Systematic theology

Augustus Hopkins Strong

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Augustus H. Strong.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

A

COMPENDIUM AND COMMONPLACE-BOOK

DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF

THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS

BY

AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D. D.

PRESIDENT AND PROFESSOR OF BIBLICAL THEOLOGY IN THE

ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

ROCHESTER

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1886

The Author.

TO

JOHN B. TREVOR, Esq.,

THE STEADFAST FRIEND OF THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION,

THROUGH WHOSE LIBERALITY THE AUTHOR IS ENABLED TO PRESENT HIS

WORK IN ITS ENLARGED AND AMENDED FORM,

THIS VOLUME IS GRATEFULLY

INSCRIBED.

PREFACE.

THIS work is an enlarged and amended edition of the author's "Lectures on Theology," printed in 1876 for the use of students in the Rochester Theological Seminary. It contains nearly four times the amount of matter embraced in the former volume. The main text remains substantially the same, although important additions have been made to the treatment of the intuition of the divine existence, the classification of the attributes, the statement of the doctrine of decrees, the teaching as to race-sin and race-responsibility, ability or inability, the ethical theory of the atonement, and the final state of the wicked. The section on the moral nature of man (conscience and will) is new; a few minor paragraphs of the older book have been omitted; and the work has been somewhat altered in arrangement.

The author's aim has been not so much the writing of a theology for theologians as the construction of a hand-book for the use of students for the ministry. The main text is intended to serve as the basis for daily recitation; the matter in smaller print is added by way of proof, explanation, or illustration. To save labor to the reader, Scripture passages referred to in the text have been printed in full in the appended notes — the Revised English Version, except where otherwise indicated, being used, and the readings of the American Committee being generally preferred. Minute references are given, under each head, to the various books which may serve

as additional sources of information or suggestion. The writers referred to are not mentioned as authorities: it has been the aim, in general, to indicate not only the authors whose views are favored, but also those who best represent the views combated, in the text. The editions used are those found in the Library of the Seminary for whose students the text-book was originally written; fortunately these editions are, in general, the latest.

It has been thought well not only to give references to the best writers on the subjects treated, but also to introduce brief quotations from them, with a view to familiarize the reader with their general doctrinal position and to stimulate him to further reading of the works themselves. Many of these quotations are followed by explanatory or critical remarks, and in the smaller print considerable space is not unfrequently given to notes upon matters that could not be fully treated in the text, such as the history of systematic theology, the authorship of the Pentateuch, heathen systems of morality, heathen trinities, the Mosaic history of creation, the Sabbath, objections to the evolutionary theory of the origin of man, a tabular view of theories of imputation, notes on depravity, guilt, and penalty, the humanity of Christ, the Old Testament sacrifices, the doctrine of election, union with Christ, ordination to the ministry, the immortality of the soul, and the second coming of Christ.

It will be noticed that books are sometimes referred to which can hardly be called the best sources of information: in such cases the intention has often been to help the theological student to use intelligently the books he has; in other words, to enable the possessor of few books, and those not the best, to get from them all the good he can.

Attention is called to the element of Scriptural exposition that has been admitted. Under each of the chief doctrines, the main passages relied upon for proof are somewhat fully explained; while

the attempt has been made to condense the results of the best modern exegesis into the few words of explanation immediately following many of the minor passages cited. Although much material for private study is thus added, the author does not regard the work, even in its present form, as more than an outline which needs to be filled in by the fuller expositions and discussions of the class-room. It is to be judged by its aim — to provide a basis and starting-point, a source of elementary knowledge and a stimulus to thought, in preparation for the oral instruction of a Theological Seminary.

To three living persons the author desires to express his peculiar obligation. Two of these are his former teachers: President Noah Porter, of Yale College, and President Ezekiel G. Robinson, of Brown University; to the former he owes his first insight into philosophy; to the latter his first insight into theology. The third name is that of Professor William G. T. Shedd, of the Union Theological Seminary, from whose various writings the author has for many years derived constant stimulus and suggestion. The sincerity and warmth of this threefold recognition are not lessened by the fact that the views presented in this volume are in some respects peculiar to the author.

The usefulness of the work, it is hoped, will be greatly increased by the very copious indexes of subjects, of authors, and of Scripture passages. For the preparation of these, thanks are due to the Rev. Robert Kerr Eccles, M. D., recently a student of the Rochester Theological Seminary, but now pastor of the Baptist Church in Salem, Ohio, with whom the work has been a labor of love. For the good measure of typographical accuracy which has been secured, grateful acknowledgements are made to Mr. Charles Augustus Strong, the author's son and pupil.

In the view of the author, the aim of a course of theological study is not to crowd upon the pupil a ready-made system, but rather to

put him in possession of the most important Biblical and scientific materials of theology, to cultivate in him the habit of theological thinking, and to enable him for himself to master certain of the strategic points of doctrine, from which he may afterwards advance his lines with safety and success. In the hope that the present work may, in these respects, be serviceable to those who are preparing for the ministry of the gospel, it is now, with all its imperfections, committed to the care and blessing of Christ, the great head of the church,— to whom, as the author and perfecter of our faith, be eternal glory!

Rochester Theological Seminary,
Rochester, May 1, 1886.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

ERRATA AND *ADDENDA.*

Page 17, line 17 from bottom, *for* Vaughn, *read:* Vaughan.

Page 22, last line, *add:*
Zöckler, Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften, 2 : 606-769.

Page 25, line 2, *for* Lepsius, *read:* Lipsius.

Page 26, line 6 from bottom, *for* E. J. Baird, *read:* Samuel J. Baird.

Page 27, line 14 from bottom, and page 323, line 10 from bottom, *for* Summa Doctrina, *read:* Summa Doctrinæ.

Page 28, line 13 from bottom, *add:*
Butler, Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion.

Page 50, bottom, *add:*
Some things are given to us. Among these things are "grace and truth" (John 1 : 17; *cf.* 9). But there are ever those who are willing to take nothing as a free gift, and who insist on working out all knowledge, as well as all salvation, by processes of their own. Pelagianism, with its denial of the doctrines of grace, is but the further development of a rationalism which refuses to accept primitive truths unless these can be logically demonstrated. Since the existence of the soul, of the world, and of God cannot be proved in this way, rationalism is led to curtail, or to misinterpret, the deliverances of consciousness, and hence result certain systems now to be mentioned.

Page 54, line 10 from top, *add:*
Cousin, Hist. Philos., 2 : 289-343; F. E. Abbot, Scientific Theism, 171-177; Veitch's Hamilton (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), 176-191.

Page 55, line 10 from bottom, *omit* the three sentences beginning: "Yet this seems to be, *etc.*"; "In the London Spectator, *etc.*"; "It is the extinction, *etc.*" This matter is, for substance, transferred to page 87, line 27 from bottom.

Page 56, line 3 from bottom, *add:*
On the fact of sin as refuting the pantheistic theory, see Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, 140-164.

Page 63, line 13, *add:* See also Gloatz, Wunder und Naturgesetz, in Studien und Kritiken, 1886 : 408-546.

Page 66, line 24 from top, *add:*
West, in Defence and Confirmation of the Faith (Elliott Lectures for 1885), 80-129.

Page 67, line 4, *add:* See Buckley on Faith-healing, in Century Magazine, June, 1886 : 221-236.

Page 72, line 18, *for* sense which, *read:* sense in which.

Page 74, line 14 from bottom, *instead of* A. D. 63, *read:* A. D. 64: line 13 from bottom, *instead of* 56, *read:* 63.

Page 79, line 26 from top, *add:*
Salmon, Introd. to N. T., 6-31; A. B. Bruce, in Present Day Tracts, 7 : no. 38.

Page 86, line 1, and page 133, line 26, *for* Supernatural, *read:* Superhuman.

Page 95, line 13 from bottom, and page 142, line 21 from bottom, *for* Priestly, *read:* Priestley.

Page 96, line 14, *for* apostles, *read:* apostles'.

Page 107, line 10, *add:* Zöckler, Die Urgeschichte der Erde und des Menschen, 137-163.

Page 109, line 18, *for* Jellet, *read:* Jellett.

Page 124, line 26, *for* Spencer, *read;* Spenser.

Page 134, line 23 from bottom, *omit* quotation-marks before the word: maintained; line 15 from bottom, *omit* quotation marks after the word: antecedents.

Page 142, line 4 from bottom, *add:*
See also art. on the Metaphysics of Oughtness, by F. L. Patton, in Presb. Rev., 1886 : 127-150.

Page 147, line 4 from bottom, after "the works of thy hands," *add:*

3 : 3, 4 — Christ is the builder of the house of Israel; "but he that built all things is God" = Christ is God, since the maker must be greater than his work, and the Maker of all things must be divine.

Page 149, line 8, *add:*

Eph. 5 : 5 — "kingdom of Christ and God."

Page 166, line 6 from bottom, after *applicatæ*, *add:* " [quotation marks].

Page 164, line 13 from bottom, *add:* James S. Candlish, The Work of the Holy Spirit.

Page 167, line 13 from bottom, *for* Neither, *read:* No one.

Page 169, line 22, *add:*

Jeremy Taylor: "He who goes about to speak of the mystery of the Trinity, and does it by words and names of man's invention, talking of essence and existences hypostases and personalities, priority in coequality, and unity in pluralities, may amuse himself and build a tabernacle in his head, and talk something — he knows not what; but the renewed man, that feels the power of the Father, to whom the Son is become wisdom, sanctification, and redemption, in whose heart the love of the Spirit of God is shed abroad — this man, though he understand nothing of what is unintelligible, yet he alone truly understands the Christian doctrine of the Trinity."

Page 174, line 10, *instead of* forsees, *read:* foresees.

Page 181, line 7 from bottom, *for* Andrew, *read:* Andrew Fuller.

Page 186, line 6, *for* Maccabees, *read:* 2 Maccabees.

Page 190, line 15, change the comma to a period, and *omit* the words: indeed it is impossible to conceive of its not having had a beginning.

Page 195, line 15 from bottom, *after* Creation, *add:* Zöckler, Die Urgeschichte der Erde und des Menschen, 1-77; Reusch, Biblische Schöpfungsgeschichte.

Page 196, line 28, *for* maintainance, *read:* maintenance.

Page 210, line 28, *add:*

Charles Kingsley, Two Years Ago: "He [Treluddra] is one of those base natures whom fact only lashes into greater fury,—a Pharaoh, whose heart the Lord himself can only harden"— here we would add the qualification: 'consistently with the limits which he has set to the operations of his grace.'

Page 218, line 1, *for* Monad, *read:* Monrad.

Page 221, line 4, *for* exeution, *read:* execution.

Page 236, line 8, *add:* Zöckler, Die Urgeschichte der Erde und des Menschen, 81-105.

Page 243, line 21 from bottom, *add:* Zöckler, Urgeschichte, 109-132.

Page 250, line 26, *for* breaths, *read:* breathes.

Page 253, line 15 from bottom, *for* creation, *read:* creatian.

Page 264, line 10, *for* combatted, *read:* combated.

Page 274, line 5, *for* is the only mode, *read:* is only the mode.

Page 282, after line 14 from bottom, *insert:*

Law reveals God's love and mercy, but only in their mandatory aspect: it requires in men conformity to the love and mercy of God; and as love and mercy in God are conditioned by holiness, so law requires that love and mercy should be conditioned by holiness in men. Law is therefore chiefly a revelation of holiness: it is in grace that we find the chief revelation of love; though even love does not save by ignoring holiness, but rather by vicariously satisfying its demands.

Page 288, last line, *for* חַטָּאת, *read:* חַטָּא; line 6 from bottom, *for* חַאָטָה, *read:* חַטָּאָה.

Page 291, line 18, *add:*

This theory confounds sin with the mere consciousness of sin: on Schleiermacher, see Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 1 : 341-349.

Page 291, line 2 from bottom, *add:*

London Spectator on Mephistopheles in Goethe's Faust: — "The great drama is radically false in its fundamental philosophy. Its primary notion is that even a spirit of pure evil is an exceedingly useful being, because he stirs into activity those whom he leads into sin, and so prevents them from rusting away in pure indolence. There are other and better means of stimulating the positive affections of men than by tempting them to sin."

Page 292, line 27, *add:*

On Hegel's view of sin, a view which denies holiness even to Christ, see Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 1 : 390-407.

Page 307, line 3 from bottom, *for* conclusion, *read:* exclusion.

Page 311, line 30, *for* while did, *read:* while he did.

Page 316, line 13 from bottom, *for* held, *read:* hold.

Page 337, line 28, *for* Burgess, *read:* Burgesse.

Page 348, line 6, after "to him it is sin," *add:*

John Ruskin: "The condemnation given from the Judgment Throne — most solemnly described — is for all the 'undones' and not the 'dones.' People are perpetually afraid of doing wrong; but unless they are doing its reverse energetically, they *do it all day long*, and the degree does not matter.

Page 350, line 3 from bottom, *for* determination, *read:* deterioration.

Page 351, line 3 from bottom, *add:*

Dorner, Glaubenslehre, 2 : 238, 239 (Syst. Doct., 3 : 134, 135).

