothing in the connection or the structure of the sentence would indicate the least possibility of preaching now to lost spirits. 1 Peter 3: 18-20 is really the only text of Scripture that has a plausible bearing in that direction; but this language plainly affirms that Christ preached the Gospel by the Spirit—in the days of Noah—to those in prison, or under sentence within limited time. The word prison expresses limit, and

not unfrequently a limit in time as well as space. They were thus in prison during the one hundred and twenty years of the building of the ark. To suppose that Christ went to hell to preach to the lost is a supposition entirely foreign to the language of this text. But for the Romish idea of purgatory, and the natural traditional influence from that source, none could ever have dreamed of such a work in such a place. But at all events the preaching was done in the "days of Noah," without the least intimation of continued probation or any indication of reform effected. So if by any possibility it could be supposed that Christ did go to the lost from the cross and while in the tomb, it is now two thousand years after the time specified, and, as it would seem, it was useless labor.

(4) Future probation is not demanded by justice to the heathen. By the law of nature and voice of conscience, and the influence of the Spirit of God, they can learn enough of God and duty to be saved. (See Rom. 1: 20.) God and Christ are one, and whoever believes in a God who "so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son" for the salvation of men, believes in the real Christ, whether he knows of the "historic Christ" or not. Just how much faith in the historic or personal Christ, Enoch, who "walked with God" and the patriarchs, possessed, we do not know; but we do understand that "Abraham believed God, and it was accounted unto him for righteousness," and that he made gifts to Melchizedek, whose faith must have been in God the Father. Cornelius was a "devout man," and yet his faith seems to have included Christ in God, and not the historical Christ. A name is only representative, and to believe in his name regardless of his being, certainly is not faith; but to believe in him as Divine, and in divinity as possessing the character and attributes of the Saviour, is faith. Those without "law" are "judged without law," and no more is "required than is given." The heathen have the knowledge of God and may be saved in him, and if lost, are lost by sin and not by ignorance. (See Rom. 10: 18.)



(5) Future probation is not necessary for the salvation of infants, nor to render their salvation the work of Christ. They are already fitted for heaven, and saved under the general work of Christ. (See Mark 10: 14; Luke 18: 16; 19: 14; 1 Cor. 15: 22.) If given a new probation, they might fall in the trial like Adam, and thus be lost. When Adam sinned it was treason, and nothing but mercy through Christ could have prevented capital punishment, and thus the end of the race. The existence of all men, including infants, is by the work of Christ. But again, "If any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his" (Rom. 8: 9). Christ's people are "sealed" by the Spirit. (See 2 Cor. 1: 22; Eph. 1: 13; 4: 30.) In addition to the innocency of infancy, the sealing work of Christ is necessary to the family relations of heaven, and in the immediate presence of Christ that work must be experienced where there is no sin to prevent. By "beholding, they are changed into the same image." The promises and work of Christ reach all who do not refuse. Infants do not disbelieve or exercise their will against Christ, and so, when removed from earth, they are safe in heaven, "for of such is the kingdom of heaven." And still more, Christ is the resurrection (John 11: 25), and the author of the resurrection of the dead (Phil. 3: 10, 11; 1 Cor. 15: 12-18). He is the "first-fruits" of the resurrection. Infants, therefore, are indebted to Christ for these three divine works: first, their existence; second, the spiritual impression upon the heart; and third, the resurrection from the dead.

(6) Upon the same mode of reasoning adopted in favor of future probation, why would not probation be continued indefinitely and eternally, and thus the judgment be eternally postponed. There can be no government, human or divine, without a judiciary. The completion of God's government depends upon the judgment, and judgment must follow probation always and everywhere.

(7) Man's natural surroundings will be entirely changed, and so far as we can learn or reasonably imagine, there can

be nothing in the constitution and circumstances adapted to probation and the possibility of a change after this life.

