

## LECTURE IV.

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### DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

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#### SECTION I.—PHYSICAL AND PROVIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT.

MOTION without force is inconceivable. Force resisting motion is equally evident and certain. When we see the changes of the planets, the motions of the tides, or the waving of the forest trees, we know there must be force to cause these changes. And we know, as we see the stability of the mountains, the firmness of the rock, the fixedness of the roots of the trees, that there are resisting forces which antagonize the active forces. Thus all nature is balanced by the two great forces,—the centripetal, that draws steadily to some center of gravity; and the centrifugal, that radiates, propels, and sets in motion opposite tendencies of nature. All these forces which seem to govern, are themselves governed by finite or infinite power. Whatever is not controlled by the creature is controlled by the Creator. Sometimes the finite and infinite are so blended that the distinction is scarcely observable; but more commonly there is a marked distinction which says to finite force, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." This power therefore reveals the existence throughout the whole universe, of a moral and physical government.

The physical government of God is proprietary. The Creator having made all things is the proprietor of all things, and governs them according to the laws and forces

involved in creation. It is emphatically the government of force. It is chemical and mechanical, exhibiting volition and purpose in the ruler, but none in the subjects ruled. Thus it is distinguished from moral government, which reveals volition and purpose on the part of the ruler, and implies volition and choice on the part of the governed. But in physical government there is choice only with the ruler, and thus the government itself, in all its forms and varieties, seems to be either chemical, by the operation of internal forces, or mechanical, arising from external relations.

This government and its forces and philosophy are incomprehensible, and yet its facts are self-evident. No man disputes the existing efficiency of these forces, and yet no man comprehends their nature. They must be dependent or independent. If dependent, then the effective force is beyond, and so at last we come to believe in the independent causality here, the same as in creation. The same arguments and methods of reasoning which teach us the theistic power in creation teach us also the Divine power in the government of creation. These powers are uniform and immutable, and the uniformity of the laws of nature is the ground of the confidence on which all the plans and activities of the world depend.

The physical government of God extends :

1. Over all material objects ; their forms, substance, forces, and laws, so that every sun and star, every mountain and valley, every ocean and river, every grain of sand and atom of matter, is under this government and its laws. No being or thing is left outside of its claims. And the forces within all these substances, producing their activity and stability, and the laws by which they are governed are embraced in this universal physical government of the Divine Ruler.

2. This government embraces also all the instincts of animal creation. These instincts seem to move quite as

freely as mind, and therefore sometimes are taken as subjects of moral law; but if we attempt to give a command outside of results attained by physical contact, a difference is at once seen. "As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined." So the instincts of animals and men are bent by habit and impelled by physical conditions, and are under the control of physical laws. The instinct of the duck leads it to the water in spite of the training and the fears of an adopted parent of another species. The instincts of the bird and the fish, the tiger and the buffalo, are physically fixed, and are under the physical government of God. The gratification of these instincts may depend upon circumstances and changes of conditions. And so the stability of the rock and its motion upon the mountain-side may depend upon showers and electric shocks. But all these are embraced in the same physical government.

3. So also of the involuntary laws and forces of mind. While admitting our ignorance of the nature of mind, but conscious of causality and capability of action in that mind, we are conscious of certain laws of thought and feeling which choice cannot cause nor control, and certain consequences that will arise necessarily from conditions which are voluntary. If one chooses to think of certain subjects and meditate upon them continuously, corresponding feelings will naturally and necessarily follow by the physical laws of mind. The orphan child in thinking of the departed parent will find the feelings change; and so in much thought of injuries, real or imagined, which all have experienced, the feelings will grow more bitter with reference to the one blamed. If a man chooses to think very much upon the possession of wealth, his eagerness and desire for it will increase.

So, many of the actions of mind, which in their first development are voluntary, are determined afterward by physical law. With some simple instrument the sand that dams the water may be removed, and when the current starts, it

moves with physical force. So the involuntary laws of mind are under the physical government of God, and certain relations between cause and effect are fixed beyond all finite power. By this power a man may choose a path which is sure to produce happiness, or the way that is sure to be the "way of death." And here is precisely where we see the blending of the moral and physical government of Jehovah. The physical over matter and its laws, instincts and their relations, and the involuntary powers of mind; and the moral over the moral powers. The relations of this physical government of God to his moral government involves the doctrine of Divine providence.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE: ITS EXPLANATION. The word means foresight; not simply to know what is in the future, but to know for some purpose. It is prevision—a knowledge of future wants and what will be needed. It is provision for such demands. There is animal providence, human providence, and Divine providence. The belief in Divine providence is about as ancient and universal as the belief in a God. There have been many shades of belief upon this subject, but they may be classified in four general divisions:

1. Some have believed that Divine power was the only power in the universe, and that beings and things were only the occasions for its immediate exercise; that all the forces of mind and matter were simply and directly manifestations of God's purpose and power. This, of course, makes the whole universe a mere machine, operated without second causes by the hand of God alone. This must, of necessity, deny all moral government, moral law, and all human responsibility and moral character. It makes God and nature so identical that pantheism and materialism must be the ultimate conclusions. Whatever men may profess to believe or strive to argue in this direction, universal experience, common consciousness, and common sense testify against it in all history, literature, legislation, and executive

human forces. Indeed, this theory destroys all idea of providence. Instead of a provision of one for another it implies a fixed fatality. This view is termed "occasionalism," and is being revived a little with modern materialistic theories.

2. Another class takes the opposite extreme, adopting the theory of "mechanism,"—holding that the universe is made with internal forces and second causes which continue to operate without any Divine agency. They do not pretend to explain the nature of these forces, or show how they are self-supporting or self-perpetuating. Every force must be dependent or independent. How a dependent force can continue without the law and ground of dependence, can never be explained, if, indeed, it can be believed. As water-propelled machinery depends upon the water, and the power of the engine upon steam, so all finite power, while in nature distinct from the Divine, must be upheld by force outside of itself.

3. The Calvinistic theory applies this doctrine of providence to the universal government of God, explaining it as the universal provision of the Almighty for the accomplishment of his own purposes. Schmucker discusses the subject under the head of "Providence and Decrees." Dwight, Hodge, and Strong, representing the Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Baptists, assume the same position. They admit second causes in intelligent beings, and that in some way man is responsible for his own actions, but affirm that Divine providence in some way secures, positively and definitely, the accomplishment of Divine decrees with reference to every event and experience of mankind. It does not affirm, like occasionalism, that there is but one force in the universe, but it does affirm that all other forces are subject to the one force of Providence, thus making all events depend upon fore-ordination. As thus explained, providence is made to cover the doctrine of fore-ordination, election, final perseverance, and all the five points of Calvinism. But

this view of the doctrine of Providence is not only objectionable because it involves the fatal doctrine of necessitarianism, and makes Providence responsible for human actions, but because of its indefinite stretch over every other subject. This would include all science and philosophy of mind and matter, all theology and Christology false and true, and place the entire field of religious discussion under the dominion of God. It is only another name for sovereignty over all the subjects of religious thought, practice, and experience.

4. The Scriptural and philosophical view of Divine providence implies some distinct end for which some distinct provision is made. The moral good and happiness of man are evidently ends for which the world and its fullness were created, and for this the entire physical creation and government is provided and adapted. "The earth hath he given to the children of men" (Psa. 115: 16). See also Gen. 1: 26; Dan. 2: 38. By the providence of God "the hairs of our heads are numbered" (Matt. 10: 30), all our wants anticipated (Matt. 6: 26, 32), and every "need supplied" (Phil. 4: 19).

In the physical government of God there is a wall of irresistible forces and circumstances with which every being is surrounded, but within which there is space and opportunity for voluntary action, and the development of virtue or vice. Some things man cannot do, some things he can do.

"God, binding nature fast in fate,  
Left free the human will."

These physical conditions are universally adapted to man's moral nature, but not universally *controlling*. Divine providence refers to the boundary line between the physical and the moral government of God. With this general idea, the following statements are plain and evident.

1. The Creator causes every event not caused by the creature. Every event in nature, in the world at large, in

each individual life and experience not caused by the creature must be caused by the Creator. So in raising the crops, in business plans and transactions, in health and sickness, in family and State affairs, there are constantly occurring events outside of man's agency, and almost as constantly events under human control. The former are providential; the latter are moral acts coming under the moral government of God. Therefore, in cases of business success or failure, in society changes, in sickness and death, it is right and best to refer to the dealings of Providence, who certainly has caused many of the events and circumstances brought out in these particular experiences. The man has a right to suppose that he had some agency in planting his wheat, and yet he knows that God made it to grow. So in the ills of life, and physical effects even of the sins of men, they know they have some agency, and yet there are Divine forces at work.

2. This providential arrangement furnishes provision and opportunity for improvement and happiness. With the law of God and its penalty in Eden, provision was still furnished for life and happiness, and the blessings of life have all come to man providentially. So each human being on earth may look upon his life and labor feeling that "in Him we live and move and have our being." Every year and month, each day and hour, is a providential gift, and the fact that human agency has had something to do with the blessings thus furnished does not in the least destroy the idea of Divine care and providence. Properly viewed, it enlarges and emphasizes that idea.

3. This providential power sometimes affects actions, volitions, and results, actually preventing the natural consequences of evil deeds. And this is an encouragement for man to work for the restraint of sin and crime, with the belief that upon the evil counsel and purpose of some other men, Providence will so combine circumstances and motives as to prevent their success. If it be asked why God

does not thus prevent all sin and evil, we have only to reply that these result from the nature of things which man cannot fathom; and that such a providential arrangement would destroy all human agency; and that as everywhere else, one man's efforts are made the condition of blessings to others, so here a man may, by prayer and effort, secure that Divine interposition which would prevent the execution of ultimate criminal purposes, or pursue an opposite course, and cause pain and grief.

4. This same providential arrangement may present motives for virtue much higher and stronger than otherwise could be expected. Special blessings sometimes constitute special motives for goodness. Special afflictions sometimes increase the force of motives to righteousness. This increase of motive power does not destroy the agency of man any more than the increase of motives given by the father to the child destroys the responsibility of the child. Indeed, providential events, pleasant or otherwise to us, are one vast supply of motives and influences for virtue and piety, sometimes more and sometimes less forcible upon us, but always increasing our responsibility to God and to each other, and always intended to increase motives to virtue and holiness.