Page 358, line 15 from bottom, *for* ἀπτακίζων, *read:* ἀπτικίζων.

Page 367, line 7 from bottom; and page 378, line 19 from top; after οὐρανῷ, *add:*

for advocacy of the common reading, see Broadus, in Hovey's Com. on John, 3 : 13.

Page 371, line 16, *for* 8, *read:* 18.

Page 377, line 4, *for* œcumenical, *read:* œcumenical.

Page 423, line 2 from bottom, *after* knoweth what, *insert:* is.

Page 450, line 19 from bottom, *after:* producing power by which the effect is secured, *add:*

James Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 1: preface, xiii — "A cause is that which determines the indeterminate."

Page 454, line 7, *add:* See Lotze, Outlines of Psychology (translated by Ladd), 142, 143.

Page 458, line 5, *after* Hovey, *add:*

Manual of Theology and Ethics, 245: see also Hovey's Com. on John, 1 : 12, 13 — "The meaning would then be this: 'Many did not receive him; but some did; and as to al who received him, he *gave* them grace by which they were enabled to do this, and so to become God's children.'"

Page 478, line 7, *add:*

Rom. 8 : 3 — "God, sending his own Son ..... condemned sin in the flesh" = the believer's sins were judged and condemned on Calvary. The way of pardon through Christ honors God's justice as well as God's mercy; *cf.* Rom. 3 : 26 — "that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus."

Page 501, line 16 from bottom, *for* mercy, *read:* memory.

Page 511, line 16, *for* Stephens, *read:* Stephanus.

Page 522, line 22, *for* work, *read:* word.

Page 540, line 3 from bottom, *add:*

Per contra, however, see 1 Cor. 11 : 34 — "let him eat at home" — where οἶκος is contrasted with the place of meeting; so also 1 Cor. 14 : 35 and Acts 20 : 20, where οἶκος seems to mean a private house.

Page 545, line 27, *add:*

C. Hebert, The Lord's Supper: History of Uninspired Teaching.

Page 548, line 23 from bottom, *after* body, *add:* Vedder, however, in Bap. Quar. Rev., 1886: 289, says that "The church at Bedford is proved by indisputable documentary evidence never to have been a Baptist church in any strict sense."

Page 560, line 16, *after* the resting place, *add:*

But Gesenius, Lexicon, 9th ed., says that though שְׁאוֹל is commonly explained as infinitive of שָׁאַל, to demand, it is undoubtedly allied to שְׁעַל (root שׁל), to be sunk and = 'the sunken, or deep, place.'

Page 560, line 22, *for* "gathered to their fathers." *read:* "gathered unto his people."

Page 581, line 25, *before* 20 : 12, *insert:* Rev.

Page 584, line 4 from bottom, *add:*

The "book of life" = the book of justification, in which are written the names of those who are united to Christ by faith; as the "book of death" would = the book of condemnation, in which are written the names of those who stand in their sins, as unrepentant and unforgiven transgressors of God's law.

The author's friends and former students are kindly requested to inform him of any additional errata which they may discover.

"THE EYE SEES ONLY THAT WHICH IT BRINGS WITH IT THE POWER OF SEEING."—*Cicero.*

"OPEN THOU MINE EYES, THAT I MAY BEHOLD WONDROUS THINGS OUT OF THY LAW."—*Psalm 119 : 18.*

"FOR WITH THEE IS THE FOUNTAIN OF LIFE: IN THY LIGHT SHALL WE SEE LIGHT."—*Psalm 36 : 9.*

"For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." I Cor 13:9, 10

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

PART I.

PROLEGOMENA.

CHAPTER I.

IDEA OF THEOLOGY.

Test Question

I. DEFINITION.—Theology is the science of God and of the relations between God and the universe.

Though the word 'theology' is sometimes employed in dogmatic writings to designate that single department of the science which treats of the divine nature and attributes, prevailing usage, since Abelard (A. D. 1079–1142) entitled his general treatise "Theologia Christiana," has included under that term the whole range of Christian doctrine.

Theology, therefore, gives account not only of God, but of those relations between God and the material and spiritual universe in view of which we speak of Creation, Providence, and Redemption.

John the Evangelist is called by the Fathers 'the theologian,' because he most fully treats of the internal relations of the persons of the Trinity. Gregory Nazianzen (328) received this designation because he defended the deity of Christ against the Arians. For a modern instance of this use of the term 'theology' in the narrow sense, see title of Dr. Hodge's first volume: "Systematic Theology; Vol. 1: *Theology*." But theology is not simply "the science of God," nor even "the science of God and man." It also gives account of the relations between God and the universe.

Yet theology does not properly include other sciences—it merely uses their results; see Wardlaw, Theology, 1: 1, 2. Physical science is not a part of theology. As a mere physicist, Humboldt did not need to mention the name of God in his "Cosmos" (but see Cosmos, 2: 413, where Humboldt says: "Psalm 104 presents an image of the whole Cosmos"). On the definition of theology, see Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 1, 2; Blunt, Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theology, art.: Theology; H. B. Smith, Introd. to Christ. Theol., 44; *cf.* Aristotle, Metaph., 10, 7, 4; 11, 6, 4; and Lactantius, De Ira Dei, 11.

II. AIM.—In defining theology as a science, we indicate its aim. Science does not create; it discovers. Science is not only the observing, recording, verifying, and formulating of objective facts; it is also the recognition and explication of the relations between these facts, and the synthesis of both the facts and the rational principles which unite them, in a comprehensive, rightly proportioned, and organic system.

Theology answers to this description of a science. It discovers facts and relations, but does not create them. As it deals with objective facts and

their relations, so its arrangement of these facts and relations is not optional, but determined by the nature of the material with which it deals.

In fine, the aim of theology may be stated as being the ascertainment of the facts respecting God and the relations between God and the universe, and the exhibition of these facts in their rational unity, as connected parts of a formulated and organic system of truth.

Scattered bricks and timbers are not a house, and facts alone do not constitute science. Science = facts + relations. Whewell, Hist. Inductive Sciences, I., Introd., 43: There may be facts without science, as in every common mind; there may be thought without science, as in early Greek philosophy. Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 14—"The pursuit of science is the pursuit of relations." Everett, Science of Thought, 3: "Logy" (*e. g.* in "theology"), from λόγος, = word + reason, expression + thought, fact + idea; *cf.* John 1: 1—"In the beginning was the Word."

Because theology deals with objective facts, we refuse to define it as "the science of religion"; *versus* Am. Theol. Rev., 1850: 101-126, and Thornwell, Theology, 1: 139. Both the facts and the relations with which theology has to deal have an existence entirely independent of the subjective mental processes of the theologian. A true theology thinks over again God's thoughts and brings them into God's order, as the builders of Solomon's temple took the stones already hewn, and put them into the places for which the architect had designed them. We cannot make theology, any more than we can make a law of physical nature. As the natural philosopher is "naturæ minister et interpres," so the theologian is the servant and interpreter of the objective truth of God. On the Idea of Theology as a System, see H. B. Smith, in Faith and Philosophy, 125-166.

Test Question

III. POSSIBILITY.—A particular science is possible only when three conditions combine, namely, the actual existence of the object with which the science deals, the subjective capacity of the human mind to know that object, and the provision of definite means by which the object is brought into contact with the mind.

In like manner, the possibility of theology has a threefold ground: 1. In the existence of a God who has relations to the universe; 2. In the capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain of these relations; and 3. In the provision of means by which God is brought into actual contact with the mind, or in other words, in the provision of a revelation.

We may illustrate the conditions of theology from selenology—the science not of "lunar politics," but of lunar physics. Selenology has three conditions: 1. the objective existence of the moon; 2. the subjective capacity of the human mind to know the moon; and 3. the provision of some means (*e. g.* the eye and the telescope) by which the gulf between man and the moon is bridged over, and by which the mind can come into actual cognizance of the facts with regard to the moon.

1. *In the existence of a God who has relations to the universe.* It has been objected, indeed, that since God and these relations are objects apprehended only by faith, they are not proper objects of knowledge or subjects for science. We reply that faith is only a higher sort of knowledge. Physical science rests also upon faith—faith in our own existence and our own faculties, in our primitive cognitions and in human testimony—but is not invalidated thereby, because this faith, though unlike sense-perception or logical deduction, is yet a cognitive act of the reason, and may be defined as certitude with respect to matters in which verification is unattainable.

The objection to theology mentioned and answered above is expressed in the words of Sir William Hamilton, Metaphysics, 44, 531: "Faith—belief—is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge." But science is knowledge, and what is beyond our knowledge cannot be matter for science. Pres. E. G. Robinson says well,

that knowledge and faith cannot be severed from one another, like bulkheads in a ship, the first of which may be crushed in while the second still keeps the vessel afloat. Hamilton consistently declares that the highest achievement of science is the erection of an altar "To The Unknown God." This however is not the representation of Scripture. *Cf.* John 17: 3—"this is life eternal, that they should know thee, the only true God;" and Jer. 9: 24—"let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me." For criticism of Hamilton, see H. B. Smith, Faith and Philosophy, 297-336. Fichte: "We are born in faith." Goethe called himself a believer in the five senses. Balfour, Defence of Philosophic Doubt, 277-295, shows that intuitive beliefs in space, time, cause, substance, right, are presupposed in the acquisition of all other knowledge. Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 14: If theology is to be overthrown because it starts from some primary terms and propositions, then all other sciences are overthrown with it. Mozley, Miracles, 104, defines faith as "unverified reason."

So the faith which gives fit material for theology is not to be confounded with opinion or imagination. It is simply certitude with regard to spiritual realities, upon the testimony of our own rational nature and upon the testimony of God. Its only peculiarity as a cognitive act of the reason is, that it is conditioned by holy affection. As the sciences of æsthetics and ethics, respectively, are products of reason as including in the one case a power of recognizing beauty practically inseparable from a love for beauty, and in the other case a power of recognizing the morally right practically inseparable from a love for the morally right, so the science of theology is a product of reason, but of reason as including a power of recognizing God which is practically inseparable from a love for God.

In the text we use the term 'reason' to signify the mind's whole power of knowing. Reason, in this sense, includes states of the sensibility, so far as they are indispensable to knowledge. We cannot know an orange by the eye alone; to the understanding of it, taste is as necessary as sight. Love for the beautiful and the right precedes knowledge of the beautiful and the right. Ullmann draws attention to the derivation of *sapientia*, wisdom, from *sapĕre*, to taste. So we cannot know God by intellect alone; the heart must go with the intellect to make knowledge of divine things possible. By the word "heart," the Scripture means simply holy affection, or sensibility + will. *Cf.* Ex. 35: 25—"the women that were wise-hearted"; Ps. 34: 8—"O taste and see that the Lord is good" = a right taste precedes correct sight; Jer. 24: 7—"I will give them a heart to know me"; Mat. 5: 8—"Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God"; John 7: 17—"If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself"; Eph. 1: 18—"having the eyes of your heart enlightened, that ye may know"; 1 John 4: 7, 8—"Every one that loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God."

This recognition of invisible realities upon God's testimony, and as conditioned upon a right state of the affections, is faith. As an operation of man's higher rational nature, though distinct from ocular vision or from reasoning, it is a kind of knowing, and so may furnish proper material for a scientific theology.

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 1: 50, follows Gerhard in making faith the joint act of intellect and will. Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 77, 78, speaks not only of the æsthetic reason but of the moral reason. Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 91, 109, 145, 191—"Faith is the certitude concerning matters in which verification is unattainable." Emerson, Essays, 2: 96—"Belief consists in accepting the affirmations of the soul—unbelief in rejecting them." Morell, Philos. of Religion, 38, 52, 53, quotes Coleridge: "Faith consists in the synthesis of the reason and the individual will, . . . and by virtue of the former (that is, reason), faith must be a light, a form of knowing, a beholding of truth." Faith, then, is not to be pictured as a blind girl clinging to a cross—faith is not blind—"else the cross may just as well be a crucifix or an image of Gaudama."

If a right state of heart be indispensable to faith and so to the knowledge of God, can there be any "*theologia irregenitorum*," or theology of the unregenerate? We reply: Just as the blind man can have a science of optics. The testimony of others gives it claims upon him; the dim light penetrating the obscuring membrane corrob-

orates this testimony. But as, in order to make his science of optics satisfactory or complete, the blind man must have the cataract removed from his eyes by some competent oculist, so in order to any complete or satisfactory theology the veil must be taken away from the heart by God himself (*cf.* 2 Cor. 3: 15, 16—"a veil lieth upon their heart. But whensoever it [marg. 'a man'] shall turn to the Lord, the veil is taken away"). See Foundations of our Faith, 12, 13; Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 1: 154–164; Presb. Quarterly, Oct., 1871, Oct., 1872, Oct., 1873; Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, 99, 117; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 2–8; New Englander, July, 1873: 481; Princeton Rev., 1864: 122; Christlieb, Modern Doubt, 124, 125; Grau, Ueber den Glauben als höchste Vernunft, in Beweis des Glaubens, 1865: 110; Dorner, Geschichte prot. Theol., 228; Newman, Univ. Sermons, 206; Hinton, Art of Thinking, Introd. by Hodgson, 5.