(8) Man is a creature of habit, and as such is constantly tending to a fixedness in his character and destiny. If, under the circumstances of this life, there is no change, what can be the reasonable hope of a change in the future? And probation is meaningless without the probability of a change. At any rate, if it could be possible for such a probation to be granted, it must be granted to one class as well as another, and the danger, therefore, of deterioration would be equal to the probability of reform. There would seem to be but a very narrow ground between the doctrine of probation and the idea of eternal chaos.

(9) The Spirit is promised and promised only here, and impliedly, during Christ's absence. (See John 14: 16, 18, 26; 16: 7.) The definite promise of the Spirit here, and the promise of that Spirit during Christ's absence, and the necessity for such a spiritual influence in order to realize the advantages of probation, lead us to the conclusion that there is no spiritual influence in the future world upon the impenitent, nor any probation for any class there.

(10) There is no atonement after Christ's return (John 9: 4; 1 Cor. 15: 24). And all the general history and doctrines of the gospels indicate to us a specified period during which his work is to be performed, and at the close of which he is to judge the world in righteousness. There can be no probation after that judgment, for there is no mercy but in Christ nor intercession after he gives up the kingdom to the Father. Salvation comes from grace, and that grace closes with his return. It may be said that that leaves a space between death and judgment for a probationary change, but Hades is without promise of any instrumentality for reformation in the Gospel work, or of any part of the Gospel plan as adapted to such a condition. It is purely and simply imaginary. "My spirit shall not always strive with man, yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years" (Gen. 6: 3),

implies that the Spirit's influence shall last during that period and no more. (Eccles. 9: 3; Eph. 1: 13, 18.) In these we seem to have embraced the completion of the work of grace. "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption" (Eph. 4: 30). No language can make it more plain than this. In the work of this life we are exhorted not to grieve the Spirit, and this work is to seal man unto the day of redemption. (1 Thess. 4: 17; John 5: 28; Rev. 22: 11.) In addition to these and many other passages, the instruction of Christ and the apostles with reference to Christian work, its results, and conclusion, are all against the doctrine of future probation. In Matt. 10, the apostles are sent forth to work with instructions and exhortations which imply that their work belongs exclusively to this world, and the repetition of the divine commission after the resurrection involves the same idea. This is put more clearly in the account of the last day. (Matt. 25: 31-46.) There seems to be but little to be said for the presentation of this false hope in the face of these truths but the questionable consolation to the unbeliever that he is going to have time to repent hereafter, and to indolent Christians that their lack of service here for the salvation of the world may be supplied in the future state.

#### SECTION V.—MAN'S DESTINY IN A FUTURE STATE.

"The works of God are very great, sought out of all them that have pleasure therein." But of all these works upon earth man is greatest—great in comparison with other portions of creation, and great in the estimation of God. In theological discussions man seems to be the central objective point. Having spoken of his nature and destiny on earth, we come now to speak of his destiny in the future life. This life is evidently a preparatory state, the vestibule of man's real being, the infancy of his true life. That he will live in a future state is indicated,

## I. BY THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE.

1. Analogy gives some indications of this future life, in the changes of the seasons. Spring life succeeds winter and apparent death. Vegetation seems to be dead in the frost and snows of winter, and the seeds themselves are lost sight of during that period, but life survives and continues in spite of all these unfavorable, deathlike circumstances, indicating that life is probable after death. Not only do we see this in vegetable growth, but in animal formation. Destroyed and decayed flesh is often renewed, and when the whole system is seemingly dead it is sometimes quickened. This is strikingly illustrated in the nature of insects, which pass through from two to thirteen changes in the apparently different forms of life which succeed the various forms of death. As the ugly looking worm wraps himself in his own coffin and lies for months, sometimes years, in the cocoon, without the least indication of life, at last coming forth in winged beauty much surpassing the beauty of his first life, so may we expect through the bands of death to burst forth into the brighter light of eternal day.

2. The changes in all organic nature intimate an ultimate design beyond the present state. One change succeeds another, as in geological changes, and each change tends toward a more perfect condition. Is there not, therefore, to be a more perfect development of man?