5. By this same providential arrangement, events and forces are so combined and arranged as to bring in conflict sinful purposes, and thus diminish the power of evil. Sin never remedies itself, but the consequences of one sin may come in conflict with the consequences of another by the overruling of God, so that evil purposes are defeated and wickedness diminished, and the "wrath of man made to praise God." Thus the wicked as well as the righteous are more or less under the control of Providence.

6. They are thus led, sometimes, to the commission of one sinful act rather than another. Man, being criminal by his own choice and weakness, may be led into one class of crime less injurious than another. The wise father, who cannot consistently with his relations and the agency of his son,

wholly prevent his association with evil companions, may give direction where there would be less evil than in some other practices. God says, "I also will choose your delusions." Men having deluded themselves and taken the paths of sin, God so directs that they take the least evil instead of the greatest, as it was in the days of Moses with reference to divorce. After God had given direction with reference to that custom and it had been practiced for many hundreds of years, Christ said, "From the beginning it was not so," but "for the hardness of your hearts he said this." That is, in their state of mind and heart, divorce was the best state of things possible. The problem for Providence to solve was the least evil possible. So if one is known to be determined upon killing some being, every good man, who could not prevent the purpose, would readily direct him into the road where he would kill a horse instead of a man. The value of the animal would not be the measure of the guilt of the one that was directed, but the difference between the value of the animal and the value of human life would measure the intent of benevolence on the part of the one who gave the direction. So the difference between some crimes and others may show the benevolence of Providence in the direction of affairs; and sometimes even the greatest possible good is brought out by Providence ultimately from the greatest possible crime. Judas was not virtuous nor benevolent in the betrayal of his Master, and the eternal good to mankind resulting from that death is not due to the crime of Judas, but to that *overruling* power of God, which, furnishing a victory for the action of the criminal, secured thereby salvation for the world. In these manifestations of Divine providence we see God's irresponsibility for the criminal action, and his goodness in interposing providential activities which result in the well-being of men. And in this light we can see that while it is possible for ultimate good to result from sin, the guilt of it nevertheless continues.

7. This same providential power actually furnishes the physical strength, and often the conditions employed, in the greatest crimes. The man who shoots his neighbor performs the act himself and is responsible, but the continued specific gravity of the ball and the physical forces of the explosives, and the continued specific gravity of the atmosphere and all the laws of nature involved, are providential. The criminal part of the act is man's; but God, refusing to change his works and laws with reference to the criminal, maintains the forces of nature, and thus providentially is concerned in the action itself. Hence we see that this providential action may lead to the purpose of the act, may overrule the ultimate result, or may uphold the forces and laws involved in its performance, so that in one sense a murderer, having the full weight of criminality of the event, may have the support of the web-work of forces in nature in such a way as to make it a providential event. It is not fatalism, but recognition of Divine power, which leads us to speak of providential agency in the case of sickness and death, or even of the physical results of criminal action.

8. All these Divine interpositions are upon a general plan with specific adaptations, but without new discoveries or purposes. To suppose that God sees some new exigency or action, and awakens to some new idea and forms some new purpose, and thus brings out some specific or "special providence" so called, is to suppose that God is finite. It almost in theory unmakes the Deity. In human language there are said to be "general providences," "special providences," and "specific providential events." As a matter of fact, from the Divine standpoint there cannot be any difference. God sees all things from the beginning. There are no new views, forces, or purposes with Providence. Special and specific providences are therefore special and specific in their adaptation, but not in their knowledge and newness of purpose. There can be no new knowledge or new purposes with God; neither can there be any forgetfulness or over-

sight. No fiber or force of nature is forgotten or left without the care of Providence. And these specific adaptations, which we are experiencing from day to day with all the changes of nature, affecting the currents of civilization, personal character, happiness, and hope, are planned and "seen from the beginning." None the less special, none the less Divine, none the less deserving of special gratitude, none the less powerful as motives for virtue, because eternal; but they imply breadth of view, comprehensiveness of plan, wisdom of purpose, and universal benevolence. The doctrine of providence is one of the grandest doctrines in the universe, the joy of heaven, the hope of earth, the fear of the sinful.

## II. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE CONSIDERED.

1. It is sometimes supposed that the infinite God would not give minute attention to the trivial affairs of life.

(1) He did so in creation and in natural law and preservation. The smallest things in the vegetable or animal kingdom are just as carefully cared for in the elements of nature as the largest portions of creation. The falling sparrow and the hairs upon the head are observed and cared for by the omniscient Father. (Matt. 6 : 30 ; 10 : 29, 30.)

(2) Care for the whole includes its parts, and what is sufficient for each individual part is sufficient for the whole; and frequently we observe large outlays in nature's forces just as necessary for the single object as for the whole. The entire sun is necessary for the single rose, and that same sun is sufficient for all growths.

(3) Events apparently small, like the falling of smallest seeds, frequently result in the greatest consequences. It is impossible for man to say which is of the least account, and which are worthy the notice of God.

2. This doctrine is inconsistent with the uniformity of natural laws.

(1) Uniform laws may and must have specific adaptations.

(2) Forces and laws are not only uniform within themselves, but uniformly adapted to mind and morals.

3. It implies change in the Deity.

(1) In agriculture, in the use of food and medicine, and in experience generally, Divine energy is exerted conditionally.

(2) Specific adaptations do not imply change in the Creator, but in the conditions.

(3) Providential events and adaptations depend upon the eternal purpose, and not upon new views and decisions.

4. Providential events must be miraculous.

Providential events are immediately caused by natural forces, but miraculous events are caused by supernatural force. To suppose an overruling wisdom and power upon the forces of nature, is entirely different from the supposition of supernatural, miraculous supervision. Dispensations of Providence are in no sense miraculous.

5. This doctrine removes man's responsibility.

(1) No more so than conditional results in nature.

(2) It does not diminish the field of choice, but only declares other forces besides human choice involved. Man's volition and agency continue the same, while God's volition and providential working with forces outside of man's agency give the providential adaptations alluded to.

(3) This doctrine makes man responsible to God and not to things, and as responsibility to things is impossible, without such personality, man could not be responsible for any thing.

(4) In reality man is responsible for the results of his own actions, and for the results of the actions of others, and even the workings of God himself so far as these other results are conditioned upon human agency.

### III. DIRECT PROOFS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

1. The general belief in the superintending, Divine providence in the affairs of nations and of individuals, and especially of such agency by the best portions of humanity, and

when most free from habits of sinful life, is an evidence in favor of the doctrine here advocated. How this belief should exist from the first, and how it should be so prevalent and continuously active among men, is inconceivable except upon the admission of its truthfulness.

2. In the nature of the case, the universal causality underlying all events, and upon which every thing and event depends, renders this doctrine certain. Everything must be cause or caused, and this is as true of events as of things. Many events certainly are occurring outside of man's agency, and must be attributed to Divine providence.

3. The continuous preservation and uniformity of the vast webwork of life and things, of forces and influences, kept up in full vigor through successive ages in spite of accidents, disease, and death, indicate some special care over the operations and machinery of nature, and the general principles involved in their continuousness. The historian in the events of history, and each individual in his personal experience, sees evidence of some power higher than human and more living than fate. The manifestations of design and adaptation in the continuance of life and succession of events prove the presence of an All-wise, Almighty Ruler, just as manifestations of design and adaptation in the constitution of nature prove the existence of an intelligent Creator. The doctrine, therefore, of the Creator and of providence rests upon the same general, logical foundation.

4. The attributes of God, especially wisdom, power, goodness, and justice, in themselves constitute an irresistible argument upon this subject. God exists as creator of the universe, still lives with unchanging power, wisdom, goodness, and justice. With these attributes he could not suffer the works of his hands to continue by mere chance, uncared for, or exclusively according to the will of finite beings. In his very nature we see the evidence of his providential care.

5. Divine proprietorship of all beings and things teaches the same doctrine. (Deut. 10: 14; 1 Chron. 29: 11, 12;

Neh. 9 : 6 ; Psa. 24 : 1 ; 50 : 12 ; Acts 17 : 24, 26, 29 ; 1 Cor. 10 : 26, 28.) In all these passages we see the fact of God's proprietorship and the consequent certainty of his providential care.

6. The fatherhood of God implies the truthfulness of this doctrine. (Psa. 103 : 13 ; Isa. 9 : 6 ; Jer. 31 : 9 ; Mal. 2 : 10 ; Matt. 6 : 9, 11 ; Acts 1 : 4 ; 1 Cor. 8 : 6 ; Heb. 1 : 5 ; Jer. 1 : 17.) The very idea of a father implies care and providence.

7. A very strong argument in favor of the doctrine of Providence, and somewhat peculiar in its nature, is seen in its relation to evil and sin in personal and national experience. (Gen. 65 : 5-8 ; 50 : 20 ; Isa. 65 : 7 ; Jer. 18 : 11 ; 52 : 11, 27 ; Amos 3 : 6.) In these places we see the fact revealed that in a certain sense, upon certain occasions, God is the author of evils and afflictions suffered, and even in sinful actions there are physical forces brought into action which are continued under Divine agency, making the evil in one sense providential, while in its moral character it is human. All actions are more or less compound, and actions in which man's volition is developed involve physical forces, not human ; so that even in the case of evil suffered, and sometimes in evil performed, there is a Divine agency, showing that God works with human events and forces in consistency with the laws of their being and the principles of his government.

8. The promises of God teach this same doctrine. (See Gen. 22 : 8, 14 ; Deut. 8 : 3 ; Phil. 4 : 19 ; Matt. 6 : 8, 32, 35.) To the Jews deliverance from the Babylonish captivity was promised in such a way as to imply the pledge of Almighty power. All promises of temporal blessings, comfort in trials, and ultimate success in Christian effort imply the same thing. (Psa. 4 : 8, 121 : 3 ; 68 : 10.) In addition to all the passages bearing upon the specific points involved, there are general Biblical proofs. The following are a few of the numberless passages bearing upon this point : Psa. 104 : 8, 16, 27 ; 28 : 9 ; Matt. 6 : 26 ; 10 : 29.