2. *In the capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain of these relations.* But it has been urged that such knowledge is impossible for the following reasons:

A. Because we can know only phenomena. We reply: (*a*) We know mental as well as physical phenomena. (*b*) In knowing phenomena, whether mental or physical, we know substance as underlying the phenomena, and as manifested through them. (*c*) Our minds bring to the observation of phenomena not only this knowledge of substance, but also the knowledge of time, space, and cause, realities which are in no sense phenomenal. Since these objects of knowledge are not phenomenal, the fact that God is not phenomenal cannot prevent us from knowing him.

Versus Comte, Positive Philosophy, Martineau's transl., 26, 28, 33—"In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity—yet it is this very activity you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe." The phrase "Positive Philosophy" implies that all knowledge of mind is negative. This view is refuted by the two facts of (1) consciousness, and (2) memory; see Martineau, Essays Philos. and Theol., 1: 24–40, 207–212. By phenomena we mean "facts, in distinction from their ground, principle, or law"; "neither phenomena nor qualities, as such, are perceived, but objects, percepts, or beings; and it is by an afterthought or reflex process that these are connected as qualities and are referred to as substances"; see Porter, Human Intellect, 51, 238, 520, 619–637, 640–645. Phenomena may be internal, *e. g.* thoughts; in this case the noumenon is the mind, of which these thoughts are the manifestations. Qualities, whether mental or material, imply the existence of a substance to which they belong—mind or matter: they can no more be conceived of as existing apart from substance than the upper side of a plank can be conceived of as existing without an under side; see Bowne, Review of Herbert Spencer, 47, 207–217. Without substance in which they inhere, the qualities of an object have no ground of unity. The characteristics of substance are (1) being, (2) power, (3) permanence; see McCosh, Intuitions, 138–154 (Eng. ed., 161). "The theory that disproves God, disproves an external world and the existence of the soul"; see Diman, Theistic Argument, 337, 363. We know something beyond phenomena, viz.: law, cause, force—or we can have no science; see Tulloch, on Comte, in Modern Theories, 53–73; see also Bib. Sac., 1874: 211; Alden, Philosophy, 44; Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 87; Fleming, Vocab. of Philosophy, art.: Phenomena; New Englander, July, 1875: 537–539.

B. Because we can know only that which bears analogy to our own nature or experience. We reply: (*a*) It is not essential to knowledge that there be similarity of nature between the knower and the known. The mind knows matter, though mind and matter are opposite poles of existence. (*b*) Our past experience, although greatly facilitating new acquisitions, is not the measure of our possible knowledge. Else the first act of knowledge would be inexplicable, and all revelation of higher characters to lower would be precluded, as well as all progress to knowledge which surpassed our present attainments. (*c*) Even if knowledge depended upon similarity of

nature and experience, we might still know God, since we are made in God's image, and there are important analogies between the divine nature and our own.

Versus Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 79–82—"Knowledge is recognition and classification." But we reply that a thing must first be perceived, in order to be recognized, or compared with something else; see Porter, Human Intellect, 206; Sir Wm. Hamilton, Metaphysics, 351, 352. We reject Monism in both its forms: 1. Materialism, which says that mind knows matter because mind is matter; and 2. Idealism, which says that mind knows matter because matter is mind. Porter, Human Intellect, 486—"Induction is possible only upon the assumption that the intellect of man is a reflex of the divine intellect, or that man is made in the image of God." Note, however, that man is made in God's image, not God in man's. The painting is the image of the landscape, not *vice versa*; for there is much in the landscape that has nothing corresponding to it in the painting. Idolatry perversely makes God in the image of man. Murphy, Scientific Bases, 122; McCosh, in International Rev., 1875: 105; Bib. Sac., 1867: 624.

C. Because we know only that of which we can conceive, in the sense of forming an adequate mental image. We reply: (*a*) It is true that we know only that of which we can conceive, if by the term 'conceive' we mean our distinguishing in thought the object known from all other objects. But, (*b*) The objection confounds conception with that which is merely its occasional accompaniment and help, namely, the picturing of the object by the imagination. In this sense, conceivability is not a final test of truth. (*c*) That the formation of a mental image is not essential to conception or knowledge, is plain when we remember that, as a matter of fact, we both conceive and know many things of which we cannot form a mental image of any sort that in the least corresponds to the reality; for example, force, cause, law, space, our own minds. So we may know God, although we cannot form an adequate mental image of him.

Versus Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 25–36, 98—"The reality underlying appearances is totally and forever inconceivable by us." *Per contra*, see Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, 77, 78 (*cf.* 26)—"The first distinguishing feature of a concept, viz.: that it cannot in itself be depicted to sense or imagination." Porter, Human Intellect, 392 (see also 429, 656)—"The *concept* is not a mental image: we recall an individual *percept*, one or many." Sir Wm. Hamilton: "The unpicturable notions of the intelligence." Martineau, Religion and Materialism, 39, 40—"This doctrine of Nescience stands in exactly the same relation to causal power, whether you construe it as Material Force or as Divine Agency. Neither can be *observed*; one or the other must be *assumed*. If you admit to the category of knowledge only what we learn from observation, particular or generalized, then is Force unknown; if you extend the word to what is imported by the intellect itself into our cognitive acts, to make them such, then is God known." Spencer himself calls the inscrutable reality back of phenomena an infinite and absolute Force and Cause. "It seems," says Father Daigairns, "that a great deal is known about the Unknowable." See McCosh, Intuitions, 186–189 (Eng. ed., 214); Murphy, Scientific Bases, 133; Bowne, Review of Spencer, 30–34; New Englander, July, 1875: 543, 544; Oscar Craig, in Presb. Rev., July, 1883: 594–602.

D. Because we can know truly only that which we know in whole and not in part. We reply: (*a*) The objection confounds partial knowledge with the knowledge of a part. We know the mind in part, but we do not know a part of the mind. (*b*) If the objection were valid, no real knowledge of anything would be possible, since we know no single thing in all its relations. We conclude that, although God is a being not composed of parts, we may yet have a partial knowledge of him, and this knowledge, though not exhaustive, may yet be real, and adequate to the purposes of science.

Versus Mansel, Limits of Relig. Thought, 97, 98. *Per contra*, see Martineau, Essays, 1 : 291. The mind does not exist in space, and has no parts (sides, corners). Yet we find the material for mental science in partial knowledge of the mind. We are not "geographers of the divine nature"—Bowne, Review of Spencer, 72—but we say with Paul, not "now know we a part of God," but "now know we [God] in part" (1 Cor. 13 : 12); *cf.* John 17 : 3 —"this is life eternal, that they should know thee, the only true God:" Jer. 9 : 24—"let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me." We may know truly what we do not know exhaustively; see Eph. 3 : 19—"to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge." Dorner: "Only he who knows God, knows his unfathomableness."

E. Because all predicates of God are negative, and therefore furnish no real knowledge. We answer: (*a*) Predicates derived from our own consciousness, such as spirit, love, and holiness, are positive. (*b*) The terms 'infinite' and 'absolute', moreover, express not merely a negative but a positive idea—the idea, in the former case, of the absence of all limit, the idea that the object thus described goes on and on forever; the idea, in the latter case, of entire self-sufficiency. Since predicates of God, therefore, are not merely negative, the argument mentioned above furnishes no valid reason why we may not know him.

Versus Sir Wm. Hamilton, Metaph., 530—"The absolute and the infinite can each only be conceived as a negation of the thinkable; in other words, of the absolute and infinite we have no conception at all." Hamilton here confounds the infinite, or the absence of all limits, with the indefinite, or the absence of all known limits. *Per contra*, see Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 248; Philosophy of the Infinite, 272—"Negation of one thing is possible only by affirmation of another." McCosh, Intuitions, 194, note; Porter, Human Intellect, 651, 652; Mivart, Lessons from Nature, 363. Yet a plane which is unlimited in the one respect of length may be limited in other respects, such as breadth. Our doctrine here is not therefore inconsistent with what immediately follows.

F. Because to know is to limit or define. Hence the Absolute as unlimited, and the Infinite as undefined, cannot be known. We answer: (*a*) God is absolute, not as existing in *no* relation, but as existing in no *necessary* relation; and, (*b*) God is infinite, not as excluding all co-existence of the finite with himself, but as being the ground of the finite, and so unfettered by it. (*c*) God is actually limited by the unchangeableness of his own attributes and personal distinctions, as well as by his self-chosen relations to the universe he has created and to humanity in the person of Christ. God is therefore limited and defined in such a sense as to render knowledge of him possible.

Versus Mansel, Limits of Religious Thought, 75-84, 93-95. *Cf.* Spinoza: "Determinatio est negatio"; hence to define God is to deny him. But we deny that all limitation is imperfection. Man can be other than he is. Not so God—at least internally. But this limitation, inherent in his unchangeable attributes and personal distinctions, is his perfection. Externally, all limitations upon God are self-limitations, and so are consistent with his perfection. That God should not be able thus to limit himself in creation and redemption would render all self-sacrifice in him impossible, and so would subject him to the greatest of limitations. Perfection necessarily implies the power of self-limitation. See Pfleiderer, Die Religion, 1 : 189, 195; Porter, Human Intellect, 653; Murphy, Scientific Bases, 130; Calderwood, Philos. of Inf., 168; McCosh, Intuitions, 186; Hickok, Rational Cosmology, 85.

G. Because all knowledge is relative to the knowing agent; that is, what we know, we know, not as it is objectively, but only as it is related to our own senses and faculties. In reply: (*a*) We grant that we can know only that which has relation to our faculties. But this is simply to say that we know only that which we come into mental contact with, that is, we know only what we know. But, (*b*) We deny that what we come into mental

contact with is known by us as other than it is. So far as it is known at all, it is known as it is. In other words, the laws of our knowing are not merely arbitrary and regulative, but correspond to the nature of things. We conclude that, in theology, we are equally warranted in assuming that the laws of our thought are laws of God's thought, and that the results of normally conducted thinking with regard to God correspond to the objective reality.

Versus Sir Wm. Hamilton, Metaph., 96-116, and H. Spencer, First Principles, 68-97. The doctrine of relativity is derived from Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, who holds that *a priori* judgments are simply "regulative." But we reply that when our primitive beliefs are found to be simply regulative, they will cease to regulate. The forms of thought are also facts of nature. The mind does not, like the glass of a kaleidoscope, itself furnish the forms; it recognizes these as having an existence external to itself; see Bishop Temple, Bampton Lectures for 1884: 13. W. T. Harris, in Journ. Spec. Philosophy, 1: 22, exposes Herbert Spencer's self-contradiction: "All knowledge is, not absolute, but relative; our knowledge of this fact however is, not relative, but absolute." On Sir Wm. Hamilton's theory of knowledge, see H. B. Smith, Faith and Philosophy, 297-336; J. S. Mill, Examination, 1: 113-134; Herbert, Modern Realism Examined; Pres. M. B. Anderson, art.: "Hamilton," in Johnson's Encyclopædia; McCosh, Intuitions, 139-146, 340, 341, and Christianity and Positivism, 97-123; Maurice, What is Revelation? Alden, Intellectual Philos., 48-79 (esp. 71-79); Porter, Human Int., 525; Murphy, Scientific Bases, 103; Bib. Sac., Apr., 1868; 341; Princeton Rev., 1864: 122; Bowne, Review of H. Spencer, 76; Bowen, in Princeton Rev., Mar., 1878: 445-448; Mind, April, 1878: 257; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, 117; Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 109-113; Inverach, in Present Day Tracts, 5: no. 29.

3. *In God's actual revelation of himself and certain of these relations.* As we do not in this place attempt a positive proof of God's existence or of man's capacity for the knowledge of God, so we do not now attempt to prove that God has brought himself into contact with man's mind by revelation. We shall consider the grounds of this belief hereafter. Our aim at present is simply to show that, granting the fact of revelation, a scientific theology is possible. This has been denied upon the following grounds.

A. That revelation, as a making known, is necessarily internal and subjective—either a mode of intelligence, or a quickening of man's cognitive powers—and hence can furnish no objective facts such as constitute the proper material for science.

The objection here mentioned is urged by the idealistic school of thinkers, as the objections previously considered are mainly urged by those who incline to materialism. As the pendulum of thought seems now about to swing once more in the direction of idealism, a careful examination of the objection before us is indispensable. It may be found stated in Morell, Philos. of Religion, 128-131, 143—"The Bible cannot in strict accuracy of language be called a revelation, since a revelation always implies an actual process of intelligence in a living mind"; F. W. Newman, Phases of Faith, 152—"Of our moral and spiritual God we know nothing without—everything within"; Theodore Parker: "Verbal revelation can never communicate a simple idea like that of God, Justice, Love, Religion"; see review of Parker in Bib. Sac., 18: 24-27.

In reply to this objection,

(*a*) We grant that revelation, to be effective, must be the means of inducing a new mode of intelligence, or, in other words, must be understood. We grant that this understanding of divine things is impossible without a quickening of man's cognitive powers. We grant, moreover, that revelation, when originally imparted, was often internal and subjective.