3. Man's relative position. He is superior to all other beings; of this there is no dispute. Does not such superiority therefore indicate a higher destiny than awaits other portions of creation? Animals vary in their length of life, some dying in a day and some living a hundred years. Will not the superiority of man indicate a vastly longer period for this life? And yet, as a matter of fact, in this world man's life is shorter than that of some animals. But not only is man higher in position than other beings here, but he seems to be the end in view in the constitution of things, and of animals below him; and this appropriation of nature's forces,

laws, and organic being to man, continued while he lives here, would seem to indicate another life still beyond, for which these appropriations and sacrifices were intended.

This vast combination and sacrifice of other beings and things hardly seems deserved, if man is confined to the present state. His life here seems to be too brief to justify the exquisite workmanship of his body and mind, and the expenditure of so much of other things and beings for these thirty years of average human life.

Of this thirty years, ten years at least are expended in sleep and inefficient vibratory action of mind without any real results. Much of the remaining twenty can hardly be called efficient life with most men. At least a quarter of that is expended in childhood and preparation, so that about fifteen years of conscious, efficient life is fully the average of human life. Can we believe that the Creator has provided such a world as this, with all its productions, and expended such a vast amount of vital force for these fifteen years of life? And if attention is confined to the individual, the argument still holds good. The products of life, the appropriation of animal life, the innumerable applications of force and blessings for each individual life, all expended for these brief fifteen years, can in no possible way be accounted as consistent with the divine economy. These intimations, even from physical nature and from the material universe, indicate existence after death.

## II. BY METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS INVOLVED IN THE MIND ITSELF.

1. The distinction of mind from matter, and from vegetable and animal organism, denotes for mind an entirely different destiny. There are no elements, forces, or laws of matter ever found in the mind; and there are no elements, forces, or laws of mind ever found in matter. In mind we reflect upon the past and future, reason, judgment, conscience, and will, and we see these mental properties in special prominence indicating their superiority. In ecstasy and hope, in memory

and guilt, there are states of mind so distinct and superior to everything around us as to indicate that man occupies a peculiar position, and in his position may expect a higher destiny.

The fact that sometimes the body affects the mind, and the mind the body, only proves an incidental and not a necessary relation. Sometimes a very little disease, as ague chills, seems to derange the mind, while in the last stages of other fatal diseases the mind is as clear as in its best day, showing that the effect is entirely different in different cases, and the connection between mind and matter cannot be necessary but only incidental. Sometimes mental states will affect health and produce death. At other times the highest possible exercise of the mind has no effect upon health and life, showing that the connection between mind and matter is not at all points what would be expected if they were one. The general upon his horse is swung and moved by the animal, and the animal is guided and moved by the general, but nobody imagines that the general and his horse are one, and the mutual effect between the two is quite as distinct and complete as between the mind and body. With such vast distinctions between the mind and body we must expect a different destiny for the two.

2. The ideals of the mind and the dissatisfaction with the present are a clear indication of some higher and better state. The painter is never satisfied with his work. The business man always sees something a little beyond what he realizes. The statesman and the philanthropist have ideals beyond the actual fulfillment; and so everywhere in human life, in every department of human work, we see these ideals, like approaching angels appearing in the dawn of the morning, pointing to a higher and better development. It cannot be possible that nature or nature's God has constituted the human mind for constantly framing such ideals without having any reality possible beyond the present life. These ideals are sometimes imaginary and are never fully realized. They

are to be regarded as always prophetic of something better, and as a continued assertion of the mind's adaptation to a future life.

3. The native conviction of the mind's simplicity. All decay and death arise from the compound nature of things. There can be no fermentation or decay or mechanical displacement of any substance or thing that is purely simple. Different elements and forces in their contact produce decay and death. But the mind of man is simple; it is one mind, and simple in all its nature. It is the same *ego* which thinks, feels, and wills, remembers and anticipates, loves and hates, and nothing can be more clearly a matter of consciousness in the human mind in that direction than the perfect simplicity of mind; and if thus simple, science affirms its indestructibility.