## SECTION II.—DIVINE MORAL GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is the control of one force by another. In physical government there is no volition in the forces governed, although there may be in the governing force. Moral government is the exercise of intelligent moral forces over intelligent moral beings by law and motives. Such a government necessarily postulates and assumes some of the most important facts involved in human nature and experience, — things which must exist in order to any moral government, human or Divine. In the discussion of this subject it seems necessary to consider :

## I. THE CONDITIONS OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.

1. There must be moral subjects. Government implies control of something, and moral government implies control of moral beings. Beings without moral nature cannot be subjects of such a government. Moral government cannot exist without such subjects. Moral nature implies three things :

(1) Intelligence, including self-knowledge as given by intuitions and consciousness. Without intuitive appreciation of simple sensation, elementary ideas, and first truths, there can be no knowledge. Intelligence also implies sense perception and all knowledge received through the senses. The result of reflection and reason must be included in the intelligence of moral beings.

(2) A moral being must have the faculty of conscience, by which the moral quality of actions is seen and felt, and the mind influenced toward the right and from the wrong, giving pleasure in right and pain in wickedness. A being might as well be held responsible for the execution of paintings without eyes as for moral conduct without conscience.

(3) Moral nature not only implies intelligence and conscience, but the power of volition. Man must not only be able to know, and to know the moral quality of actions, but

he must be able to choose between right and wrong, or he has no moral nature, moral character, or responsibility. These three characteristics of moral beings are the three characteristics implied in the nature of the subjects of moral government, without all of which no man can be such a subject, and with which he cannot avoid responsibility. Suppose, for instance, a man has no intelligence, he cannot, of course, have any obligation. Suppose him to have intelligence and no conscience, no light upon moral quality of actions, there could be no vice or virtue in his life. But suppose he has both, knows things and sees moral quality of actions, but has no power of self-control. No being could hold him responsible for his character or conduct.

2. There must be moral relations. All moral government assumes that moral beings sustain relations to each other. Could we imagine a being located where he was entirely unknown to all others, and all others unknown to him, he could not be a subject of government, nor under obligation.

By relation we mean that position of two or more ideas, things, or beings in which one affects, or can affect, the other. Moral relation implies that moral beings are thus situated, and the moral government of God implies that men are thus related to God and to his creatures. These relations and their changes and modifications are innumerable. The simple recognition of a stranger suggests relations and some obligation. In business transactions another relation is implied, while in literary, social, civil, and religious affairs, numerous relations and indefinite modifications of them are seen. In each of these different relations there is a claim of one upon the other. A man is so constituted in his very nature that, upon the perception of these relations, he naturally and necessarily feels that claim.

3. There must be moral obligations. The word obligation in its original signification means a bond or cord which binds one thing or being to another. Obligation is an

original impulse of our being. Whether we meet a crying child, a sympathetic parent, a commanding general, a ruling monarch, or in common language the God of heaven, we necessarily feel a certain force of obligation, a feeling that we ought to do something. We feel a claim of others upon us. If we hear the weeping child at night and know not what is the cause of grief, there is that secret impulse to do something. If we hear a singular voice in the street, we listen, we stand in suspense for the moment, until satisfied it is a human voice instead of an animal's. We naturally feel under obligation to know and do something respecting it, which we do not feel for the animal. This feeling of obligation is evidently the fundamental idea in all human character and conduct, the foundation of all human joy and hope; it depends upon moral nature as its ground, and these relations as its occasion. Obligation does not rest

(1) Upon self-interest, as Paley and others seem to reason. To suppose that a man is bound to do only for his interest is really to suppose that universal selfishness is the standard of morality. It is difficult to see where there could be a line drawn between that motive in conduct and the worst possible motive in human life. This cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.

(2) Obligation does not rest upon the principle of general utility. It has with somewhat more plausibility been argued that no one is bound to do anything but that which he thinks would be for the public good and general utility; and inasmuch as that utility must be an influence only as conceived by the actor, it will leave it to man's conception what would be for general good. But with man's nature and circumstances it is often utterly impossible for him to see ultimate results. The child under the direction of the parent, the soldier under the command of his general, cannot act on that principle. In the common affairs of every-day life, circumstances are frequently occurring that demand

more immediate decision than could be made by one looking out upon the world to see what would be for general good. A mother that should see her child in the fire and pause to ask what would be for the public good, would be considered insane or a fool. We are constantly meeting with exigencies that require immediate decision and less consultation. Many of the worst evils and some of the highest virtues are not at first seen in their true character and results. Children, soldiers, servants, and others are frequently under obligation to do what, in their circumstances, they cannot see would be beneficial. But they must act entirely upon the judgment and authority of others. And then again some of the grossest crimes, to all human appearances, do good. Many men possess more wealth than is useful to themselves or others, which might be useful elsewhere. Why not steal that wealth like the brigands of Italy, for public good. Some men are proud and haughty with wealth who would be useful with less. Why not destroy property, and humble them? And some men are evidently a curse to the world, and the people take a long breath of relief when they die, believing such deaths are a public good. Why not kill them, and bless the world? Reason and conscience would thus direct, if utility were the only grounds of obligation. Again, sometimes hopeless suffering may be relieved by killing the afflicted. So thought a utilitarian Scotch pastor, who with a little arsenic relieved the sufferings of the hopelessly afflicted members of his flock. He thought it duty to act upon this principle, but the courts thought otherwise. This utilitarianism is subtle, delusive, and terribly evil. Taking the testimony of others, and especially the Word of God, we believe that whatever is right will do the most good. But the good is frequently entirely beyond the sight of the actor, and cannot be the foundation of obligation, even if it is the reason for the law of duty.

(3) This principle cannot lie in the arbitrary command of God or man. An arbitrary command is one not based

in the reason of things, but simply in the independent will of the individual. God's will is the reason for our performing an act, but the ground of that obligation rests upon the nature of God and the nature of our relations to him. Indeed, God issues no arbitrary command. All his commands are such as are based in the nature of the case, that is, in the nature of God and of his subjects, and the nature of their relations. Let it not be understood that we are not to obey God in all things. The question is, why should we do that?

(4) The reason for virtuous action, or the foundation of obligation, is not in absolute right. There is no such thing as absolute right. Right is a predicate, and always is and must be applied to some thing or some being, but cannot be conceived of as absolute and distinct from all beings. A thing is right if it fits its place, and the being is right, and right is applied to the being, when he meets his destiny. We speak of right feelings, right affections, right actions, right men; but right in the abstract, absolutely distinct from being, is impossible, and impossible of conception.

(5) But this same statement may be applied to the idea of absolute good or happiness of beings, for which Finney argues with so much force and plausibility. There is no intrinsic good in itself. The good of being itself implies that it is goodness to beings. Happiness, therefore, cannot be absolute; it is only the state of feeling, and it cannot be made absolutely the foundation of our obligation. This will be seen more clearly if we just simply change the mode of expression. Suppose we say it is a man's duty to think, purpose, and labor for the good of beings. No one will dispute that this is a duty. The question is, what is the reason for its performance, and so the duty that is devolving upon all of us is given as the reason for its performance. The same may be applied with reference to the right. It is a man's duty to do right. But why? The reason and the duty are not identical. So Hickok, in presenting "moral

excellence" — described so eloquently, and still left so indistinctly — urges the duty to be performed as the reason for its performance. Hopkins, if possible, still more pointedly presents the duty of general good-will, and makes that duty the foundation of itself. Metcalf, with his work of five hundred pages to prove that the foundation of moral obligation is "benevolent intention," makes that duty the duty of life, and the foundation of it is the duty itself. So most of the works upon this subject seem constantly to blend the duty with the reason for its performance. There is no *foundation* if the duty and foundation are identical.

There are two or three errors upon this subject which seem to us fundamental, and which constitute the occasion of this confusion of ideas and controversy upon this simple question. These writers generally blend two questions which are distinct. Why duty is required, and why it is to be performed, are entirely distinct questions. The reason why a military commander gives his order may be one thing, and the reason why the soldier obeys is another thing. The reason why God commands may be one thing, and a thing entirely beyond human comprehension, and the reason why a man should obey that command is entirely another subject, and within the comprehension of common intelligence. They generally commence with the inquiry, "What is the reason for the performance of duty?" but before they get through, they become metaphysical and ask for the general reason for having such requirements given. This mixture of the finite with the infinite, or the possible with the impossible, is confusing. Why God commands men to love him and their neighbors is really a question respecting the motives of God. "By searching we cannot find out the Almighty." But why it is man's duty to love God and man is a plain, practical question. This tendency to inquire into the Divine motives and principles of actions and obligations, affirming what he ought and ought not to do, is a tendency to go beyond what is written. Another error is seen in

most of the writings upon this subject. It arises from that same field of speculation in which men are constantly searching for some reason for man's volition outside of man himself. Ignoring the nature of man, and assuming that there must be some reason for action, they find it in the Divine decree, or in chance, or in something outside of the creature himself.

Until Tappan and others controverted Edwards's position upon necessitated will, the real principle of causality in man was not recognized, and men felt bound, speculatively and logically, to find the reason for human volition outside of man himself. Just so in this case, men seem to feel it necessary to find some reason for the performance of duty outside of man himself. Under such circumstances it is difficult to find or state the reason for human duty without giving the duty as the reason for itself, which is absurd.

The foundation of moral obligation must be that upon which obligation rests, and without which obligation is impossible. The foundation of a building is under the building, not in some other lot or city. So if we revert to what has been already said, we see where the foundation of obligation must be found. Without moral nature everybody admits there could be no obligation. With moral nature and the knowledge of relations, everybody admits that man is necessarily under obligation. With these two considerations he can but be under obligation; without them there can be no obligation. And if that does not mean the foundation of obligation, it is difficult to find any true meaning for that phrase. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion that the foundation of moral obligation is in the nature of the being as the cause, and in the nature of the relations as the occasion. Everybody admits that God himself commands what the nature of the circumstances requires or justifies. Blackstone and all law commentators affirm that pretended laws, not according to the laws of nature, are nul and void.