(*b*) But we deny that external revelation is therefore useless or impossible. Even if religious ideas sprang up wholly from within, an external revelation

might stir up the dormant powers of the mind. Religious ideas, however, do not spring wholly from within. External revelation can impart them. Man can reveal himself to man by external communications, and if God has equal power with man, God can reveal himself to man in like manner.

(*c*) Hence God's revelation may be, and, as we shall hereafter see, it is, in great part, an external revelation in works and words. We claim, moreover, that in many cases where truth was originally communicated internally, the same Spirit who communicated it has brought about an external record of it and so has insured its preservation in permanent and written form.

(*d*) With this external record we shall also see that there is given upon proper conditions a special influence of God's Spirit, so to quicken our cognitive powers that the external record reproduces in our minds the ideas with which the minds of the writers were at first divinely filled.

(*e*) Internal revelations thus recorded, and external revelations thus interpreted, both furnish objective facts which may serve as proper material for science. Although revelation in its widest sense may include, and as constituting the ground of the possibility of theology does include, both insight and illumination, it may also be used to denote simply a provision of the external means of knowledge, and theology has to do with inward revelations only as they are expressed in, or as they agree with, this objective standard.

We may illustrate the need of internal revelation from Egyptology, which is impossible so long as the external revelation in the hieroglyphics is uninterpreted. External revelation (φανέρωσις, Rom. 1 : 19, 20) must by supplemented by internal revelation (ἀποκάλυψις, 1 Cor. 2 : 10–12). Christ is the organ of external, the Holy Spirit the organ of internal, revelation. In Christ (2 Cor. 1 : 20) are "the yea" and "the Amen" = the objective certainty and the subjective certitude, the reality and the realization. Revelation objective, as at Sinai; subjective, as in Elisha's knowledge of Gehazi (2 K. 5 : 26). On the whole subject, see Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3 : 37–43; Nitzsch, Syst. Christ. Doctrine, 72; Luthardt, Fund. Truths, 193; Auberlen, Div. Rev., Introd., 29; Martineau, Essays, 1 : 171, 280; Bib. Sac., 1867 : 593, and 1872 : 428; Porter, Hum. Intellect, 373–375; Mead, in Boston Lectures, 1871 : 58.

B. That many of the truths thus revealed are too indefinite to constitute the material for science, because they belong to the region of the feelings, because they are beyond our full understanding, or because they are destitute of orderly arrangement.

See Jacobi and Schleiermacher, who regard theology as a mere account of devout Christian feelings, the grounding of which in objective historical facts is a matter of comparative indifference; see Hagenbach, Hist. Doctrine, 2 : 401–403. Allied to this is the view of Feuerbach, to whom religion is a matter of subjective fancy, and the view of Tyndall, who would remit theology to the region of vague feeling and aspiration, but would exclude it from the realm of science: see Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, translated by Marian Evans, and Tyndall, Belfast Address.

We reply:

(*a*) Theology has to do with subjective feelings only as they can be defined, and shown to be effects of objective truth upon the mind. These are not more obscure than the facts of morals or psychology, and the same objection which would exclude such feelings from theology, would make these latter sciences impossible. Moreover,

(*b*) Those facts of revelation which are beyond our full understanding, may, like the nebular hypothesis in astronomy or the atomic theory in chemistry, furnish a principle of union between great classes of other facts

otherwise irreconcilable. We may define our concepts of God, and even of the Trinity, at least sufficiently to distinguish them from all other concepts, and whatever difficulty may encumber the putting of them into language only shows the importance of attempting it and the value of even an approximate success.

(c) Even though there were no orderly arrangement of these facts, either in nature or in Scripture, an accurate systematizing of them by the human mind would not thereby be proved impossible, unless a principle were assumed which would show all physical science to be equally impossible. Astronomy and geology are constructed by putting together multitudinous facts which at first sight seem to have no order. So with theology. And yet, although revelation does not present to us a dogmatic system ready-made, a dogmatic system is not only implicitly contained therein, but parts of the system are wrought out in the epistles of the New Testament, as for example in Rom. 5 : 12–19; 1 Cor. 15 : 3, 4; 8 : 6; 1 Tim. 3 : 16; Heb. 6 : 1, 2.

We may illustrate the construction of theology from the dissected map, two pieces of which are already put together. Origen: God gives us truth in single threads, which we must weave into a finished texture. Scripture hints at the possibilities of combination, in Rom. 5 : 12–19, with its grouping of the facts of sin and salvation about the two persons, Adam and Christ; in Rom. 4 : 24, 25, with its linking of the resurrection of Christ and our justification; in 1 Cor. 8 : 6, with its indication of the relations between the Father and Christ; in 1 Tim. 3 : 16, with its poetical summary of the facts of redemption (see Commentaries of DeWette, Meyer, Fairbairn); in Heb. 6 : 1, 2, with its statement of the first principles of the Christian faith. On the whole subject see Martineau, Essays, 1 : 29, 40; Am. Theol. Rev., 1859: 101-126—art. on the Idea, Sources, and Uses of Christian Theology.

Test Question main points in order

IV. Necessity.—The necessity of theology has its grounds

(a) *In the organizing instinct of the human mind.* This organizing principle is a part of our constitution. The mind cannot endure confusion or apparent contradiction in known facts. The tendency to harmonize and unify its knowledge appears so soon as the mind becomes reflective; just in proportion to its endowments and culture, does the impulse to systematize and formulate increase. This is true of all departments of human inquiry, but it is peculiarly true of our knowledge of God. Since the truth with regard to God is the most important of all, theology meets the deepest want of man's rational nature. Theology is a rational necessity. If all existing theological systems were destroyed to-day, new systems would rise to-morrow. So inevitable is the operation of this law that those who most decry theology, show nevertheless that they have made a theology for themselves, and often one sufficiently meagre and blundering. Hostility to theology, where it does not originate in mistaken fears for the corruption of God's truth, or in a naturally illogical structure of mind, often proceeds from a license of speculation which cannot brook the restraints of a complete Scriptural system.

"Every man has as much theology as he can hold." Consciously or unconsciously, we philosophize, as naturally as we speak prose. See Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 27–52; Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 195–199.

(b) *In the relation of systematic truth to the development of character.* Truth thoroughly digested is essential to the growth of Christian character in the individual and in the church. All knowledge of God has its influence upon character, but most of all the knowledge of spiritual facts in

their relations. Theology cannot, as has sometimes been objected, deaden the religious affections, since it only draws out from their sources and puts into rational connection with each other the truths which are best adapted to nourish the religious affections. On the other hand, the strongest Christians are those who have firmest grasp upon the great doctrines of Christianity; the heroic ages of the church have been those which have witnessed most consistently to them; the piety that can be injured by the systematic exhibition of them must be weak, or mystical, or mistaken.

Some theology is necessary to conversion—at least, knowledge of sin and knowledge of a Savior. For texts which represent truth as nourishment, see Jer. 3 : 15—"feed you with knowledge and understanding"; Mat. 4 : 4—"man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God"; 1 Cor. 3 : 1, 2—"babes in Christ .... I fed you with milk, not with meat"; Heb. 5 : 14—"but solid food is for full-grown men." Christian morality is a fruit which grows only from the tree of doctrine. Christian character rests upon Christian truth as its foundation; see 1 Cor. 3 : 12-15—"I laid a foundation, and another buildeth thereon." See Dorus Clarke, Saying the Catechism; Simon, on Christ. Doctrine and Life, in Bib. Sac., July, 1884 : 433-449.

(c) *In the importance to the preacher of definite and just views of doctrine.* His chief intellectual qualification must be the power clearly and comprehensively to conceive, and accurately and powerfully to express, the truth. He can be the agent of the Holy Spirit in converting and sanctifying men, only as he can wield "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God" (Eph. 6 : 17), or, in other language, only as he can impress truth upon the minds and consciences of his hearers. Nothing more certainly nullifies his efforts than confusion and inconsistency in his statements of doctrine. His object is to replace obscure and erroneous conceptions among his hearers by those which are correct and vivid. He cannot do this without knowing the facts with regard to God in their relations—knowing them, in short, as parts of a system. With this truth he is put in trust. To mutilate it or misrepresent it, is not only sin against the Revealer of it—it may also prove the ruin of men's souls. The best safeguard against such mutilation or misrepresentation, is the diligent study of the several doctrines of the faith in their relations to each other, and especially to the central theme of theology, the person and work of Jesus Christ.

The more refined and reflective the age, the more it requires reasons for feeling. Imagination (poetry, eloquence, political and military enthusiasm) is not less strong, but more rational. Progress from "Buncombe," in forensic oratory, to sensible and logical address. In pulpit oratory, mere Scripture quotation and fervid appeal are no longer sufficient. The preacher must furnish a basis for feeling by producing intelligent conviction. He must instruct before he can move. Spurgeon: "We shall never have great preachers until we have great divines. You cannot build a man-of-war out of a currant-bush, nor can great soul-moving preachers be formed out of superficial students." Illustrate by mistake in physician's prescription, and by sowing crop of acorns.

(d) *In the intimate connection between correct doctrine and the safety and aggressive power of the church.* The safety and progress of the church is dependent upon her "holding the pattern of sound words" (2 Tim. 1 : 13), and serving as "pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Tim. 3 : 15). Defective understanding of the truth results sooner or later in defects of organization, of operation, and of life. Thorough comprehension of Christian truth as an organized system furnishes, on the other hand, not only an invaluable defense against heresy and immorality, but also an indispensable stimulus and instrument in aggressive labor for the world's conversion.

The creeds of the church have not originated in mere speculative curiosity and logical hair-splitting. They are statements of doctrine in which the attacked and imperiled church has sought to express the truth which constitutes her very life. Those who deride the early creeds have small conception of the intellectual acumen and the moral earnestness which went to the making of them. The creeds of the third and fourth centuries embody the results of controversies which exhausted the possibilities of heresy with regard to the Trinity and the Person of Christ, and which set up bars against false doctrine to the end of time.

(*e*) *In the direct and indirect injunctions of Scripture.* The Scriptures urge upon us the thorough and comprehensive study of the truth (John 5 : 39, marg., "Search the Scriptures"), the comparing and harmonizing of its different parts (1 Cor. 2 : 13, "comparing spiritual things with spiritual"), the gathering of all about the great central fact of revelation (Col. 1 : 27, "which is Christ in you, the hope of glory"), the preaching of it in its wholeness as well as in its due proportions (2 Tim. 4 : 2, "Preach the word"). The minister of the gospel is called "a scribe who hath been made a disciple to the kingdom of heaven" (Mat. 13 : 52); the "pastors" of the churches are at the same time to be "teachers" (Eph. 4 : 11); the bishop must be "apt to teach" (1 Tim. 3 : 2), "handling aright the word of truth" (2 Tim. 2 : 15), "holding to the faithful word which is according to the teaching, that he may be able both to exhort in the sound doctrine and to convict the gainsayers" (Tit. 1 : 9).

As a means of instructing the church and of securing progress in his own understanding of Christian truth, it is well for the pastor to preach regularly each month a doctrinal sermon, and to expound in course the principal articles of the faith. The treatment of doctrine in these sermons should be simple enough to be comprehensible by intelligent youth; it should be made vivid and interesting by the help of brief illustrations; and at least one-third of each sermon should be devoted to the practical applications of the doctrine propounded.

Test Question

V. Relation to Religion.—Theology and religion are related to each other as effects, in different spheres, of the same cause. As theology is an effect produced in the sphere of systematic thought by the facts respecting God and the relations between God and the universe, so religion is an effect which these facts produce in the sphere of individual or collective life. With regard to the term 'religion', notice:

1. *Derivation.*

(*a*) The derivation from *religare*, 'to bind' or 'to bind back' (man to God), is negatived by the authority of Cicero and of the best modern etymologists; by the difficulty, on this hypothesis, of explaining such forms as *religio*, *religens;* and by the necessity, in that case, of presupposing a fuller knowledge of sin and redemption than was common to the ancient heathen world.

For advocacy of the derivation of *religio*, as meaning 'binding duty,' from *religare*, see Lange, Dogmatik, 1: 185–196. Lange cites *rebellio*, from *rebellare*, and *optio*, from *optare*. But we reply that many verbs of the first conjugation are derived from obsolete verbs of the third conjugation.

(*b*) The more correct derivation is from *relegĕre*, 'to go over again,' 'carefully to ponder.' Its original meaning is therefore 'reverent observance' (of duties due to the gods).

For the derivation favored in the text, see Curtius, Griechische Etymologie, 5te Aufl.,

304; Fick, Vergl. Wörterb. der Indoger. Spr., 2: 227; Vanicek, Gr.-Lat. Etym. Wörterb., 2: 829; Andrews, Latin Lexicon, *in voce;* Nitzsch, System of Christ. Doctrine, 7; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 75-77; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 1: 6; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3: 18.

2. *False conceptions.*

(*a*) Religion is not merely, as Hegel declared, a kind of knowing; for it would then be only an incomplete form of philosophy, and the measure of knowledge in each case would be the measure of piety.