4. The universal conviction of the superior value of ideas and the universal willingness to sacrifice everything else for ideas. Sometimes, through willfulness, man will sacrifice everything to gain an end, but willfulness is a mental state—a mind force. Sometimes out of love, and regardless of the intrinsic worth of the object loved, man will sacrifice everything else for that object. Sometimes it is a cherished idea or hoped-for discovery in science, sociology, or statesmanship that rules the life. Perhaps the most common and striking illustration of this estimate of ideas for which everything else is sacrificed is seen in patriotism and religion. It is a simple mental phenomenon that secures the sacrifice. There are other principles that may enter into warfares and stimulate soldiers, but patriotism is an absorbing idea for which life and everything else is sacrificed. But the sacrifice of all material good for an idea appears in a still more striking sense in religion. And this sacrifice is not confined to true religion; it is simply the idea that we speak of now, for which old men and young, feeble women and children give up life with pleasure. It is the idea; it is the mental conception; it is something thought of for

which they sacrifice in that manner. In all these ways is shown the natural, intuitive, and universal estimation in which ideas are held, and that estimation denotes that according to the laws of nature and true science, the mind and its phenomena are worth more than every thing else. And if that be true, then, according to the will of God, nature and all the world is to be sooner or later appropriated to the invisible and spiritual mode of being.

5. In every mind there is a consciousness of personal and continuous identity. The body of a man fifty years old has been entirely changed at least seven times during that life in every particle and fiber, and yet he knows he is the same man. Identity thus being continued through different periods and all the changes of life, shows that there is somewhere, somehow, in the man, in the center of his vibratory and changing forces a continuousness and continuity; and we infer that this identity will be continued after other changes occur in man's body and life. And again, science and universal experience teach us that what is, is to be, unless some other interposing force prevents. Man is, and therefore will be eternally, unless annihilation can be proved, and this is impossible. Perhaps this simple fact of existence without the least knowledge or intimation of annihilation may be one cause for the belief in a future life.

6. There is an inherent conviction in the minds of men everywhere, as indicated in all their funeral rites and ceremonies, and in all their hopes and fears, that death affects only the body. We can scarcely see why there should be such a universal feeling that disease attacks only the body, that death comes only to the body, that all that is mortal is bodily. While this conviction refers directly to the body, it implies the recognition of an immortal, undying something in man beyond the reach of disease and death. This feeling and belief are not common in respect to animals.

7. There is a natural regard for the future, as exhibited in the works of art, monuments, and anxiety for posthumous



fame. Many men, without being able to give any reason why, make large arrangements for burial-lots, tombs, and monuments. The painter, when asked the reason for his peculiar care in touching and finishing his picture, replied, "I am painting for eternity." What he did, Raphael, Angelo, and Christopher Wren did. The general in the army and the statesman in the legislative hall are each influenced by the voice of posterity. They live for the approval of future ages, sometimes saying, as a celebrated statesman once said, "I can afford to wait five hundred years for justice in this regard." All this peculiar interest is attributed to an intuitive estimation of the future, which is false in the nature of things if there be no future. We argue that mind was not thus made to lie to itself.

8. In all these things we hear the voice of man's mental nature and consciousness, which is still more distinctly declared by the universal belief in immortality. The earliest philosophers dated this doctrine back to the beginning of the race. It has been the most common belief on earth, unless belief in an intelligent First Cause be excepted. Homer, the father of the poets, writes of these things in such a way as to show a confidence in the doctrine of immortality,—as in the case of Achilles after the death of his beloved friend, Patroclus.

"'Tis true, 'tis certain; man, though dead, retains  
Part of himself: th' immortal mind remains;  
The form subsists without the body's aid,  
Aerial semblance, and an empty shade."