In this we see in what sense and in what circumstances

God is the author of obligation, "the author and finisher of our faith." God has created beings according to his own will and purpose. God having created them as they are, the nature of those beings now is the ground of their obligation. So, then, every man is bound to do just that which his nature and the nature of the one to whom obligation is due, and the nature of their relations to each other demand; and he is bound to do that, not upon the objective command and consideration, but upon the intuition, impulse, and being of his own mind. So if asked why we are to love God, we answer, *Because of what God is, and what we are.*

This is the foundation of moral obligation, simple and plain according to the common convictions and common sense of mankind; and practical for preaching and praying, as most of these noted disquisitions on the subject are not. Any one to whom obligation is due has the right to dictate in the discharge of that obligation. Just so far as a child is under obligation to the father, or a citizen to the government, or a man to his God, just so far these respective parties have the right to direct in the discharge of the obligations involved.

This direction may be expressed by circumstances or by language. The crying child, unable to utter a word, shows its condition and wants with a force that no human language could express, and demands a discharge of the obligation to it accordingly. The helpless and unconscious friend on the sick or death bed, by his condition and circumstances, calls for a discharge of the obligation due to him. So in the nature of men, in their relations to men and to God, the force of the claim arising from these different relations without any language enjoining it is often felt. This demand, whether from the crying child or dying friend, civil government or the God of heaven, is law.

4. There must be moral laws. Law is implied necessarily in moral government. By law in general we mean method of force. It may be passive or active. The rock

remains in its place by its laws, while the tree grows by another set of laws, and the winds and waters moved by their respective laws.

These are the methods of force in the material universe. In voluntary beings law is the method of force in which they ought to develop their forces. It is the rule of conduct. Any rule of conduct given by any being to whom obligation is due from the nature of the case, is in a certain sense law. Friends command us, governments give their laws, and God gives the supreme law. Some law must be higher than other laws. Hobbs thinks that civil law is the highest law binding upon man. Others think the instincts and intuitions of human nature are a law of themselves, which in a certain and elementary sense is true sometimes. Others think that the enactments of church organizations and officials are of the highest authority; but it goes without saying that in the Divine moral government, God and the law are supreme. This law is really the ground of duty, which always and necessarily depends upon law. But duty and obligation are not the same.

5. Duty is obedience to law, and this is synonymous with obedience to the laws of being. We are now able to see the regular chain of ideas as involved in this subject with reference to all the postulated and implied ideas of government. First, moral nature; second, moral relations; third, moral obligations; fourth, moral law; fifth, duty. Without these ideas of government, moral government is impossible. With them moral government becomes a simple necessity.

These forces of nature, obligations, laws, and duties must be executed by somebody; and so a government, naturally and necessarily, springs up, even among men, and is necessarily involved in the Divine economy. There must be something to be governed before there can be a government, and government is really the outgrowth of beings and things that are, and it is representative of the people.

The government is not the nation. A nation is made up

of individuals, and the government is supposed to be representative of the people, and to give the voice of the whole people. Each individual, therefore, is under obligation to the government as the people's representative, each one owing duty to the whole. So these laws above alluded to, on which duty rests, may be styled personal laws, civil and social laws, and Divine laws. In each of these respects they have their claims, and in each of these claims there is a duty involved. This leads us to consider :

## II. CLAIMS AND LAWS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

1. They are natural and philosophical. They are founded in nature, not in conquest, purchase, or arbitrary power. To the disgrace of men it must be confessed that a large proportion of their governments have been established by intrigue and purchase, or by bloody conquest, with the assertion that "might makes right." Rights thus claimed are false in their foundation, and of course ultimately defective and ruinous. The claims of the Divine government are based upon the immutable laws of nature and of nature's God,—upon the nature of God's relations to his creatures and their necessities and inherent wants. Such a government has no source of weakness, no elements of wrong, no possibility of failure, and cannot be inefficient. The government itself is thus perfect in its nature and objects, and presents one of the grandest subjects for contemplation and admiration in the universe. If military organizations sometimes command fear and awe, and statesmanship demands respect and honor, how much more so Divine statesmanship, and the perfect government of the holy God !

2. These claims are equitable and impartial. The claims of the Divine government demand only what is given,—no impossibility,—always arranging for and requiring obedience according to the intelligence and the ability of the subject. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all *thy heart*, and with all *thy soul*, and with all *thy mind*, and with all *thy strength*." This simply covers the ability of the creature, and

no more. The claims are perfectly equitable in reference to the individual, and impartial in their application. No more is claimed of one than is claimed of another under the same conditions. Circumstances seem very different in which men are placed, and the difference in joy and sorrow seems to be unequal; but upon the whole, the claims of the Divine government are adapted to the circumstances and conditions of men, requiring only what is possible and impartial.

3. These claims are universal. They extend to all men in all places, at all times, and are operative over all voluntary purposes and states of mind and heart. The darkest pagan as well as the most enlightened Christian is required to act according to the light given. So far as man's knowledge extends, he is to be submissive to God's claims in his purposes and feelings. There are no exceptions in all the history of mankind. There never has been a time or a period when there were men or nations outside of Divine government. He reigns in heaven; he reigns in earth. It would be well if these claims were generally recognized. The supposition sometimes entertained that some in the darker ages of the past, and that some in the deepest shadows of the present, are not required by the claims of God to recognize his authority and worship him, is a supposition entirely at variance with sound philosophy and the Word of God. "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse" (Rom. 1: 20). "The heavens declare the glory of the Lord" (Psa. 19: 1). "These, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves" (Rom. 2: 14). This universal adaptation of the Divine claims to men in their various circumstances and degrees of ability, is the perfect carrying out of the principle of government recognized in the best states of human society. All reasonable parents deal with their children upon that principle, acting

according to the age and ability of those governed. All enlightened nations exercise the same kind of discretion; and though they pretend to excuse nobody for ignorance of the law, yet in a certain sense they do refuse to punish a man who unintentionally does an act which otherwise would be wrong. God, knowing the hearts of men, carries out this principle perfectly, showing justice to its full extent,—only requiring what is given. (Luke 12: 48.)

4. The claims of God are infinitely benevolent. They require nothing but what is for the good and happiness of the subjects, and although self-interest and utility are not to be the motive in obedience, yet as a matter of fact "great peace have they that love thy law." It is the most successful path for happiness, and the only certain path of peace and hope. The benevolent intention of these claims is especially seen in their adaptation to the sinful. They are especially adapted to that class, requiring duties that will be for their highest good. And they are benevolent to the suffering, as pointing to the only way of light and peace and hope. The common supposition of transgressors that the laws of God are irksome and burdensome and perplexing, is gross self-deception. Every law of restraint is but a golden cord which holds the steps which otherwise would take hold on death. Every duty required is only an encouragement to such exertion as will strengthen the powers, discipline the mind, and enable one to reach a higher and eternal good. "As the people rejoice when the righteous rule," as men are always happy under the most righteous government, so the government of God is divinely and supremely the highest source of happiness.

5. These claims are authoritative, supremely so. Their authority is seen in the infinity, character, and power of the ruler. The general is sometimes personally commanding, and leaders and statesmen often exercise the authority of office, character, and truth. But what are men or angels compared with the God of the universe, and what authority

can go forth from any governor compared with the "King of kings and Lord of lords"? The simple declaration unto Moses, "I am that I am," and the repeated declaration over and over, scores of times, to the Jews, "I am the Lord," show the fact (the intended fact) of Divine authority. The claims of God cannot be set aside with impunity nor his authority with safety. His infinite power, with the myriads of forces and instrumentalities and resources under his control, should strike every finite being with awe, and lead to one universal declaration of humble submission. And this authority in the Divine government rests not simply upon the personality of the ruler, but upon his representative relation to all the beings in the universe. He knows the wants of every living being, and in accordance with these wants he commands each one to live and act according to his requirements for the general good of his subjects. If we could conceive of the solitariness of God, his authority would be infinite. If we could conceive of him as representing a hundred thousand men, or a million, his authority in our eyes might possibly be enhanced. But to consider him as the representative of hundreds and thousands of millions of beings for whom he plans and speaks, and for whose welfare he commands each individual to live and labor, presents his authority before us in overwhelming grandeur.

6. The claims of God's government are specific. Not only general, as in the parts mentioned, but specific in their specific claims. In these claims is demanded :

(1) Allegiance to Divine government. There is a great difference between submission to the single law and the different laws, and to submission to government as a whole. That allegiance to the government which foreigners must recognize in becoming citizens, and which all men must acknowledge personally and specifically in becoming a child of God, is the most imperative and important claim of the Divine government. A distinction too often overlooked between the laws and government leaves many in darkness up-

on this subject. The real condition of piety, of all goodness, all peace and hope, sincere, heartfelt submission to the *government* of God, and willingness, not simply to do certain duties, but willingness to be led and governed by him in all things. This, of all duties, is the first, and without this there is no true obedience. A rebel against human government may do many things perfectly according to law, and according to the laws of citizenship, and yet be a rebel, and by refusing the oath of allegiance subject himself justly to the condemnation and punishment of treason. This duty cannot be emphasized too clearly nor enforced too positively. But with this :

(2) Submission to laws both positive and negative is of course indispensable. And this must include repentance for past violations, confidence in God's Word, and the faithful performance of personal, social, and public duties as required.

(3) Although somewhat general, yet supreme love for the ruler is a specific claim. It cannot be ignored nor forgotten. It is true that submission to the government embraces this, for not only submission to the government, but a true, sincere, personal love to God is required. It is demanded by his nature and relationship to us, demanded by his good works and love to us, demanded by his law and is implied in his promises; and with this supreme love there is to be blended entire trust, and the withholding of equal adoration, love, and trust from others.

(4) Gratitude is another specific claim upon us, the claims and grounds of which are infinite. This law rests upon the multitude of mercies, the richness of blessings, and the fullness of Divine love, which no finite mind can comprehend. And yet it is a duty to comprehend what we can and to feel the gratitude we owe. All our obligations to God rest upon a foundation broader than we can comprehend; but the duty required of us, as above explained, only equals our ability. "We owe him ten thousand talents, but have

nothing to pay." "What shall we render unto the Lord for all his benefits?" "We can take the cup of salvation and praise the Lord." This debt of gratitude is one of supreme importance, a claim so just, so reasonable, so imperative, that no one can find excuse for its neglect. And with, if possible, a still higher sense of obligation we should say: "Thanks be unto God for his unspeakable gift;" "for when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly."