In a system of idealistic pantheism, God is the subject of religion as well as its object. Religion = God's knowing himself through the human consciousness. The Gnostics, Stapfer, Henry VIII, show that there may be much theological knowledge without true religion. Inaccuracy of Chillingworth's maxim: "The Bible only, the religion of Protestants." See Hamerton, Intel. Life, 214; Bib. Sac., 9: 374. On Hegel, see Porter, Human Intellect, 59, 60, 412, 525, 529, 532, 536, 589, 650.

(*b*) Religion is not, as Schleiermacher held, the mere feeling of dependence; for such feeling is not religious, unless exercised toward God and accompanied by moral effort.

Position of Schleiermacher in German theology, as transition from the old rationalism to evangelical faith. "Like Lazarus, with the grave-clothes of a pantheistic philosophy entangling his steps," yet with a Moravian experience of the life of God in the soul, he based religion upon the inner certainties of Christian feeling. But though faith begins in feeling, it does not end there. Valuelessness of mere feeling shown in emotions of theatre-goers, and in occasional phenomena of revivals. *Cf.* James 1: 27—"Pure religion ..... is this, To visit the fatherless"; 2: 17—"faith without works is dead." On Schleiermacher, see Bib. Sac., Apr., 1852: 375; July, 1883: 534; Liddon, Elements of Religion, lect. 1; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 14; Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 1: 175; Hagenbach, Encyclop., 2te Aufl., 13: 525-571; Fisher, Essays on Supernat. Orig. of Christianity, 563-570; Caird, Philos. of Religion, 160-186. On emotional excitement in preaching, see Kerfoot, in Bap. Rev., April, 1884: 167-184.

(*c*) Religion is not, as Kant maintained, morality or moral action; for morality is conformity to an abstract law of right, while religion is essentially a relation to a person, from whom the soul receives blessing and to whom it surrenders itself in love and obedience.

Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Beschluss: "I know of but two beautiful things, the starry heavens above my head and the sense of duty within my heart." But the mere sense of duty only distresses. Objections to the word "obey" as the imperative of religion: (1) It makes religion a matter of will only. (2) Will presupposes affection. (3) Love is not subject to will. (4) It makes God all law and no grace. (5) It makes the Christian a servant only, not a friend. See Shedd, Sermons to the Natural Man, 244-246; Liddon, Elements of Religion, 19. *Versus* Matthew Arnold: Religion is "Ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling." This leaves out of view the receptive element in religion, as well as its relation to a personal God.

3. *Essential idea.*

Religion in its essential idea is a life in God, or, in other words, a life lived in recognition of God, in communion with God, and under control of the indwelling Spirit of God. Since it is a life, it cannot be described as consisting solely in the exercise of any one of the powers of intellect, affection, or will. As physical life involves the unity and coöperation of all the organs of the body, so religion, or spiritual life, involves the united working of all the powers of the soul. To feeling, however, we must assign the logical priority, since holy affection toward God, imparted in regeneration, is the condition of truly knowing God and of truly serving him.

See Godet, on the Ultimate Design of Man—"God in man and man in God"—in Princeton Rev., Nov., 1880; Pfleiderer, Die Religion, 5-79, and Religionsphilosophie, 255:

Religion is "Sache des ganzen Geisteslebens." Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 81-85; Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2: 227; Nitzsch, System of Christ. Doctrine, 10-28; Luthardt, Fund. Truths, 147; Twesten, Dogmatik, 1: 12. Query: Can a man, in strict propriety of speech, be said to "get religion"?

4. *Inferences.*

From this definition of religion it follows:

(*a*) That in strictness there is but one religion. Man is a religious being, indeed, as having the capacity for this divine life. He is actually religious, however, only when he enters into this living relation to God. False religions are the caricatures which men given to sin, or the imaginations which men groping after light, form of this life of the soul in God.

Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 88-93; Peabody, Christianity the Religion of Nature, 18—"If Christianity be true, it is not *a* religion, but *the* religion. If Judaism be also true, it is so not as distinct from but as coincident with Christianity, the one religion to which it can bear only the relation of the part to the whole. If there be portions of truth in other religious systems, they are not portions of other religions, but portions of the one religion which somehow or other became incorporated with fables and falsities."

(*b*) That the content of religion is greater than that of theology. The facts of religion come within the range of theology only so far as they can be definitely conceived, accurately expressed in language, and brought into rational relation to each other.

(*c*) That religion is to be distinguished from formal worship, which is simply the outward expression of religion. As such expression, worship is "formal communion between God and his people." In it God speaks to man and man to God. It, therefore, properly includes the reading of Scripture and preaching on the side of God, and prayer and song on the side of the people.

On the relation between religion and worship, see art. by Prof. Day, in New Englander, Jan., 1882.

CHAPTER II.

MATERIAL OF THEOLOGY.

Test Question place in sequence

I. Sources of Theology.—God himself, in the last analysis, must be the only source of knowledge with regard to his own being and relations. Theology is therefore a summary and explanation of the content of God's self-revelations. These are, first, the revelation of God in nature; secondly and supremely, the revelation of God in the Scriptures.

Ambrose: "To whom shall I give greater credit concerning God than to God himself?" Von Baader: "To know God without God is impossible; there is no knowledge without him who is the prime source of knowledge."

1. *Scripture and Nature.* By nature we here mean not only physical facts, or facts with regard to the substances, properties, forces, and laws of the material world, but also spiritual facts, or facts with regard to the intellectual and moral constitution of man, and the orderly arrangement of human society and history.

We here use the word 'nature' in the ordinary sense, as including man. There is another and more proper sense of the word 'nature,' which makes it simply a complex of forces and beings under the law of cause and effect. To nature in this sense man belongs only as respects his body, while as immaterial and personal he is a supernatural being. Free will is not under the law of physical and mechanical causation. As Bushnell has said: "Nature and the supernatural together constitute the one system of God." Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World, 232—"Things are natural or supernatural according to where we stand. Man is supernatural to the mineral; God is supernatural to the man." We shall in subsequent chapters use the term 'nature' in the narrow sense. The universal use of the phrase "Natural Theology," however, compels us in this chapter to employ the word 'nature' in its broader sense as including man, although we do this under protest, and with this explanation of the more proper meaning of the term. See Hopkins, in Princeton Rev., Sept., 1882: 183 *sq.*

(*a*) Natural theology.—The Scriptures assert that God has revealed himself in nature. There is not only an outward witness to his existence and character in the constitution and government of the universe (Ps. 19; Acts 14 : 17; Rom. 1 : 20), but an inward witness to his existence and character in the heart of every man (Rom. 1 : 17, 18, 19, 20, 32; 2 : 15). The systematic exhibition of these facts, whether derived from observation, history, or science, constitutes natural theology.

Outward witness: Ps. 19 : 1-6—"The heavens declare the glory of God"; Acts 14 : 17—"he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons"; Rom. 1 : 20—"for the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity." Inward witness: Rom. 1 : 19—τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ = "that which is known of God is manifest among them." Compare the ἀποκαλύπτεται of the gospel, in verse 17, with the ἀποκαλύπτεται of wrath, in v. 18—two revelations, one of ὀργή, the other of χάρις; see Shedd, Homiletics, 11. Rom. 1 : 32—"knowing the ordinance of God"; 12 : 5—"they show the work of the law written in their hearts." Therefore even the heathen are "without excuse" (Rom. 1 : 20). There are two books: Nature and Scripture—one written, the other unwritten: and there is need of studying both. On the passages in Romans, see the Commentary of Hodge.

(*b*) Natural theology supplemented.—The Scriptures declare, however, with equal plainness, that the revelation of God in nature does not supply all the knowledge which a sinner needs (Acts 17 : 23 ; Eph. 3 : 9). This revelation is therefore supplemented by another, in which divine attributes and merciful provisons only dimly shadowed forth in nature are made known to men. This latter revelation consists of a series of supernatural events and communications, the record of which is preserved in the Scriptures. There is, indeed, an internal work of the divine Spirit, by which the outer word is made an inner word, and its truth and power are manifested to the heart. This teaching of the Spirit, however, is not a giving of new truth, but an illumination of the mind to perceive the truth already revealed. Christian experience is but a testing and proving of the truth objectively contained in Scripture. While theology, therefore, depends upon the teaching of the Spirit to interpret, and upon Christian experience to illustrate, the Scriptures, it looks to the Scriptures themselves as its chief source of material and its final standard of appeal. We use the word revelation, therefore, henceforth, to designate the objective truth made known in Scripture.

Acts 17 : 23—Paul shows that, though the Athenians, in the erection of an altar to an unknown God, "acknowledged a divine existence beyond any which the ordinary rites of their worship recognized, that Being was still unknown to them; they had no just conception of his nature and perfections" (Hackett, *in loco*). Eph. 3 : 9—"the mystery which from all ages hath been hid in God"—this mystery is in the gospel made known for man's salvation. "Experience," from *experior*, to test, try. Christian consciousness is not *norma normans*, but *norma normata*. Light, like life, comes to us through the mediation of others. Yet the first comes from God as really as the last, of which without hesitation we say: "God made me," though we have human parents. See Calvin, Institutes, book I : ch. 7—"As nature has an immediate manifestation of God in conscience, a mediate in his works, so revelation has an immediate manifestation of God in the Spirit, a mediate in the Scriptures." See Twesten, Dogmatik, 1 : 344-348; Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1 : 15.

(*c*) The theology of Scripture not unnatural.—Though we speak of the systematized truths of nature as constituting natural theology, we are not to infer that Scriptural theology is unnatural. Since the Scriptures have the same author as nature, the same principles are illustrated in one as in the other. All the doctrines of the Bible have their reason in that same nature of God which constitutes the basis of all material things. Christianity is a supplementary dispensation, not as contradicting, or correcting errors in, natural theology, but as more perfectly revealing the truth. Christianity, indeed, is the ground-plan upon which the whole creation is built—the original and eternal truth of which natural theology is but a partial expression. Hence the theology of nature and the theology of Scripture are mutually dependent. Natural theology not only prepares the way for, but it receives stimulus and aid from, Scriptural theology. Natural theology may now be a source of truth, which, before the Scriptures came, it could not furnish.

See Peabody, Christianity the Religion of Nature, lect. 2: Revelation is the unveiling, uncovering of what previously existed, and excludes the idea of newness, invention, creation. "The revealed religion of earth is the natural religion of heaven." Compare Rev. 13 : 8—"The Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world" = the coming of Christ was no make-shift; in a true sense the cross existed in eternity; the atonement is a revelation of the heart of God. Note Plato's illustration of the cave which can be easily threaded

by one who has previously entered it with a torch. Nature is the dim light from the cave's mouth; the torch is Scripture. Kant to Jacobi, in Jacobi's Werke, 3: 523—"If the gospel had not previously taught the universal moral laws, reason would not yet have obtained so perfect an insight into them." Dorner, Hist. prot. Theol., 252, 253: Faith at the Reformation first gave scientific certainty; it had God sure—hence it proceeded to banish scepticism in philosophy and science. See also Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 333; Bowen, Metaph. and Ethics, 442-463; Bib. Sac., 1874: 436.

2. *Scripture and Rationalism.* Although the Scriptures make known much that is beyond the power of man's unaided reason to discover or fully to comprehend, they contain nothing which contradicts a reason conditioned in its activity by a holy affection and enlightened by the Spirit of God. To reason in the large sense, as including the mind's power of cognizing God and moral relations—not in the narrow sense of mere reasoning, or the exercise of the purely logical faculty—the Scriptures continually appeal.

A. The proper office of reason, in this large sense, is: (*a*) To furnish us with those primary ideas of space, time, cause, right, and God, which are the conditions of all subsequent knowledge. (*b*) To judge with regard to man's need of a special and supernatural revelation. (*c*) To examine the credentials of communications professing to be such a revelation. (*d*) To receive and reduce to system the facts of revelation, when such an one has been properly attested. (*e*) To deduce from these facts their natural and logical conclusions. Thus reason itself prepares the way for a revelation above reason, and warrants an implicit trust in such revelation when once given.

Dove, Logic of the Christian Faith, 318—"Reason terminates in the proposition: Look for revelation." Leibnitz: "Revelation is the viceroy who first presents his credentials to the provincial assembly, and then presides." Reason can recognize truth after it is made known (*e. g.* demonstrations in geometry) which it never could discover of itself. "Above reason" is not "against reason." See Calderwood's illustration of the party lost in the woods, in Philosophy of the Infinite, 126. Path blazed. Luthardt, Fund. Truths, lect. viii: Reason could never have invented a self-humiliating God, cradled in a manger and dying on a cross. Lessing: "What is the meaning of a revelation that reveals nothing?"

B. Rationalism, on the other hand, holds reason to be the ultimate source of all religious truth, while Scripture is authoritative only so far as its revelations agree with previous conclusions of reason, or can be rationally demonstrated. Every form of rationalism, therefore, commits at least one of the following errors: (*a*) That of confounding reason with mere reasoning, or the exercise of the logical intelligence. (*b*) That of ignoring the necessity of a holy affection as the condition of all right reason in religious things, and the absence of this holy affection in man's natural state. (*c*) That of regarding the unaided reason, even in its normal and unbiased state, as capable of discovering, comprehending, and demonstrating all religious truth.