"His account of the descent of Ulysses into hell, and his description of Minos in the shades below distributing justice to the dead assembled in troops around his tribunal and pronouncing irrevocable judgments which decide their everlasting fate, demonstrates the entertainment of the belief that virtues are rewarded and crimes punished in another state of existence." Thus Phocylides says, "Immortal souls, free from old age, live forever." "All the dead are equal, but God governs souls." So Socrates, four hundred years before

Christ, speaks of the "mysteries of bliss," "high on the hills of immortality," which in the future awaited them. "Whether this be really so," said he, "the Divinity alone knows; but I cannot find it in me to disbelieve so probable and desirable a truth." "So cheerfully," said he, as he received the fatal poison from his executioners, "do I depart this life, *hoping* for the immortal—the imperishable."

Plato and Aristotle taught the same thing. Plato says, "Yet to me it seems not to be doubted but the belief of the eternal existence of man's rational soul is *fully as ancient as mankind itself*. For, methinks, the excellency of its own faculties and operations above all material agents should be alone sufficient to afford, to every contemplative man, certain glimpses of both the divine original, and immortality thereof; and the desire of posthumous glory,—an affection congenial and natural to all noble minds,—together with a secret fear of future unhappiness, common to all, to give pregnant hints of its endless existence after death."

Cyrus, king of Persia, has uttered his convictions in this social sort of way: "No, my dear children; I can never be persuaded that the soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal body, and that it dies on separation; for I see that the soul communicates vigor and motion to mortal bodies during its continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded that the soul is divested of intelligence on its separation from this gross, senseless body; but it is probable that, when the soul is separated, it becomes perfect and entire, and is then more intelligent." The Chinese, Japanese, and Moham-medans have believed this doctrine in all ages. Most of the known tribes of Asia, Europe, and America, and with a few exceptions, the entire civilized world, in some form, entertain this doctrine. This belief must have some cause in nature or revelation. If inspired by nature's original force it cannot be false; if revealed, it is Divine truth.

9. Immortality is a *necessary demand* of human nature. Whatever is necessarily demanded in human nature must be

true. Even if the idea of God were abandoned and nature was original, there could be no reason why it should not be consistent with itself. If there is a Creator, he could not be such and contradict himself. He created the world with antagonistic forces, but they are correlative and harmonious, and wherever a necessary demand in nature is given, there must be some provision for meeting that demand. That "nature cannot give the lie to herself" is affirmed in science and natural history, by common sense and common experience. Men may make mistakes and imagine that the demand is universal when it is only occasional, but when sure that we get back to the original, universal demand in nature, we know it is true. The rising of the sun is no more certain. That immortality is a demand of nature is evident from universal conviction and belief, and from every individual's nature and love of life. Cases of suicide only show that a man may be so excited upon certain points that, in his limited view of life, it is a curse. Every suicide, in one sense at least, is a monomaniac. It is a sudden action against the common law of the love of existence. This love of existence is not what some annihilationists and materialists have affirmed—a simple desire of man, like other desires—it is a *necessary* desire involved in the constitution of the mind. It shows the nature of the mind.

When we see the fish with its fins and the beautiful red fringe upon its gills instead of lungs, an air bladder for rising and lowering in the water, and the general arrangements for animal life in the water, we know its destiny and the place it was designed to occupy. We may not know its name, but if we have never seen one of that type or peculiar figure, we know its destiny. If we take a bird, look at its feathers and wings, tubular bones, and general adaptation for aerial flight, the size of its lungs, proportionately larger than the lungs of other animals or men, we know that that animal was not made for living or breathing in the water. We know its destiny. So with the functions of other animals,

and particularly of the human body. Just as really and as certainly we know by the powers, and functions, and demands of the human soul, that it was made for the future state. We do not pretend to examine the essence of mind, or of matter in birds or men, but the necessary tendency and functions show the general purpose. The necessary demands and functions of the human mind can only be met by immortality; and God's works were not good nor wisdom developed, if man is made only for the present state. Such are the instructions of nature within the mind itself, showing its own constitution and destiny.