(5) The voluntary worship of God is a specific claim, not only because he deserves it, but because such praise of his name is for the good of others. Soldiers extol their general, cities their civil officers, and friends their honored associates above all others; and in all circumstances we should be willing to testify for God and to speak in his praise. The fullness of that spirit is especially developed in many of the Psalms. In the visions of the prophets and of John the Revelator, and in the occasional reports of the angels in heaven, is indicated our duty in this respect. Men are not slow or ashamed to speak of the good qualities of their friends. We should praise God.

(6) Co-operation in God's work, and the support of his cause, is another specific duty required at our hands. God has a great and glorious enterprise and work going on in this world, nothing less than the conversion of souls, the evangelization of the people, and the conquering of the whole world; and he asks "for laborers to go into his vineyard," "for laborers together with him," and soldiers under "the captain of our salvation." In all these different figures and figurative representations of his work and demands, we see the claims of the Divine government, and the promise that even greater things than Christ performed personally can thus be accomplished implies a claim of special force and moment. This includes all the special claims in connection with the church in its organic and evangelistic work; the duties of preaching and publishing the Gospel, sustaining

and practicing religious worship, and maintaining the administration of the ordinances.

(7) Together with these special claims of the government of God with reference to the King and the kingdom, there are general duties required with reference to his subjects of every grade and kind, and everywhere duties to man as man, and duties to man as a creature of God, covering the whole field of morals and religion. These are some of the specific claims of the Divine government. They are all reasonable, just, and necessary to happiness and heaven, and only by the pardoning blood of the Lamb can any one secure either without strict obedience to these, and that merit of Christ is secured only by submission to the principles of these claims and faith in God.

#### SECTION III.—PENALTY IN THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is representative of organized society, and assumes the responsibility of protecting, caring for, and promoting the interest of all the individuals in society. The expressed will of the government in accordance with the nature and relations of the governed is law, and the expressed will of the highest government is the highest law in the universe. In every case obedience to this law must be satisfactory to the government. Disobedience must secure the disfavor of that government, and in this truth are involved the sanctions of law and government. Every law must have its appropriate penalty, or it is no law. The sanctions of the Divine government, its rewards and penalties, constitute a part, and an essential part, of the moral government of God. These rewards are involved in the Divine approval, and embrace all the happiness and blessings arising from such approval. Development of mind, peace of conscience, joy of hope, and eternal bliss are the rewards proposed in this government. The loss of all these blessings and the evils assigned by the Creator and Gov-

error of the universe constitute the penalty. Without penalty there is no law; without law, no government. The consideration, therefore, of the penalty becomes necessary in the consideration of the Divine government.

#### I. THE DESIGN OF PENALTY.

1. It is not designed for reformation. If such were its object, it would be a good, and not a penalty. Penalties in human government are never for that purpose. The instrumentalities and moral forces which philanthropy employs for reforming criminals and prisoners belong to another system than the penal system. As a matter of fact, penalties in themselves are not efficient in that direction. It is a painful fact that often the philanthropist meets with poor success in reforming criminals, and that civil punishments seem to do but little towards securing that result.

2. Neither is penalty a manifestation of malice or vindictiveness. In the raging of human passions penalties sometimes seem to be conceived and inflicted upon the principle of malice, the object being simply to produce pain and torture. Such is not the design of the government of the God who is in himself love, and whose every penalty is for the public good. But affirmatively—

3. Penalty is intended for the prevention of crime and the promotion of virtue. There is a tendency and disposition to seek personal interests and gratifications, so as to intrude upon the rights of others in the commission of crime. To prevent this and to secure peace must be the design of every good government, and the object of every penalty included in the law. It is for prevention, and not for reformation,—to secure right action rather than to remedy evils already accomplished.

4. The good of society and of individuals, the honor of the government, and the success of its work depend largely, if not mostly, upon the estimate of law. The penalty in the Divine law shows God's estimate of that law. Every government thus expresses its view of the worth of the law, and

God's government is no exception. Without such an estimate law is a failure, and without suitable penalties such an estimate will be impossible.

5. Penalty is designed to reveal God's character so as to justify the highest and most universal confidence in him as a ruler: that is, in his wisdom, justice, holiness, benevolence, and veracity. The objects of government are all defeated without confidence in the rulers, and the objects of the Divine government are attained only by such confidence in God's just dominion. The penalty revealing his appreciation of virtue, opposition to vice, and care for his subjects, implies a God of such character, justice, and truthfulness as to constitute the highest possible estimate of such a ruler. Without these penalties the angels could not thrice repeat their ascription of holiness to God.

6. Another and prominent design of the penalties in the Divine government, as in all other governments, is the protection of the subjects. The restraint of criminals and prevention of injury to the innocent are alike necessary for the protection of the rights, persons, characters, happiness, and hopes of the subjects. God, by his very being, character, and promises, stands pledged for the protection of his subjects, and every honest subject is interested in having such penalties instituted and executed as will protect his rights and happiness. So far as the penalty is just and in accordance with the importance of the law and its objects, it is but a simple act of justice to every subject.

7. The universal good of all is evidently the ultimate end and design of all penalty. As God is good, he must show his love of goodness and holiness. As he is benevolent, he must establish and execute such laws and penalties as will, upon the whole, be the most beneficial to all the subjects in all his dominion. As law without penalty would leave society and the universe without restraint or authoritative rule of action, as penalties are necessary for the vindication of such laws, as their existence and execution is to

prevent men from going to the depths of misery and crime and producing misery to others, universal benevolence demands the existence and execution of just penalties. And the justice of these penalties cannot be criticised or condemned by criminals themselves, or by man, with his limited, clouded intellect. God, who sees all things from the beginning, has fixed these penalties not to meet an arbitrary demand, but the demands of *public justice*. As sin is the greatest evil in the universe, the God of love must present the greatest motive against it. There is not a penalty in all the Divine government, in this or any other life, that is not fixed by benevolence and executed in love. The justice of God is always blended with love.

## II. THE NATURE OF PENALTY IN THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

1. It cannot consist in physical suffering, which is not generally, if anywhere, suffered according to moral desert.

2. It does not consist in the feeling of guilt, which is generally diminished with multiplicity of crimes. The more a man sins, the less keenly he feels the weight of sin. When, a few years ago, a pirate stood upon the scaffold, in his dying speech he stated that his first crime was stealing a pin, for which he keenly felt his wrong. Afterwards, in different steps of crime, he felt the pangs of conscience at first, which lessened in the practice of wrong. His first murder shocked him, but at last he came to feel perfectly indifferent, and when slipping in the blood of his victims on the ship's deck he could laugh and jeer and joke without the least compunction of conscience. The Bible speaks of "conscience seared with hot iron," that is, rendered insensible. To suppose that God would make such an arrangement in creation and government, and that increase of crime would work diminution of penalty, is absurd.

3. Penalty does not consist in annihilation or suspension of consciousness. We have proved in the chapter upon

anthropology that mind is naturally and unconditionally immortal. According to the universal laws of nature, whatever is, is to be, and continues until there is some other force intervening to prevent. The soul is immortal, and will continue in its natural activity, unless there is some proof to the contrary. No proof has been furnished in human experience of the annihilation of mind any more than of matter.

It is sometimes affirmed that the occasional suspension of consciousness proves the possibility or probability of man's annihilation. But this is only the suspension of some of the functions of the brain, the organ of the mind. We might as well suppose that the cessation of the action of the instrument would prove that the agent employing it was dead. In the present state of being, mind uses the brain as its instrument. We may prevent the development of the mind through that organ, but there is no evidence that the mind itself is suspended in its activity. The only proof possible is in the imaginary, *a priori* inferences of men, or in revelation. Some have imagined that annihilation would be more in accordance with Divine benevolence than continued existence with the consciousness of crime and of suffering the penalty. Not to be is more shocking than to be, with whatever liabilities are attached to existence. It may be remarked respecting this that man is not capable of deciding what is most or least benevolent in the Divine government. God is the only competent judge in that matter; and even in the narrow limits of man's mind it is not true that to a very large number of men the idea of penalty is any more terrible than the idea of annihilation. To many men the thought of ceasing to exist would be more shocking than the thought of other punishment, whatever it might be. In other words, men would leave themselves in the hands of the just and holy God for such punishment or modes of being as he would assign, rather than drop into nonentity.

But the principal arguments given upon this subject are

founded mostly upon the use of terms in the Bible. The terms "perish," "destruction," "death," etc., are assumed to mean cessation of being, and these are the terms used respecting Divine penalties. Such terms are used, and used often, with reference to punishment, but never with reference to annihilation. They are frequently applied to the body, as in Ecclesiastes, where most of the texts quoted upon this question refer directly to the body, and not to the mind. And elsewhere in the Bible we see the words are applied without involving or favoring the doctrine of annihilation. In Num. 17: 12, it is said, "we all perish," and in Matt. 9: 17, that "the broken bottles perish." In Isa. 57: 1, it is said, "the righteous perish," and in 1 Cor. 8: 11, the weak brother is spoken of as perishing. In Jer. 9: 12, even the "land perisheth."

The word "destruction" is adduced with much confidence. It does not mean annihilation in Prov. 1: 32, "The prosperity of fools shall destroy them," or in John 2: 19, "Destroy this temple, and I will raise it again." Rev. 11: 18 speaks of "those who destroy the earth." In Isa. 32: 7 it is said, "devices destroy the poor," and in Job 19: 10, "He hath destroyed me." Hosea 13: 9 says of Israel, "Thou hast destroyed thyself." Here the living are addressed as having been destroyed. In Gal. 1: 23 it is said of Paul, "He preaches the faith he once destroyed." The same idea is given in Gal. 2: 18. In Jer. 48: 8 it is said, "the plains shall be destroyed." In 2 Thess. 1: 9 it speaks of the "wicked as being destroyed with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord."

The word "death" shows different applications in the same way. "Thou art but a dead man" (Gen. 20: 3), and yet alive to hear the announcement. "We be all dead men" (Gen. 12: 3). Prov. 9: 18 gives a warning about impure places—"Knoweth not that the dead are there." In Isa. 26: 19, "Thy dead men shall live." In John 5: 25, "The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God."