See Fetich in Theology, by Miller, for criticism of Dr. Hodge's description of rationalism as an "overuse of reason." It is rather the use of an abnormal, perverted, improperly conditioned reason. See Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1: 34, 39, 55. "Sanctified intellect"= intellect accompanied by right affections toward God, and trained to work under their influence. Bishop Butler: "Let reason be kept to, but let not such poor creatures as we are go on objecting to an infinite scheme that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call that reasoning." The most unreasonable people in the world are those who depend solely upon reason, in the narrow sense. Compare γνῶσις (1 Tim. 6: 20) with ἐπίγνωσις (2 Pet. 1: 2). See Twesten, Dogmatik, 1: 467-500; Julius Müller, Proof-texts, 4, 5; Mansel, Limits of Relig. Thought, 96.

3. *Scripture and Mysticism.*

A. True mysticism.—We have seen that there is an illumination of the minds of all believers by the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, however, makes no new revelation of truth, but uses for his instrument the truth already revealed. The illuminating work of the Spirit is, therefore, an opening of men's minds to understand the Scriptures. As one thus initiated into the mysteries of Christianity, every true believer may be called a mystic. True mysticism is that higher knowledge and fellowship which the Holy Spirit gives through the use of the Scriptures as a means.

"Mystic"—one initiated, from μύω, "to close the eyes"—probably in order that the soul may have inward vision of truth. But divine truth is a "mystery," not only as something into which one must be initiated, but as ὑπερβάλλουσα τῆς γνώσεως (Eph. 3: 19)—surpassing full knowledge even to the believer. See Meyer on Rom. 11: 25. The Germans have *Mystik* with a favorable sense, *Mysticismus* with an unfavorable sense,—corresponding respectively to our true and false mysticism. True mysticism, in John 16: 13—"Spirit . . guide . . into all truth"; Eph. 3: 9—"fellowship of the mystery"; 1 Cor. 2: 10—"God hath revealed them to us by his Spirit." Nitzsch, Syst. of Christ. Doct., 35—"Whenever true religion revives, there is an outcry against mysticism, *i. e.*, higher knowledge, fellowship, activity, through the Spirit of God in the heart." *Cf.* the charge against Paul, that he was mad, in Acts 26: 24, 25; 2 Cor. 5: 13—"beside ourselves."

B. False mysticism.—Mysticism, however, as the term is commonly used, errs in holding to the attainment of religious knowledge by direct communication from God, and by passive absorption of the human activities into the divine. It either partially or wholly loses sight of (*a*) the outward organ of revelation, the Scriptures; (*b*) the activity of the human powers in the reception of all religious knowledge; (*c*) the personality of man, and, by consequence, the personality of God.

In opposition to false mysticism, we are to remember that the Holy Spirit works through the word (Eph. 6: 17—"sword of the Spirit"), and that by that word we are to test all new communications which would contradict or supersede it (1 Jo. 4: 1—"try the spirits"; Eph. 5: 10—"prove what is acceptable to the Lord"), *e. g.* Spiritualism, Joseph Smith, Swedenborg. Note the mystical tendency in Francis de Sales, Thomas a Kempis, Madame Guyon, Upham. Using Scripture *ad aperturam libri*. False abnegation of reason and will, and "swallowing up of man in God"—implying that God and man are one substance, and that man is an incarnation of God. *Cf.* Ps. 16: 7—"the Lord, who hath given me counsel: yea, my reins instruct me" = God teaches his people through the exercise of their own faculties. Dorner, Gesch. prot. Theol., 48–59, 243; Herzog, Encyclopaedie, art.: Mystik, by Lange; Vaughn, Hours with the Mystics, 1: 199; Morell, History of Philosophy, 58, 191-215, 556–625, 728; Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1: 61–69, 97, 104: Fleming, Vocab. of Philosophy, *in voce*; Tholuck, Introd. to Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik.

4. *Scripture and Romanism.* While the history of doctrine, as showing the progressive apprehension and unfolding by the church of the truth implicitly contained in the Scriptures, is a subordinate source of theology, Protestantism recognizes the Bible as the only primary and absolute authority.

Romanism, on the other hand, commits the twofold error (*a*) Of making the church, and not the Scriptures, the immediate and authoritative source of religious knowledge, and (*b*) Of making the relation of the individual to Christ depend upon his relation to the church, instead of making his relation to the church depend upon, follow, and express his relation to Christ.

In Roman Catholicism there is a mystical element. The Scriptures are not the sole standard. God gives to the world from time to time, through popes and councils, new communications of truth. See Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1: 61–69. In reply to the Romanist

argument that the church was before the Bible, and that the same body that gave the truth at first can make additions to that truth, we say that the unwritten truth was before the church and made the church possible. The word of God existed before it was written down, and by that word the first disciples as well as the latest were begotten (1 Pet. 1: 23—"born again . . . . . by the word of God"). See Robinson, in Mad. Av. Lectures, 387.

The Roman Church would keep men in perpetual childhood—coming to her for truth instead of going directly to the Bible. See Dorner, Gesch. prot. Theol., 227; Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 30—"Romanism is so busy in building up a system of guarantees for Christianity, that she forgets the truth of Christ which she would guarantee." Schleiermacher, Glaubenslehre, 1: 24. George Herbert: "What wretchedness can give him any room, Whose house is foul, while he adores his broom!" Drummond, Nat. Law in Spir. World, 327: Romanist semi-parasitic doctrine of safety without spirituality.

II. Limitations of Theology.—Although theology derives its material from God's twofold revelation, it does not profess to give an exhaustive knowledge of God and of the relations between God and the universe. After showing what material we have, we must show what material we have not. We have indicated the sources of theology; we now examine its limitations. Theology has its limitations

(*a*) *In the finiteness of the human understanding.* This gives rise to a class of necessary mysteries, or mysteries connected with the infinity and incomprehensibleness of the divine nature (Job 11: 7; Rom. 11: 33).

Job 11: 7—"Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" Rom. 11: 33—"how unsearchable are his judgments!" Every doctrine, therefore, has its inexplicable side. A system that explained all would be untrue. Here is the proper meaning of Tertullian's saying: "Credo quia impossibile est." Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World: "A science without mystery is unknown; a religion without mystery is absurd." See Calderwood, Philos. of Infinite, 491; Sir Wm. Hamilton, Discussions, 22.

(*b*) *In the imperfect state of science, both natural and metaphysical.* This gives rise to a class of accidental mysteries, or mysteries which consist in the apparently irreconcilable nature of truths, which, taken separately, are perfectly comprehensible.

Instance divine sovereignty and human freedom. Astronomy has its centripetal and centrifugal forces. The child cannot hold two oranges at once in the same hand. F. W. Robertson's conclusion. Theology helped by Bp. Butler's doctrine of conscience, and by Darwin's doctrine of heredity.

(*c*) *In the inadequacy of language.* Since language is the medium through which truth is expressed and formulated, the invention of a proper terminology in theology, as well as in every other science, is a condition and criterion of its progress. The Scriptures recognize a peculiar difficulty in putting spiritual truths into earthly language (1 Cor. 2: 13; 2 Cor. 3: 6; 12: 4).

1 Cor. 2: 13—"not words which man's wisdom teacheth"; 2 Cor. 3: 6—"the letter killeth"; 12: 4—"unspeakable words." God submits to conditions of revelation. Language has to be created. Words "stagger under their weight of meaning"—*e. g.* "day" in Genesis 1, and ἀγάπη in N. T. "As fast as we tunnel into the sandbank of thought, the stones of language must be built into walls and arches, to allow further progress into the boundless mine."

(*d*) *In the incompleteness of our knowledge of the Scriptures.* Since it is not the mere letter of the Scriptures that constitutes the truth, the progress of theology is dependent upon hermeneutics, or the interpretation of the word of God.

Progress of commenting—from homiletical to grammatical, historical, dogmatic—illustrated in Scott, Ellicott, Stanley, Lightfoot. John Robinson: "I am verily persuaded that the Lord hath more truth yet to break forth from his holy word."

(*e*) *In the silence of written revelation.* For our discipline and probation, much is probably hidden from us, which we might even with our present powers comprehend.

The origin of evil; the method of the atonement; the state after death. Paul's silence upon speculative questions which he must have pondered with absorbing interest. John Foster's "gathering questions for eternity." On Luther, see Hagenbach, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 338.

(*f*) *In the lack of spiritual discernment caused by sin.* Since holy affection is a condition of religious knowledge, all moral imperfection in the individual Christian and in the church serves as a hindrance to the working out of a complete theology.

The spiritual ages make most progress in theology—witness the half-century succeeding the Reformation, and the half-century succeeding the great revival in New England in the time of Jonathan Edwards.

We do not, therefore, expect to construct a perfect system of theology. All science but reflects the present attainment of the human mind. No science is complete or finished. However it may be with the sciences of nature and man, the science of God will never amount to an exhaustive knowledge. We must not expect to demonstrate all Scripture doctrines upon rational grounds, or even in every case to see the principle of connection between them. Where we cannot do this, we must, as in every other science, set the revealed facts in their places and wait for further light, instead of ignoring or rejecting any of them because we cannot understand them or their relation to other parts of our system.

Theology is progressive, in the sense that our subjective understanding of the facts with regard to God, and our consequent expositions of these facts, may and do become more perfect. But theology is not progressive, if by this be meant that its objective facts change, either in their number or their nature. With Martineau we may say: "Religion has been reproached with not being progressive; it makes amends by being imperishable." Though our knowledge may be imperfect, it will have great value still. Our success in constructing a theology will depend upon the proportion which clearly expressed facts of Scripture bear to mere inferences, and upon the degree in which they all cohere about Christ, the central person and theme.

CHAPTER III.

METHOD OF THEOLOGY.

I. REQUISITES TO THE STUDY.—The requisites to the successful study of theology have already in part been indicated in speaking of its limitations. In spite of some repetition, however, we mention the following:

(*a*) *A disciplined mind.* Only such a mind can patiently collect the facts, hold in its grasp many facts at once, educe their connecting principles by continuous reflection, suspend final judgment until its conclusions are verified by Scripture and experience.

On opportunities for culture in the Christian ministry, see N. Englander, Oct., 1875: 644. Chitty, to a father inquiring as to his son's qualifications for the law: "Can your son eat sawdust without any butter?"

(*b*) *An intuitional as distinguished from a merely logical habit of mind*—or, trust in the mind's primitive cognitions, as well as in its processes of reasoning. The theologian must have insight as well as understanding. He must accustom himself to ponder spiritual facts as well as those which are sensible and material; to see things in their inner relations as well as in their outward forms; to cherish confidence in the reality and the unity of truth.

Vinet, Outlines of Philosophy, 39, 40—"If I do not feel that good is good, who will ever prove it to me?" Pascal: "Logic, which is an abstraction, may shake everything. A being purely intellectual will be incurably sceptical." Calvin: "Satan is an acute theologian." Dove, Logic of Christian Faith, 1-29, and esp. 25: Demonstration of the impossibility of motion. Hazard, Man a Creative First Cause, 109: Bottom of a wheel does not move. *Cf.* 1 Tim. 3: 2—the bishop must be σώφρων=sober-minded, well-balanced.

(*c*) *An acquaintance with physical, mental, and moral science.* The method of conceiving and expressing Scripture truth is so affected by our elementary notions of these sciences, and the weapons with which theology is attacked and defended are so commonly drawn from them as arsenals, that the student cannot afford to be ignorant of them.

Advantage to the preacher of taking up, as did F. W. Robertson, one science after another. Chemistry entered into his mental structure "like iron into the blood." See article by A. H. Strong, on Philosophy and Religion, in Baptist Quarterly, 2: 393 *sq.* Sir Wm. Hamilton: "No difficulty arises in theology which has not first emerged in philosophy." N. W. Taylor: "Give me a young man in metaphysics and I care not who has him in theology." Meaning of the maxim: "Ubi tres medici, ibi duo athei." Talbot: "I love metaphysics, because they have to do with realities."

(*d*) *A knowledge of the original languages of the Bible.* This is necessary to enable us not only to determine the meaning of the fundamental terms of Scripture, such as sin, righteousness, atonement, but also to interpret statements of doctrine by their connections with the context.

Instance the διὰ τοῦτο and ἐφ' ᾧ, in Rom. 5:12. Dr. Philip Lindsay to his pupils: "One of the best preparations for death is a thorough knowledge of the Greek Grammar." The dead languages are the only really living ones—free from danger of misunderstanding on account of changing usage. Divine Providence has put revelation into fixed forms in the Hebrew and the Greek. Sir Wm. Hamilton, Discussions, 330—"To be a competent divine is in fact to be a scholar."

(*e*) *A holy affection toward God.* Only the renewed heart can properly feel its need of divine revelation, or understand that revelation when given.