### III. BY MORAL ARGUMENTS.

1. Man is a moral being, and considerations of that character come in, perhaps, as the final cause and proof of his immortality. The truth of this doctrine is seen from its relations to moral character. It presents motives to virtue, and against vice, more mighty and forcible than can be found anywhere else. With this motive in view, no dangers are feared in doing right, no temptations are effective for doing wrong. Death itself is received with a smile, and temptation with a frown. This has been found necessary as a matter of utility, in all departments of sociology. The hope of the child, the citizen, the scholar, and the philanthropist, is used as a stimulant in the different relations and works of life. But the effect of this doctrine on moral character, in the natural consequence of belief or disbelief in it, is conclusive evidence for it. It is not claimed that every disbeliever in immortality is an immoral man, in the common use of that term, or that every believer is a moral man, but it is claimed that a much larger proportion of the immoral and vicious deny the doctrine of immortality, and that the general denial of it indicates a low moral sentiment and generally a vicious tendency, and that the stronger convictions upon the future life and its relations to this life, other things being equal, are most favorable to sound morals and true benevolence.

2. Its relations to social and civil society. It aids much

in fixing the true estimate of man in family and State, and all social relations. A very large proportion of the errors and misery of the world arises from the false estimate of man. He is valued too much like the animal, and thus life is taken upon a slight provocation. But if man is to live eternally, that eternity involves the truth of intrinsic worth in him which serves to lift man in the common estimation, and to secure general morality. It secures, especially, a higher estimate of character. Moral character is estimated more highly if it lasts eternally. It presents motives to rulers and subjects favorable to his well being in every department of sociology. The rulers of any people will have more regard for themselves and their subjects with this doctrine than without it, and the subjects will likewise have more reverence for rulers, constitutions, and laws.

3. Its relation to moral happiness. It is evident from every power and faculty of man, and from all his circumstances here, that he was made for happiness. This doctrine of immortality gives relief from anxiety, and satisfaction of mind in various ways. It solves the most perplexing problems respecting life — its work and destiny. We sometimes are shocked and dumb-stricken at the sight of a writhing infant who, although innocent, suffers indescribable agony and then dies; and we are perplexed with the pain and tears and wretchedness of the poor widow and her orphan children, and still more so when they die having had so little of life. We are equally perplexed when we see the criminal, seemingly in prosperity, abundant in possessions, daring and reckless in selfishness and maliciousness, and "having more than heart could wish" — "having no bands in his death." What strange confusion and staggering anxieties come upon the mind! But this doctrine of immortality settles all, giving hope of equalized reward to virtue, and justice to criminals. It not only seems to relieve the intellect by solving its darkest problems, but it relieves the heart, giving joy and comfort to the sorrowing. The poor and oppressed, the destitute

and dying, with this hope, smile in the midst of pain, and rejoice in spite of death. It comes like the breath of morning to soothe the fevered cheek, relieve the anguished mind, and stimulate the hope. When money can do no more, and friends cease their attentions, and all the world recedes from our grasp, this doctrine, like the messenger of heaven, comes to the sick-room and death-bed, and speaks of hope a thousand times richer than all the world can furnish. Is man so constituted as to be thus supremely blest and comforted by falsehood? It cannot be.

4. The relations of this doctrine to the divine justice may be seen to prove its truthfulness. (*a*). The universe is certainly governed upon the principle of justice. The general principles of compensation, penalty, and reward, attached to all living moral beings, show the existence of the law of infinite justice. There are questions we cannot solve in this connection. There are some seeming defeats of justice, but they are only seeming, and not real; and that upon the whole the government of this world is upon the principle of justice must be admitted. Even if nature was her own manufacturer, she could not be unjust to herself. If God has made all things, the "Judge of all the earth will do right," so that upon the whole justice must be administered. (*b*) But justice is not executed here. The innocent and the helpless suffer intensely in many instances, while the reckless and the guilty are for the time being happy, and frequently die in an ecstasy or in the imagined bliss of delirium. (*c*) Therefore, there must be a future life; some other place for settling these difficulties, for equalizing these inequalities, for administering justice to all classes, for the vindication of God and his government, and the vindication of his loved ones and approved subjects. Either the universe is governed upon the principle of injustice, partiality, and cruelty, or another life is absolutely certain. Immortality, then, is involved in the plans of God, and this is the final destiny of man.