“Though he were dead, yet shall he live” (John 11 : 25). In Rom. 6 : 2, “How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?” and in 7 : 4, “ye are dead to the law.” In 2 Cor. 5 : 14, the Apostle concludes “that if Christ died for all, then were all dead.” In Eph. 2 : 15, and Col. 2 : 13, man is spoken of as “dead in sin.” In Matt. 10 : 39, “He that loseth his life shall find it.” The loss of life cannot be annihilation. “But if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost” (2 Cor. 4 : 3). But they still have blinded minds and were not annihilated. In Psa. 6 : 7, the Psalmist says, “Mine eye is consumed”; in 31 : 9, “that his bones were consumed”; in 73 : 19, “he was utterly consumed with terrors.” In Luke 20 : 47, Christ speaks of “devouring widows’ houses”; in Rom. 3 : 16, of certain ones that “destruction was in their path.” In 1 Tim. 6 : 9, it speaks of “lusts which drown men in destruction.” These terms are frequently applied exclusively to morals and to the state of mind. In Heb. 6 ; 1, “dead works” are mentioned. In Jude 12, he says they are “twice dead.” In Rev. 3 : 1, it speaks of those having the name of living and yet are dead. From these different quotations and many others that might be given we find these different words which are supposed to mean cessation of being never have that meaning. There is no indication that any particle of matter was ever annihilated or ever will be; and these destructions refer rather to the destruction of advantages, the loss of character, the loss of happiness, but never to annihilation. There is no proof, therefore, that it will ever occur. But men sometimes attempt to prove that annihilation is the penalty of the law, by attempting to prove that immortality is conditional, as in Rom. 2 : 7, where some are spoken of as “seeking immortality and eternal life.”

The idea of seeking an object does not prove nor indicate that the object is not in existence without being sought. Men are to seek God, not because that seeking is to create God, but to seek his favor. Men are to seek peace and pur-

sue it, that is, to make it the prominent object of pursuit. So as in making God the great end and purpose of life, we are to keep immortality in view as an end in life and faith. That is all this verse means. It does not or cannot mean that immortality is conditioned upon our choice of purpose or action.

In Phil. 3: 11, and in Luke 20: 35, the resurrection is spoken of as an object of pursuit. But as before said, it is to be the subject of thought and pursuit, and there is a difference always between seeking a thing in the abstract, and the seeking of a thing as a good in itself. A man may seek for an object in the abstract and not gain the good of it; or he may seek that object for the sake of the value or worth involved in it. So in seeking God, or the resurrection, or immortality, we are to seek these objects as a good, as a supreme good. They may not be alike good to all. Objects of not doubtful value are objects of pursuit, and abstract things do not suggest all the ideas involved in their relations to us.

We are to seek Christ, yet he is not supposed to be non-existent unless we seek him. "In his favor is life" (Psa. 30: 5). "O Lord, by these things men live, and in all these things is the life of my spirit" (Is. 38: 16). In John 8: 12, we have the "spirit of life" mentioned, and "to be spiritually minded is life." Rom. 11: 15 speaks of individuals as receiving them as "alive from the dead." "The Spirit giveth life" (2 Cor. 3: 6), and "Death worketh in you" (4: 12), show that death and life have no reference to existence. In 2 Cor. 5: 4, the Apostle speaks of "being clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life." "For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ" (Col. 3: 3). "He shall ask, and he shall give him life" (1 John 5: 16).

In the absence of any facts in nature or history, of any statements or threatenings of the Bible, or any doctrine involving annihilation, we are bound to believe that annihilation cannot be possible. The nature of the punishment

threatened in the Word of God and indicated in the universal convictions and beliefs of the world is complete upon this subject. But there are other considerations bearing upon this groundless theory which have less foundation in reason and philosophy than universalism, or even deism.

(1) Annihilation would be a violation of the laws of mind. If there is any fact revealed in the nature of the mind, it is its immortality, which is contradicted by annihilation.

(2) Penal annihilation as well as natural annihilation is contrary to analogy. There is no evidence of annihilation anywhere else in creation, and how can we expect it will take place in the human mind—the highest portion of creation.

(3) It is contrary to the order of nature. Man as the end in view in all creation must be ultimate and eternal. "Things which are seen are temporal." Will there not be something unseen and eternal in man?

(4) Annihilation is contrary to the common consciousness and belief of all nations. The intuitions of the mind, the revelations by "things that are made" of the "invisible things of God," condemn the doctrine of annihilation.

(5) This fatal error implies the annihilation of the Divine government over the wicked. To destroy a subject or citizen is to destroy the government so far as that subject or citizen is concerned. Prisoners are still under the government; but annihilated ones cannot be subjects. Thus the government of God would defeat its own dominion over its transgressors.

(6) It destroys penalty as a fact of experience, making it to include only the dread of the future loss. If there is no conscious existence, there is no conscious penalty.

(7) It leads to materialism and atheism. Those who claim to be Christian annihilationists and are zealous in the advocacy of some forms of Christian truth, quote the same objections to the doctrine of spiritual life and immortality

which infidels quote, and generally assume the materialistic constitution of the mind. And those who admit the natural immortality of the soul, believing that to be its true destiny, still, in arguing for penal annihilation, so easily, naturally, and generally follow in line with the materialistic view as to favor materialism and atheism in all its worst forms. They mutually aid each other; infidels help them to arguments and they help infidels to their arguments,—a copartnership which is sadly inconsistent with Christian doctrine and profession.

(8) The Bible proves eternal punishment by the use of the same terms as are applied to eternal life. If mind cannot be punished while unconscious, and that state is to be eternal, then conscious happiness may come to an end also, for the same words are applied to the duration of both.

But, affirmatively, Divine penalties must be :

1. Purely mental. There are penalties for moral law, and they must belong to the intellectual and moral faculties. Figurative language has to be used in all mental and spiritual matters. And so the harps of gold and the pearly gates of heaven and the fires of hell must be considered figurative, and as expressive of the highest types of joy and of deepest sorrow.

2. This punishment must to a great extent consist in the recollection of the past. "Son, remember," was the suggestion made to the lost rich man; and so memory must ever be the executor of Divine penalties, pointing to opportunities lost, crimes committed, injury accomplished. The voice of conscience and memory will constitute the "worm that dieth not."

3. A selfish, sensual spirit loses relish for the pleasures of this life, and when removed from the body must be removed from the pleasures of life. Such removal would be no grief to one perfectly supplied with highest spiritual gratification, but without such gratification it is easy to see what the loss of all bodily pleasures must be.

See Ed. Note on the next several pages for clarity concerning Hell.

**Ed. Note:** We must disagree with the author on this point that divine punishment must be figurative. The torments of Hell cannot be figurative. And although the Lake of Fire was not mentioned by the author, it must also be discussed whenever Hell is discussed in order to get the complete picture of Divine Punishment.

Hell is a place of torment perceived as physical. The mind, indivisible as it is from the soul, only perceives pain because of its connection to the brain which is the central processing organ of the human body. The brain processes all of the sensory input from the body's nervous system and translates those as gross groupings that we can use. Sensations of pain, smooth, rough, hot, cold, thirst, etc., are but some of those gross groupings. We have certain built in reactions to certain groupings of sensations and others are learned. Extremes of hot, cold, or pressure, cause pain, and we are hard-wired to react immediately to those extremes. Other reactions, such as a reaction to sensual touch, can be a combination of built in reaction to the sensation but also involves a measure of learned reaction through positive reinforcement.

### **Scriptural and medical definitions:**

#### **Luke 16:19-31**

**:24 tormented** Gk οδυνωμαι (*od-dune-oh-mie*), to grieve, sorrow, torment

**:25 tormented** Gk οδυνασαι (*od-dune-a-sigh*) to grieve, sorrow, torment

**:28 torment** Gk βασανου (*bas-an-oo*) torture:- torment

**:24 flame** Gk φλογι (*flogee*) a blaze:- flame

The passage in Luke is obviously talking about the perception of acute pain brought on by burning in a flame.

#### **Acute pain (medical definition and explanation):**

**Acute pain often results from tissue damage, such as a skin burn or broken bone. Acute pain can also be associated with headaches or muscle cramps. This type of pain usually goes away as the injury heals or the cause of the pain (stimulus) is removed.**

**To understand acute pain, it is necessary to understand the nerves that support it. Nerve cells, or neurons, perform many functions in the body. Although their general purpose, providing an interface between the brain and the body, remains constant, their capabilities vary widely. Certain types of neurons are capable of transmitting a pain signal to the brain.**

**As a group, these pain-sensing neurons are called nociceptors, and virtually every surface and organ of the body is wired with them. The central part of these cells is located in the spine, and they send threadlike projections to every part of the body. Nociceptors are classified according to the stimulus that prompts them to transmit a pain signal.**

**Thermoreceptive nociceptors are stimulated by temperatures that are potentially tissue damaging. Mechanoreceptive nociceptors respond to a pressure stimulus that may cause injury. Polymodal nociceptors are the most sensitive and can respond to temperature and pressure. Polymodal nociceptors also respond to chemicals released by the cells in the area from which the pain originates.**

**Nerve cell endings, or receptors, are at the front end of pain sensation. A stimulus at this part of the nociceptor unleashes a cascade of neurotransmitters (chemicals that transmit information within the nervous system) in the spine. Each neurotransmitter has a purpose. For example, substance P relays the pain message to nerves leading to the spinal cord and brain. These neurotransmitters may also stimulate nerves leading back to the site of the injury. This response prompts cells in the injured area to release chemicals that not only trigger an immune response, but also influence the intensity and duration of the pain.**

This medical definition and explanation is obviously valid only for the time of physical existence and depends upon the physical existence of the body, including all of the nerves involved and the central processor and collator

for the information supplied by the nerves, the brain. These then, during physical existence which we call life, give some type of stimulus to the mind by some unknown connection, whether material or immaterial is not germane to our discussion, and the mind translates that into the perception of pain. The mind uses those various stimuli, in this case pain but we must also include all of the range from pain to pleasure and all of the shades in-between, to connect it to the physical body and through that body to the material universe- God's creation- of which the body, including the nervous system and the brain, is a part. However, since the mind is not God, then it too must be part of the creation. Not considered by the scholars a part of the physical creation but, nevertheless, still part of the creation. Since there is a physical creation and a spiritual creation, and the mind is not part of the physical creation, remember, mind and brain are two separate things, then it must be part of the spiritual creation. In that sense, then, we can conclude that it is either the same thing as the soul or at least one is an inextricable part of the other.