Neander's motto: "Pectus est quod theologum facit." Goethe: "As are the inclinations, so are the opinions." Fichte: "Our system of thought is very often only the history of our heart;" "truth is descended from conscience;" "men do not will according to their reason, but reason according to their will." Hobbes: "Even the axioms of geometry would be disputed, if men's passions were concerned in them." Pascal: "We know truth, not only by the reason, but by the heart." "Human things need only to be known in order to be loved, but divine things must first be loved before they can be known." Aristotle: "The power of attaining moral truth is dependent upon our acting rightly." W. C. Wilkinson: "The head is a magnetic needle with truth for its pole. But the heart is a hidden mass of magnetic iron. The head is drawn somewhat toward its natural pole, the truth; but more it is drawn by that nearer magnetism." See Theodore Parker's Experiences as a Minister. *Cf.* Ps. 25:14—"secret of the Lord": John 7:17—"willeth to do his will"; Rom. 12:2—"prove what is the will of God." Also Ps. 36:1—"the transgression of the wicked speaks in his heart like an oracle." The preacher cannot, like Dr. Kane, kindle fire with a lens of ice.

(*f*) *The enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit.* As only the Spirit fathoms the things of God, so only he can illuminate our minds to apprehend them.

Cicero, Nat. Deorum, 66—"Nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo adflatu divino unquam fuit." See Adolphe Monod's Sermons on Christ's Temptation, addressed to the theological students of Montauban, in Select Sermons from the French and German, 117-179.

II. Divisions of Theology.—Theology is commonly divided into Biblical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical.

1. *Biblical Theology* aims to arrange and classify the facts of revelation, confining itself to the Scriptures for its material, and treating of doctrine only so far as it was developed at the close of the apostolic age.

Instance DeWette, Biblische Theologie; Hofmann, Schriftbeweis; Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine. The last, however, has more of the philosophical element than properly belongs to Biblical Theology. Notice a questionable use of the term Biblical Theology to designate the theology of a part of Scripture severed from the rest, as Steudel's Bib. Theol. of O. T.; Schmid's Bib. Theol. of N. T.; and in the common phrases: Bib. Theol. of Christ, or of Paul. See Reuss, Hist. Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age.

2. *Historical Theology* traces the development of the Biblical doctrines from the time of the apostles to the present day, and gives account of the results of this development in the life of the church. By doctrinal development we mean the progressive unfolding and apprehension, by the church, of the truth explicitly or implicitly contained in Scripture. As giving account of the shaping of the Christian faith into doctrinal statements, Historical Theology is called the History of Doctrine. As describing the resulting and accompanying changes in the life of the church, outward and inward, Historical Theology is called Church History.

Instance Cunningham's Historical Theology; Hagenbach's and Shedd's Histories of Doctrine; Neander's Church History. See Neander's Introduction, and Shedd's Philosophy of History.

3. *Systematic Theology* takes the material furnished by Biblical and Historical Theology, and with this material seeks to build up into an organic and consistent whole all our knowledge of God and of the relations between God and the universe, whether this knowledge be originally derived from nature or from the Scriptures. It is to be clearly distinguished from Dogmatic Theology. Dogmatic Theology is the systematizing of the doctrines as expressed in the symbols of the church, together with the grounding of these in the Scriptures, and the exhibition, so far as may be, of their rational necessity. Systematic Theology, on the contrary, begins, not with the symbols, but with the Scriptures. It asks first, not what the church has believed, but what is the truth of God's revealed word. It examines that word with all the aids which nature and the Spirit have given it, using Biblical and Historical Theology as its servants and helpers, but not as its masters. Systematic Theology, in fine, is theology proper, of which Biblical and Historical Theology are the incomplete and preparatory stages.

Symbol, from συμβάλλω, = a brief throwing-together, or condensed statement, of the essentials of Christian doctrine. Synonyms are: Confession, creed, articles of faith. Dogmatism argues to foregone conclusions. The word is not, however, derived from 'dog,' as Douglas Jerrold suggested: "Dogmatism is puppyism full-grown."

4. *Practical Theology* is the system of truth considered as a means of renewing and sanctifying men, or, in other words, theology in its publication and enforcement. To this department of theology belong Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, since these are but scientific presentations of the true methods of unfolding Christian truth, and of bringing it to bear upon men individually and in the church.

It has sometimes been asserted that there are other departments of theology not included in those above mentioned. But most of these, if not all, belong to other spheres of research and cannot properly be classed under theology at all. Moral theology so-called, or the science of Christian morals (ethics, or theological ethics), is indeed the proper result of theology, but is not to be confounded with it. Speculative theology so-called, respecting, as it does, such truth as is matter of opinion, is either extra-scriptural, and so belongs to the province of the philosophy of religion, or is an attempt to explain truth already revealed, and so falls under the province of Systematic Theology.

"Speculative theology starts from certain *a priori* principles, and from them undertakes to determine what is and must be. It deduces its scheme of doctrine from the laws of mind or from axioms supposed to be inwrought into its constitution." Bib. Sac., 1852: 375—"Speculative theology tries to show that the dogmas agree with the laws of thought, while the philosophy of religion tries to show that the laws of thought agree with the dogmas." H. B. Smith, Faith and Philosophy, 18—Philosophy is "a mode of human knowledge—not the whole of that knowledge, but a mode of it—the knowing of things rationally." Science asks: "What *do* I know?" Philosophy asks: "What *can* I know?" See Luthardt, Compend. der Dogmatik, 4; Hagenbach, Encyclopaedie, 109. Theological Encyclopædia (instruction in a circle) = a general introduction to all the divisions of *Theology*, together with an account of the relations between them. Hegel's Encyclopædia was an attempted exhibition of the principles and connections of *all* the sciences. See Crooks and Hurst, Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology. Vgl. Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaft.

III. History of Systematic Theology.

1. *In the Eastern Church*, Systematic Theology may be said to have had its beginning and end in John of Damascus (700–760).

Ignatius (†115—Ad Trall., c. 9) gives us "the first distinct statement of the faith drawn up in a series of propositions. His systematizing formed the basis of all later efforts" (Prof. A. H. Newman). Origen of Alexandria (186-254) wrote his Περὶ Ἀρχῶν; Athanasius of Alexandria (300-373) his treatises on the Trinity and the Deity of Christ; and Gregory of Nyssa in Cappadocia (332-396) his Λόγος κατηχητικὸς ὁ μέγας. While the Fathers just mentioned seem to have conceived the plan of expounding the doctrines in order and of showing their relations to one another, John of Damascus (700-760) was the first who actually carried out such a plan. His Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως, or Summary of the Orthodox Faith, may be considered the earliest work of Systematic Theology. Neander: "The most important doctrinal text-book of the Greek Church." John, like the Greek Church in general, was speculative, theological, semi-Pelagian, sacramentarian.

2. *In the Western Church*, we may (with Hagenbach) distinguish three periods:

(*a*) The period of Scholasticism,—introduced by Peter Lombard (died 1164), and reaching its culmination in Thomas Aquinas (1221–1274) and Duns Scotus (1265–1308).

Though Systematic Theology had its beginning in the Eastern Church, its development has been confined almost wholly to the Western. Augustine (353-430) wrote his *Enchetridion ad Laurentium* and his *De Civitate Dei*, and John Scotus Erigena (†850), Roscelin (1092-1122), and Abelard (1079-1142), in their attempts at the rational explanation of Christian doctrine, foreshadowed the works of the great scholastic teachers. Anselm of Canterbury (1034-1109), with his *Proslogion de Dei Existentia* and his *Cur Deus Homo*, has sometimes, though wrongly, been called the founder of scholasticism.

But Peter Lombard (†1164), the *magister sententiarum*, was the first great systematizer of the Western Church, and his *Libri Sententiarum Quatuor* was the theological text-book of the Middle Ages. Teachers lectured on the "Sentences," as they did on the books of Aristotle, who furnished to scholasticism its impulse and guide. Every doctrine was treated in the order of Aristotle's four causes, the material, the formal, the efficient, the final. ("Cause" here = requisite: (1) matter of which a thing consists; (2) form it assumes; (3) producing agent; (4) end for which made). Thomas Aquinas (1221-1274), the Dominican, *doctor angelicus*, Augustinian and Realist,—and Duns Scotus (1265-1308), the Franciscan, *doctor subtilis*,—wrought out the scholastic theology more fully, and left behind them, in their *Summæ*, gigantic monuments of intellectual industry and acumen. Scholasticism aimed at the proof and systematizing of the doctrines of the Church by means of Aristotle's philosophy. It became at last an illimitable morass of useless subtleties and unintelligible abstractions, and it finally ended in the nominalistic scepticism of William of Occam (†1347). See Townsend, The Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages.

(*b*) The period of Symbolism,—represented by the Lutheran theology of Philip Melancthon (1497–1560), and the Reformed theology of John Calvin (1509–1564); the former connecting itself with the Analytic theology of Calixtus (1585–1656), and the latter with the Federal theology of Cocceius (1603–1669).

The new religious life of the Reformation led to intellectual revival. The churches were compelled to formulate their belief in symbols, and to define and expound Scripture doctrine in systematic treatises. The theology of this period, like the Reformation which produced it, had two branches, the Lutheran and the Reformed—Lutheranism being based on the material principle of the Reformation, justification by faith instead of by works; the Reformed theology being based on the formal principle of the Reformation, the supreme authority of the Scriptures instead of that of the Church.

The Lutheran theology.— Luther himself (1485–1546) was preacher rather than theologian. But Melancthon (1497–1560), "the preceptor of Germany," as he was called, embodied the theology of the Lutheran Church in his *Loci Communes* (first edition Augustinian, afterwards substantially Arminian; grew out of Lectures on the Epistle to the Romans). He was followed by Chemnitz (1522–1586), "clear and accurate," the most learned of the disciples of Melancthon. Leonhard Hutter (1563–1616), called "*Lutherus redivivus*," and John Gerhard (1582–1637), followed Luther rather than Melancthon. George Calixtus (1586–1656) separated ethics from systematic theology and applied the analytic method of investigation to the latter, beginning with the end, or final cause, of all things, viz.: blessedness. He was followed in his method by Dannhauer (1603–1666), Calovius (1612–1686), Quenstedt (1617–1688), whom Hovey calls "learned, comprehensive, and logical," and Hollaz († 1730).

The Reformed theology.—Zwingle, the Swiss reformer (1484–1531), differing from Luther as to the Lord's Supper and as to Scripture, was more than Luther entitled to the name of systematic theologian. Certain writings of his may be considered the beginning of the Reformed theology. But it was left to John Calvin (1509–1564), after the death of Zwingle, to arrange the principles of that theology in systematic form. Calvin dug channels for Zwingle's flood to flow in, as Melancthon did for Luther's. His Institutes (*Institutio Religionis Christianæ*), is one of the great works in theology (superior as a systematic work to Melancthon's *Loci*). Calvin was followed by Petrus Ramus ("Peter Martyr"—in Saint Bartholomew, 1572), Chamier († 1621), and Theodore Beza (1519–1605). Beza carried Calvin's doctrine of predestination to an extreme supralapsarianism, which is hyper-Calvinistic rather than Calvinistic. Cocceius (1603–1669), and after him Witsius (1626–1708), made theology centre about the idea of the covenants, and founded the Federal theology. Leydecker (1642–1721) treated theology in the order of the persons of the Trinity. Amyraldus (1596–1664) and Placeus of Saumur (1596–1632) modified the Calvinistic doctrine, the latter by his theory of mediate imputation, and the former by advocating the hypothetic universalism of divine grace. Turretin (1671–1737), a clear and strong theologian whose work is still a text-book at Princeton, and Pictet (1655–1724), both of them Federalists, showed the influence of the Cartesian philosophy.

In general, while the line between Catholic and Protestant in Europe runs from west to east, the line between Lutheran and Reformed runs from south to north, the Reformed theology flowing with the current of the Rhine northward from Switzerland to Holland and to England, in which latter country the Thirty-nine Articles represent the Reformed faith, while the prayer-book of the English Church is Arminian; see Dorner, Gesch. prot. Theologie, Einleit., 9. On the differences between Lutheran and Reformed doctrine, see Schaff, Germany, its Universities, Theology and Religion, 167–177. On the Reformed Churches of Europe and America, see H. B. Smith, Faith and Philosophy, 87–124.

(*c*) The period of Criticism and Speculation,—in its three divisions: the Rationalistic, represented by Semler (1721–1791); the Transitional, by Schleiermacher (1768–1834); the Evangelical, by Nitzsch, Müller, Tholuck and Dorner.

First Division—Rationalistic theologies: Though the Reformation had freed theology in great part from the bonds of scholasticism, other philosophies after a time took its place. The Leibnitz- (1646–1716) Wolffian (1679–1754) exaggeration of the powers of natural religion prepared the way for rationalistic systems of theology. Buddeus (1667–1729) combatted the new principles, but Semler's (1725–1791) theology was built upon them, and represented the Scriptures as having a merely local and temporary character. Michaelis (1716–1784) and Doederlein (1714–1789) followed Semler, and the tendency toward rationalism was greatly assisted by the critical philosophy of Kant (1724–1804), to whom "revelation was problematical, and positive religion merely the medium through which the practical truths of reason are communicated" (Hagenbach, Hist. Doct., 2: 397). Ammon (1766–1850) and Wegscheider (1771–1848) were representatives of this philosophy. Storr (1746–1805), Reinhard (1753–1812), and Knapp (1753–1825), in the main evangelical, endeavored to reconcile revelation with reason, but were more or less influenced by this rationalizing spirit. Bretschneider (1776–1828) and DeWette (1780–1849) may be said to have held middle ground.