At death the connection between the immaterial mind and the material brain is severed. Therefore, the mind is cut off from those perceptions which are derived from stimuli sent to it from the brain because the brain is dead and so are all of the nerves that make up the network we call the nervous system that is connected to every part of the body including the enveloping organ we call the skin, where the nerve endings are present in abundance. Therefore, the physical stimuli that are sensed by the nerve endings that are, for our current discussion, caused by tissue being burnt in a flame, that are then processed and collated by the central processor, the brain, are no longer capable of having their messages relayed to the mind to enable us to feel that thing that we call pain because the body is dead.

Now the question is, how can the rich man in the event recorded for us in the book of Luke express such adamant insistence that he is being tormented by flame? As it is put in verse :28, he feels that he is in a place of *torture* (a literal translation of the Greek word used.) And also, incidentally, he insists that he feels thirsty. That his tongue is "parched," as we would say; and we can infer from that statement that he believes he has a tongue.

**:24 "send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue..."**

How can this be when the body is dead? And since the body is dead it is not only incapable of sensing the burning of the flame, but is also incapable of sending sensory messages through the nervous system to that part of it called the brain; and since it, the brain, is dead and, therefore, is incapable of receiving, processing and collating the sensory messages and relaying them to the mind, how can the mind of the rich man perceive that he is feeling acute pain and thirst ("*torment... tormented ... cool my tongue*") and is being tortured in the flame?

The explanation is actually quite simple. God is the creator of both the physical and the spiritual realm- the latter being referred to by many today as the *metaphysical* realm (*metaphysical* def. *incorporeal, supernatural*) to which they relegate this thing called "the mind."

*Psychology- mind, the human faculty to which are ascribed thought, feeling, etc.; often regarded as an immaterial part of a person.*

Although there are multitudes of different views concerning mind and soul and whether they are the same thing, we can find the modern perception summed up in the following quote:

**Jose M.R. Delgado writes, "Aristotelian thought has permeated most Occidental philosophical systems until modern times, and the classification of man's function as vegetative, sensitive, and rational is still useful. In present popular usage, soul and mind are not clearly differentiated and some people, more or less consciously, still feel that the soul, and perhaps the mind, may enter or leave the body as independent entities."**

Whether mind and soul are the same thing is not germane to our current discussion; but, at the least, that they are inextricably intertwined is quite obvious. What is germane is the fact that mind is immaterial but subject to outside stimuli. And during its time dwelling in the physical body, all stimuli sent to it come from the physical creation exclusively through that physical body and the mind's unexplained connection with that part of the body called the brain which is the sole processor, collator, and sender of sensory information from the creation through the nervous system to it.

That the mind exists in the rich man in the book of Luke is quite obvious because of the conversation that he is

carrying on and the feelings he is expressing in the story recorded there. His conversation conveys all of the necessary elements of mind.

The following are commonly listed as “mental faculties” or faculties of the mind: *thought, memory, imagination, feeling, perception, emotion (love, fear, hate, joy, remorse, etc.), attention, free-will, consciousness, and others*. All of these that are appropriate for the situation recorded in **Luke ch. 16** are expressed by the rich man. The following are just a few examples from the story.

*thought* - He obviously is thinking in order to carry on a lucid conversation. He also is using reason.

*memory* - He speaks of his brothers at home, which denotes memory of them.

*imagination* - He imagines that they could come to the place of torment where his is.

*feeling* - He is expressing “feeling” in several ways. In the physical sense, he is obviously showing personal consciousness of the pain, “feeling” the pain as we would say. In addition he is expressing the fact that he is “feeling,” in an emotional sense of the word, the emotional pain caused by the thought that his brothers might also come to the place of torment if they did not repent of their sins.

*perception, emotion (fear and also at least a tinge of remorse), attention, free-will, consciousness* are also present in amounts easily perceived through the conversation of the rich man in the story.

From just these few expressions of the presence of its faculties, that he still possesses that thing called “mind” is beyond question.

**Stimuli:** Since we know that God is the creator of both the material and the immaterial realm, then we can deduce two things: (1) that stimuli in the material (physical) realm are part of His creation and operate by the rules that He has set up for them; and (2) that stimuli in the immaterial realm are also part of His creation and operate by the rules that He has set up for them. Further, we can deduce that since He is the Creator and controller of the processes both material and immaterial that make stimuli possible in their respective realms, then He is in total control of those stimuli in both the material and the immaterial realm in all of their operations and manifestations. In other words, He controls them at all times and in all ways.

We saw earlier that when in the physical body, the mind receives stimuli from the physical creation solely through that physical body and those stimuli, properly processed by the brain and transmitted to the mind in some manner as yet unknown, are perceived by the mind as pain, thirst, etc. However, after death the mind/body connection, however that connection operates, is severed. We know there are other stimuli transmitted to the mind from the spiritual realm, from God, while we are in our physical bodies; but, for our current purposes we are going to concentrate solely on the stimuli that cause pain, thirst, etc., and while in the physical body those stimuli are solely from the physical realm.

Now to return to the question at hand, how can the mind of the rich man in the events recorded in Luke be feeling tormenting pain and thirst when he no longer has a body! His body is in the grave and his soul/mind are in Hell; and there is no slightest suggestion in the Bible that during this period there is any link between them through which stimuli from the body could reach the mind. Nor is there any suggestion that the inert and non-functioning body in the grave is experiencing physical stimuli that could be relayed to the brain and forwarded to the mind where it could be perceived as pain and thirst. Nor is there any physical way it could be sensing those stimuli even if they existed because it is dead, inert, non-functioning in any way shape or form; i.e., it is inert matter slowly returning to the elements (dirt or dust of the ground as the Bible calls it) from which it was originally made.

Then how can the rich man obviously be feeling these physical sensations? The explanation is as follows. He is not feeling the physical sensations. He is simply feeling the sensations. Although the physical stimuli and processes are absent, it is obvious that his mind is still experiencing stimuli that it is processing as pain and thirst. (Research “phantom pain” experienced in a severed limb or organ.) Since all processes when the mind was connected to the physical brain, nervous system, and sensors that made a connection between the creation and the mind, were from the Creator of the physical universe, then we must conclude that the stimuli the mind of the rich man is receiving in the spiritual realm, which it is processing as pain and thirst, must also be from the Creator of it. The mind, it seems from the story in Luke, can only process stimuli in

one way; in this current scenario, its perceptions of acute pain as of burning and thirst. Where the stimuli come from is not important, whether from the Creator through the physical Creation or from the Creator through the spiritual Creation, the end result is the same. The mind of the rich man is processing the stimuli the same way in the spiritual realm as it used to process them in the physical realm. Experientially he cannot tell the difference. The pain of burning is pain of burning and the agony of thirst is the agony of thirst no matter if the stimuli are from the physical part of God's creation or the spiritual part of God's creation. He believes he has a physical body because the result experienced by him is the same as it was when he did have a body and experienced pain when he burned himself and thirst when he lacked water. Only now it is God supplying the stimuli, in this case a large amount of stimuli, through the spiritual creation to exact Divine Punishment.

This punishment is justly pronounced on the lost man and it is everlasting because the condemnation is everlasting. **(Mt 25:31-46)** The pain of burning and agony of thirst will continue forever because the everlasting God will supply the stimuli for them through eternity to come.

### **Supply of stimuli.**

The everlasting God will supply these everlasting stimuli in two ways.

#### **1. Supply in the spiritual creation.**

He will supply the stimuli in the spiritual realm for however long the mind of the lost man is in Hell.

Then at the judgment the body of the lost man will be brought out of the grave, or out of the sea if he was buried at sea, and his soul/mind will be brought out of the spiritual realm of Hell, which the mind of the lost man has perceived as physical, and the two will once again be joined together.

The Great White Throne judgment will then take place and the soul/mind once again joined to a physical body will be cast into the Lake of Fire forever. **(Rev 20:11-15)**

#### **2. Supply in the physical realm.**

Once the lost are, body and soul, in the Lake of Fire, the Creator, God, will once again supply the stimuli in a physical way, a lake of fire, and the mind of the lost man will continue processing those physical stimuli as pain of burning and the agony of thirst exactly as he did the spiritual stimuli in the spiritual realm.

In closing, we cannot agree with the author that the punishment of God is spiritual and couched in **"figurative"** language. The statements in the scriptures are too literal and in context and by comparison to other similar scriptures cannot be taken in any other than a literal way.

We do agree that the torments of Hell are, as the author of the textbook stated, **"Purely mental"**; but, that they are merely symbolic, or, as he put it, **"figurative... expressive of the highest types of joy (Heaven) and of deepest sorrow (Hell)"** are simply not acceptable. Yes, the divine punishment called Hell is purely mental but that does not mean it is purely figurative in its description. The description of the acute pain of burning and the agony of thirst are experientially real to the sufferer. Mental, Yes, but nonetheless real to the one experiencing them. Although mental and taking place in the spiritual realm, they are indistinguishable from the same experience if it were suffered in a physical reality. The lost man cannot tell the difference. The stimuli are there, even though from the spiritual creation, and those stimuli have the same resultant processing in the mind as they would have if they were from the physical creation. To the sufferer, Hell is real, the burning is real, the thirst is real, and to their perception the sufferer believes they have a body through which they believe these stimuli are being processed and delivered to their mind. To them Hell is experientially as real as if they were suffering it in their old physical bodies.

Then, when their mind is delivered from Hell and their bodies from the grave or the sea, and the two are once again joined, then they will experience the Lake of Fire in the physical. But to them, there is not, nor can there be, any difference, experientially, between Hell and The Lake of Fire. The spiritual stimuli of Hell and the physical stimuli of The Lake of Fire will elicit exactly the same perception in the mind of the lost

man. Hell will be exactly as real to them as the physical existence they had before death and The Lake of Fire will once again see them back in the physical creation to suffer eternally. Their experience of the Divine Punishment will be their lot through Hell and The Lake of Fire and it will be forever; and they will not be able to tell any difference between the two- both will be absolutely real to them. Dr. VBK

4. Men are happy with things and animals, but supremely so with friends. Just as much higher as man is above the animals, so much higher is joy in humanity and society above other sources of human happiness. The best of society is the source of highest happiness of that character. To be deprived eternally of the pleasures of good society, and associated exclusively with the vile and the sinful, must constitute no small degree of the penalty of God's law.