Second Division—Transition to a more Scriptural theology. Herder (1744–1803) and Jacobi (1743–1819), by their more spiritual philosophy, prepared the way for Schleiermacher's (1768–1834) grounding of doctrine in the facts of Christian experience. The writings of Schleiermacher constituted an epoch, and had great influence in delivering

theology from the rationalistic toils into which it had fallen. Although rationalism is of late represented by Hase and Strauss, by Biedermann and Lipsius, we may now speak of a

Third Division—and in this division we may put the names of Neander and Tholuck, Twesten and Nitzsch, Müller and Luthardt, Dorner and Philippi, Ebrard and Thomasius, Lange and Kahnis, all of them exponents of a far more pure and evangelical theology than was common in Germany a century ago.

3. *Among theologians of views diverse from the prevailing Protestant faith*, may be mentioned:

(*a*) Bellarmine (1542–1621), the Roman Catholic.

Besides Bellarmine, "the best controversial writer of his age" (Bayle), the Roman Catholic Church numbers among its noted modern theologians: — Petavius (1583–1652), whose dogmatic theology Gibbon calls "a work of incredible labor and compass;" Melchior Canus (1523–1560), an opponent of the Jesuits and of their scholastic method; Bossuet (1627–1704), who idealized Catholicism in his Exposition of Doctrine, and attacked Protestantism in his History of Variations of Protestant Churches; Jansen (1585–1638), who attempted, in opposition to the Jesuits, to reproduce the theology of Augustine, and who had in this the powerful assistance of Pascal (1623–1662). Jansenism, so far as the doctrines of grace are concerned, but not as respects the sacraments, is virtual Protestantism within the Roman Catholic Church. Moehler's Symbolism, Perrone's *Prælectiones Theologicæ*, and Hurter's *Compendium Theologiæ Dogmaticæ* are the latest and most approved expositions of Roman Catholic doctrine.

(*b*) Arminius (1560–1609), the opponent of predestination.

Among the followers of Arminius (1560–1609) must be reckoned Episcopius (1583–1643), who carried Arminianism to almost Pelagian extremes; Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), the jurist and statesman, author of the governmental theory of the atonement; and Limborch (1633–1712), the most thorough expositor of the Arminian doctrine.

(*c*) Laelius Socinus (1525–1562), and Faustus Socinus (1539–1604), the leaders of the modern Unitarian movement.

The works of Laelius Socinus (1525–1562) and his nephew, Faustus Socinus (1539–1604), constituted the beginnings of modern Unitarianism. Laelius Socinus was the reformer and Faustus Socinus was the theologian; or, as Baumgarten-Crusius expresses it, "the former was the spiritual founder of Socinianism, and the latter the founder of the sect." Their writings are collected in the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*. The Racovian Catechism, taking its name from the Polish town Racow, contains the most succinct exposition of their views.

4. *British theology*, represented by:

(*a*) The Baptists, John Bunyan (1628–1688), John Gill (1697-1771), and Andrew Fuller (1754–1815).

Some of the best British theology is Baptist. Among John Bunyan's works, we may notice his "Gospel Truths Opened." Macaulay calls Milton and Bunyan the two great creative minds of England during the latter part of the 17th century. John Gill's "Body of Practical Divinity" shows much ability, although the Rabbinical learning of the author occasionally displays itself in a curious exegesis. Andrew Fuller's "Letters on Systematic Divinity" is a brief compend of theology. His treatises upon special doctrines are marked by sound judgment and clear insight. They justify the epithets which Robert Hall, one of the greatest of Baptist preachers, gives him: "sagacious," "luminous," "powerful."

(*b*) The Puritans, John Owen (1616–1683), Richard Baxter (1615–1691), John Howe (1630–1705), and Thomas Ridgeley (1666–1734).

Of the Puritan theologians the Encyc. Brit. remarks: "As a theological thinker and writer, John Owen holds his own distinctly defined place among those Titanic intellects with which the age abounded. Surpassed by Baxter in point and pathos, by Howe in imagination and the higher philosophy, he is unrivalled in his power of unfolding the rich meanings of Scripture. In his writings he was preëminently the great theologian."

Baxter wrote a "*Methodus Theologiæ*," and a "Catholic Theology"; John Howe is chiefly known by his "Living Temple"; Thomas Ridgeley by his "Body of Divinity."

(*c*) The Scotch Presbyterians, Thomas Boston (1676–1732), John Dick (1764–1833), and Thomas Chalmers (1780–1847).

Of the Scotch Presbyterians, Boston is the most voluminous, Dick the most calm and fair, Chalmers the most fervid and popular.

(*d*) The Methodists, John Wesley (1703–1791), and Richard Watson (1781–1833).

Of the Methodists, John Wesley's doctrine is presented in "Christian Theology," collected from his writings by the Rev. Thornley Smith. The great Methodist text-book, however, is the Institutes of Watson, who systematized and expounded the Wesleyan theology. Pope, a recent English theologian, follows Watson's modified and improved Arminianism (while Whedon and Raymond, recent American writers, hold rather to a radical and extreme Arminianism).

(*e*) The English Churchmen, Richard Hooker (1553–1600), Gilbert Burnet (1643–1715), and John Pearson (1613–1686).

The English church has produced no great systematic theologian (see reasons assigned in Dorner, Gesch. prot. Theologie, 470). The "judicious" Hooker is still its greatest theological writer, although his work is only on "Ecclesiastical Polity." Bishop Burnet is the author of the "Exposition of the XXXIX Articles," and Bishop Pearson of the "Exposition of the Creed." Both these are common English text-books. A recent "Compendium of Dogmatic Theology," by Litton, shows a tendency to return from the usual Arminianism of the Anglican church to the old Augustinianism.

5. *American theology*, running in two lines:

(*a*) The Reformed system of Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), modified successively by Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790), Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803), Timothy Dwight (1752–1817), Nathaniel Emmons (1745–1840), Leonard Woods (1774–1854), C. G. Finney (1792–1875), and N. W. Taylor (1786–1858). Calvinism, as thus modified, is often called the New England, or New School, theology.

Jonathan Edwards, one of the greatest of metaphysicians and theologians, thought too little of nature, and tended to Berkeleyanism as applied to mind. He regarded the chief good as happiness—a form of sensibility. Virtue was voluntary choice of this good. Hence union with Adam in acts and exercises was sufficient. This God's will made identity of being with Adam. This led to the exercise-system of Hopkins and Emmons, on the one hand, and to Bellamy's and Dwight's denial of any imputation of Adam's sin or of inborn depravity, on the other—in which last denial agree many other New England theologians who reject the exercise-scheme, as for example, Strong, Tyler, Smalley, Burton, Woods, and Park. Dr. N. W. Taylor added a more distinctly Arminian element, the power of contrary choice—and with this tenet of the New Haven theology, Charles G. Finney, of Oberlin, substantially agreed. Thus from certain principles admitted by Edwards, who held in the main to an Old School theology, the New School theology has been gradually developed.

(*b*) The older Calvinism, represented by R. J. Breckinridge (born 1800), Charles Hodge (1797–1878), E. J. Baird, and William G. T. Shedd (born 1820); the two former favoring, and the two latter opposing, antecedent imputation. All these, however, as holding to views of human depravity and divine grace more nearly conformed to the doctrine of Augustine and Calvin, are distinguished from the New England theologians and their followers by the popular title of Old School.

Old School theology has for its characteristic tenet the guilt of inborn depravity. But among those who hold this view, some are federalists and creationists, and regard imputation as the cause of this depravity. Such are the Princeton theologians generally, including Dr. Charles Hodge, the father, and Dr. A. A. Hodge, the son, together with R. J. Breckinridge, the brothers Alexander, and Thornwell of South Carolina. Among those who hold to the Old School doctrine of the guilt of inborn depravity, however, there are others who are traducians, and who regard imputation as consequent upon corruption and not as antecedent to it. Baird's "Elohim Revealed" and Shedd's Essay on "Original Sin" (Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt) represent this realistic conception of the relation of the race to its first father.

On the history of Systematic Theology in general, see Hagenbach, History of Doctrine (from which many of the facts above given are taken), and Shedd, History of Doctrine; also, Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 44–100; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 1: 15–128; Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, 24–52. On the history of New England Theology, see Fisher, Discussions and Essays, 285–354. On Edwards's tendency to idealism, see Sanborn, in Journ. Spec. Philos., Oct., 1883: 401–420.

IV. Order of Treatment in Systematic Theology.

1. *Various methods of arranging the topics of a theological system.*

(*a*) The Analytic method of Calixtus begins with the assumed end of all things, blessedness, and thence passes to the means by which it is secured. (*b*) The Trinitarian method of Leydecker and Martensen regards Christian doctrine as a manifestation successively of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. (*c*) The Federal method of Cocceius, Witsius, and Boston treats theology under the two covenants. (*d*) The Anthropological method of Chalmers and Rothe. The former begins with the Disease of Man and passes to the Remedy; the latter divides his Dogmatik into the Consciousness of Sin and the Consciousness of Redemption. (*e*) The Christological method of Hase, Thomasius and Andrew Fuller treats of God, man, and sin, as presuppositions of the person and work of Christ. Mention may also be made of (*f*) The Historical method, followed by Ursinus, and adopted in Jonathan Edwards's History of Redemption; and (*g*) The Allegorical method of Dannhauer, in which man is described as a wanderer, life as a road, the Holy Spirit as a light, the church as the candlestick, God as the end, and heaven as the home.

See Calixtus, Epitome Theologiæ; Leydecker, De Œconomia trium Personarum in Negotio Salutis humanæ; Martensen (1808–1884), Christian Dogmatics; Cocceius, Summa Theologiæ, and Summa Doctrinæ de Fœdere et Testamento Dei, in Works, vol. vi; Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants; Boston, A Complete Body of Divinity (in Works, vol. 1 and 2), Questions in Divinity (vol. 6), Human Nature in its Fourfold State (vol. 8); Chalmers, Institutes of Theology; Rothe (1799–1867), Dogmatik, and Theologische Ethik; Hase (1800–), Evangelische Dogmatik; Thomasius (1802–1875), Christi Person und Werk; Fuller, Gospel Worthy of all Acceptation (in Works, 2: 328–416), and Letters on Systematic Divinity (1: 684–711); Ursinus (1534–1583), Loci Theologici (in Works, 1: 428–909); Edwards, History of Redemption (in Works, 1: 296–516); Dannhauer (1603–1666), Hodosophia Christiana, seu Theologia Positiva in Methodum redacta.

2. *The Synthetic method*, which we adopt in this Compendium, is both the most common and the most logical method of arranging the topics of theology. This method proceeds from causes to effects, or, in the language of Hagenbach (Hist. Doctrine, 2: 152), "starts from the highest principle, God, and proceeds to man, Christ, redemption, and finally to the end of

all things." In such a treatment of theology we may best arrange our topics in the following order:

1st. The existence of God.
2d. The Scriptures a revelation from God.
3d. The nature, decrees and works of God.
4th. Man, in his original likeness to God and subsequent apostasy.
5th. Redemption, through the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit.
6th. The nature and laws of the Christian church.
7th. The end of the present system of things.

V. TEXT-BOOKS IN THEOLOGY, valuable for reference:—

1. *Compendiums:* Hase, Hutterus Redivivus; Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik; A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology (second edition); Pendleton, Christian Doctrine; Hovey, Manual of Theology and Ethics; H. B. Smith, System of Christian Theology.

2. *Confessions:* Schaff, Creeds of Christendom.

3. *Extended Treatises:* Calvin, Institutes; Turretin, Institutio Theologiæ; Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology; Dorner, System of Christian Doctrine; Philippi, Glaubenslehre; Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics; Luthardt, Fundamental, Saving, and Moral Truths; Baird, Elohim Revealed; Dagg, Manual of Theology.

4. *Collected Works:* Jonathan Edwards; Andrew Fuller.

5. *Histories of Doctrine:* Hagenbach; Shedd.

6. *Monographs:* Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin; Dorner, History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ; Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity; Shedd, Discourses and Essays.

7. *Apologetics:* Harris, Philosophical Basis of Theism; Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief; Row, Bampton Lectures for 1877, on Christian Evidences; Peabody, Evidences of Christianity.

8. *Intellectual and Moral Philosophy:* Porter, Human Intellect; Alden, Intellectual Philosophy; Calderwood, Moral Philosophy; Alexander, Moral Science; Porter, Elements of Moral Science.

9. *Theological Encyclopædias:* Herzog (second German edition); Schaff-Herzog (English); McClintock and Strong.

10. *Bible Dictionaries:* Smith (edited by Hackett).

11. *Commentaries:* Meyer, on the New Testament; Philippi, Shedd, Lange (ed. Schaff), on the Epistle to the Romans.

12. *Bibles:* Stier and Theile, Polyglotten-Bibel; Annotated Paragraph Bible (published by the London Religious Tract Society); Revised Greek-English New Testament (published by Harper and Brothers); Revised English Bible.