5. Man is constituted for religious enjoyment, and all history proves that the highest ecstasy and happiness, in highest estimation and worth, is happiness in religion and God. There is a natural demand for such happiness in the mind of man. But the mind that voluntarily violates God's law necessarily incurs the penalty of his disapprobation. Those who are "destroyed with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord" must suffer in that separation the most fearful penalty conceivable. Their highest mental demands and supreme wants are refused. The best friend in heaven or earth is cast aside, and he in his holiness and love of right withdraws himself and his friendship from those who oppose him and violate his law. It is no arbitrary decision of the "Judge of all the earth, who will do right"; but involved in the nature of the case, in the very nature of being. Those who violate his law must lose his approval and suffer loss infinitely more severe than the loss of all other friends.

6. But, finally, and fatally, and worse than all, this state is hopeless; and the feeling, and the knowledge, and the echo eternally of "no hope," will be the deepest and most severe of all the elements of punishment in the Divine government. The time will come when the state is fixed and the doom determined.

III. THE DURATION OF THE PENALTY. That this penalty must be endless is evident:

1. From analogy. The physical penalties in nature are often irremediable. Injuries to the bark of trees or the limbs of animals are sometimes remedied, but more often such

injuries prove fatal. Ultimate and endless sequences are constantly occurring all about us. So in human nature and experience. The violation of physical law has its ultimate and never-ending sequence; and in one sense penalties for violating moral law we know are, and must be in the nature of the case, endless. A man wastes a day of time, and it is lost forever. Opportunities for great blessings and happiness if neglected never return. The fact is, endless punishment is beginning every day in life, and there is no reason why we may not expect an endless continuance of these necessary sequences in human experience.

2. It may be reasonably inferred from the laws of mind. (1) Continuous identity and memory will continue the unpleasant and painful impression upon the mind until the error or sin is forgiven. So long as man continues the same being and has the same power of memory he can but suffer more or less for past offences unless pardoned. (2) The progressive nature of the mind renders the loss of attainments and opportunities eternal unless miraculously remedied. Suppose one man loses the advantage of the progress of a single day while another improves that day to advantage. There is one day's difference in their attainments, and, inasmuch as every day has its appropriate work, that day of loss can never be recovered without the loss of another day. It must, therefore, continue endlessly. And inasmuch as improvement gives ability for improvement, the loss of opportunities must be endless plus the loss of ability for making improvement. Consequential penalties must be endless and losses sustained by sin never ending, unless some miracle of grace offered upon condition interferes; and in that case it still leaves the fact of the penalty or desert of crime eternal, for remedy does not change the law of justice. (3) The force of habit constantly increasing tends necessarily to endless fixedness. If it is more difficult for a man to reform after sixty years than in early life, the time must come when habit of mind will be fixed beyond all remedy. So, then, by this

immutable law of habit, mind is doomed to an unchanging destiny.

3. The nature of government and its laws are conclusive upon this point. God's government is holy, just, and good, and must present the highest motives for obedience to the highest laws. No laws are higher than God's laws, and no sanctions of law higher than eternal law itself, and no sanctions adequate if less than eternal. If a good and benevolent government, it must present the greatest motive against the greatest evil. Sin is the greatest evil, and deserves the strongest motive against its perpetration. Universal benevolence and justice require the strongest protection of the universal rights of all the subjects. The fine of one dollar for stealing a horse, or the fine of one hundred dollars for murder, would not be adequate penalty in human government, because it would not properly protect the rights of citizens. The infinite importance of the interests at stake in God's government demand these highest penalties.

4. We infer endless punishment from the nature of sin. Sin is the violation of the highest law in the universe, and inasmuch as Divine law is absolutely perfect, the rejection of that law is the rejection of the government, or high treason. All sin in one sense, and the spirit of sin in every sense, is rebellion against God's government, or treason. Treason in human government, inasmuch as it rejects the government with all its advantages, is punished by the withdrawal of all government favor and protection; that is, capital punishment. God's government must demand for rebellion capital punishment, which is eternal.

5. The same doctrine is necessarily inferred from the nature and results of death. Death of the body cannot change moral character. Character belongs to the spiritual nature, is beyond the reach of disease and death, and will survive forever. But death does remove from all sensual pleasures, and so removes us from them that they cannot return, and the punishment in their loss must remain endless.

6. This same conclusion is evident from the nature of Christ's mission. He came to give eternal life. (See John 3: 16; 5: 12; Acts 4: 12; Rom. 6: 23; Heb. 5: 9.) Indeed, everywhere Christ is presented as the author of eternal life. He came to save only from what is lost by sin. (Isa. 53: 6; Matt. 18: 11; Luke 19: 10; Rom. 6: 23; Gal. 3: 13.) There cannot be any question of these two propositions, that Christ gives eternal life, and that he came to save only what is lost by sin. Therefore, sin itself loses eternal life, or is punished with eternal punishment. That is the nature of the law, the principle of justice, and any plan of mercy that is introduced cannot change the fundamental law of justice. The just desert of sin is recognized in the system of atonement.

7. Christ's offer of mercy is conditional. If so, without that mercy and its conditions, the penalty continues. (1) If unconditional, it destroys penalty, and thus all law and government. To unconditionally provide for the suspension and removal of the penalty is to leave the law without sanction, and government without vindication. (2) If unconditional, it implies a change in the lawgiver since he gave the law and declared the penalty. If God has not changed, that penalty will be deserved as first announced. (3) Other blessings are conditional; and we infer that upon this same principle of government this blessing must also be conditional to the creature. We do not enjoy the sunlight, or the draught of water, food, or clothing, without opening the eyes, partaking of the food, or complying with the conditions. It could not have been expected that salvation from sin would have been unconditional. (4) But the Bible decides this question beyond all doubt. (John 1: 12; 3: 16, 36; Mark 16: 16; Acts 2: 21-38; Heb. 2: 3.) Unless the Almighty has changed his mind since giving these conditions, he never will save men unconditionally.

8. The conditions can be complied with only in the present life. There is no promise of any other time or

opportunity, and in history no example to justify any such expectation. The means of grace are all adapted to this life. "It has pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe." But there is not the least indication of any preaching in the future life, or other means or instrumentalities for leading men to the acceptance of the Gospel. But even if this were possible, what hope could be entertained for such a change with increased fixedness of mental habits, which must certainly, according to the laws of mind, be experienced. But all hope or possibility of compliance with the conditions of salvation so as to receive its benefits in the future life, is entirely cut off by the change in the official work of Christ. His redeeming work is evidently on earth, where the "redemption of the soul is precious, but it ceaseth forever." He declares that his work is to be completed, and his mission closed as a redeemer when he surrenders the kingdom (John 4: 34; 9: 4; 1 Cor. 15: 24; Heb. 9: 28), and becomes the Judge, according to Acts 17: 31; Heb. 6: 2; 9: 24; Matt. 25: 31-46; Rev. 22: 21. It is sometimes said that God's goodness and everlasting love will somehow work out this change. But God's love never changes, and if not now adequate to produce this change upon the impenitent consistently with the laws of government, it never can be. But the assumption of a possibility of accepting Christ and salvation after death implies the possibility of rejection; and if, therefore, there is a chance for accepting the conditions of salvation in a future life there is the same chance for rejecting them. We conclude, therefore, that as the atonement of Christ is conditional, and the condition can only be complied with in this life, the penalty of sin must be eternal.

9. The nature and conditions of heaven must shut out the impenitent-forever. Heaven is a place and a state of holiness, and while they that are holy are to be holy still, they that are filthy or unholy are to be still unholy. (Rev. 22: 11.) Heaven is a place for the assembled good of the

universe, and especially a place of worship. It is the delight of holy beings, but in it the wicked can have no pleasure, and it would even increase the punishment of those who do not love God. As men do not love to be in the society of those extremely different in character, and naturally turn away from the pure and holy, so the wicked would "call upon the rocks and the mountains to cover them from the face of him that sitteth upon the throne." To such as do not love God, heaven would be the worst place of punishment imaginable. (Matt. 5: 8; 10: 39; Mark 8: 35; Luke 9: 24; 16: 24; John 12: 25; 1 Tim. 6: 12; 2 Tim. 4: 7, 8; Rev. 2: 10; 3: 15.)

10. The positive Biblical declarations upon this question determine the eternity of the future state of the wicked as well as of the righteous. That no words are confined to single meanings upon all occasions and in all relations is true, and that every word has its fullness of meaning by its connection. That eternity, everlasting, etc., are sometimes applied to subjects that have an end is admitted, and yet they always cover the duration of the objects referred to. Balfour, the great Universalist writer, admits that these terms include the "longest period of duration therein mentioned." The everlasting priesthood of Aaron extended during the existence of the theocracy and national life for which it was instituted. The everlasting hills will continue as long as the earth on which they rest continues. And everlasting life and eternal death will continue just as long as the government of God continues. "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal" (Matt. 25: 46). The same Greek word is used with reference to both. "For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life." (Rom. 6: 23). These phrases are antithetic. Death and life are equal to each other, and their continuousness will be equal in extent. "They that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation"

(John 5; 29), are so placed as to imply equal duration. The general references in the Bible to the future state of existence as such, whether for the good or otherwise, indicate continued spiritual existence regardless of character. (See Matt. 22: 32; Rom. 2: 7, 10; Phil. 1: 23; Luke 23: 43, 46.) And the following quotations will indicate the real state of the wicked: Psa. 73: 17, 18; Prov. 29: 1; Matt. 5: 20; 7: 14; 8: 11; 12: 32; 13: 47; 18: 8; 24: 42, 43; 25: 11, 12, 13, 41, 46; Luke 13: 24, 25; 16: 27; 19: 27; Rom. 2: 6-8; Phil. 3: 18, 19; 2 Thess. 1: 9; Gal. 3: 21; Heb. 4: 1; John 3: 3; Rev. 2: 5; 22: 11, 19.